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Figure 1: Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome) 
 
“The Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome) was the only structure left 
standing in the area where the first atomic bomb exploded on 6 August 1945. 
Through the efforts of many people, including those of the city of Hiroshima, it 
has been preserved in the same state as immediately after the bombing. Not only 
is it a stark and powerful symbol of the most destructive force ever created by 
humankind; it also expresses the hope for world peace and the ultimate elimination 
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“As you know, since the invention of gunpowder no fortification is 
impregnable; […] I live in fear that men of science will eventually 
discover some secret which would offer a faster way to kill people, 
destroy races, and wipe out entire nations.”  
– “You are afraid, you say, that someone may invent a means of 
destruction crueller than what is currently in use. No; if such a fatal 
invention were discovered it would soon be prohibited by interna-
tional public law, and the nations would unanimously agree to bury 
this discovery […]” [Montesquieu, Persian Letters, 1721] 1 
In 1721, more than two centuries before the actual invention of the atomic bomb, Montes-
quieu wrote one of his principal works, the Persian Letters, and let the two fictional charac-
ters Rhedi and Usbek have the above mentioned conversation. Montesquieu was right in 
assuming that men of science would eventually discover some secret which would offer a 
faster way to kill people, destroy races, and wipe out entire nations. However, he was wrong 
in believing that if such a fatal invention were discovered it would soon be prohibited by 
international public law, and that nations would unanimously agree to bury this discovery. 
Nuclear weapons are considered the most destructive weapons in history. They not only 
release immense quantities of heat and energy but also powerful and prolonged radiation. 
Their destructive capacity has the potential to cause untold human suffering, endanger future 
generations by illness and genetic defects, and permanently damage the environment. In 
other words: “The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space 
or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the 
planet”.2 For these reasons, nuclear weapons constitute one of the most serious threats to 
human rights (in particular to the right to life, the right to physical and psychological integ-
rity and the right to security) and to international humanitarian law (in particular to the pro-
tection of civilians and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering in armed conflicts).  
On 16 July 1945, the USA carried out the first nuclear test in the world. Less than one 
month later, they dropped two atomic bombs on Japan: on Hiroshima on 6 August and on 
Nagasaki on 9 August 1945. By doing so, the USA forced the Japanese to surrender and 
brought the Second World War to an end. However, the consequences of the bombings were 
horrendous: approximately 200,000 people lost their life and nearly 100,000 people were 
severely insured; the large majority civilians. 
                                                     
1 Cited from: MONTESQUIEU, Charles de, Persian Letters, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 140, 142. 
2 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Legality of the Threat or Use of Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 35 and 36, available at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf> 




The Second World War not only gave birth to the Nuclear Age but also to the United 
Nations. On 26 June 1945, just a few weeks before the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, 60 states, including the USA, signed the Charter of the United Nations. Its aim was 
to save future generations from war by strengthening international peace and security and 
promoting fundamental human rights, in particular the dignity and worth of the human being. 
On 24 October 1945, just a few weeks after the atomic bombings, the Charter came into force. 
From the beginning, one of the main objectives of the United Nations was the avoidance 
of armed force and, for that purpose, the regulation of armaments. The very first resolu-
tion of the General Assembly, resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946, specifically demanded the 
complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In spite 
of that, the USA have never given up their atomic bombs and, on top of that, eight more states, 
including all permanent members of the Security Council, have joined the ‘nuclear club’.  
On one hand, there have been gradual achievements concerning the global governance 
of nuclear weapons: the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), for example, have considerably contributed 
to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, there are still enough nuclear 
weapons in existence to blow up the entire surface of the earth. Montesquieu’s idealist vision, 
that weapons of mass destruction would be prohibited by international law and that nations 
would unanimously agree to eliminate them, has been more and more replaced by the realist 
vision, that global governance is incapable and nations unwilling to make concrete steps to-
wards a nuclear weapons free world.  
The second half of the 20th century was – in terms of international peace and secu-
rity – marked by two contrary developments: on the one side, human rights and international 
law were increasingly recognized and strengthened by international cooperation, in particular 
by the rise of the United Nations system; on the other side, human rights and international 
law were increasingly threatened by the virtually unlimited production and modernization of 
armaments – inter alia nuclear weapons – and their military threat or use. 
According to the increasing recognition and strengthening of human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law, the elimination of nuclear weapons would be a coherent conclusion. 
However, according to the virtually unlimited production and modernization of armaments, 
the elimination of nuclear weapons would be an incoherent conclusion or, in other words, a 
utopian illusion. Hopes that nuclear weapons will be abolished in the 21st century remain 
modest. Nuclear powers still invest billions of dollars to maintain and upgrade their nuclear 
weapons arsenals and, in the face of contemporary international conflicts in East Europe and 
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the Middle East, deterrence strategies seem to revive. Why has it not yet been possible to 
bring the nuclear weapons regime to an end and why are prospects about a nuclear weapon 
free future so bleak?  
In the following thesis, I will analyze both the achievements and failures of the global 
governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Before beginning with the analy-
sis, I will define the key terms and concepts of the thesis, namely: nuclear weapons, global 
governance and the concepts of idealism and realism. In the first chapter, I will outline his-
torical backgrounds, which are essential for understanding the proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons and the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In the second 
chapter, I will examine the efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of four 
global key actors within the United Nations family: the General Assembly, the Security Coun-
cil, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the International Court of Justice. In the 
third chapter, I will apply theoretical approaches which serve to explain both, the armament 
and proliferation of nuclear weapons and the achievements and failures of the global govern-
ance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These include Game Theoretic Models, 
the Sagan-Waltz Controversy, and the Global Governance Problématique according to Weiss 
and Thakur. After the analysis, I will summarize the main results of the thesis and give the 
conclusions that derive from these. 
Why have I chosen this topic? First, believe that the debate on nuclear weapons has be-
come fairly silent in recent years. Some argue that the ‘true’ weapons of mass destruction 
have become light arms. Indeed, light arms are killing hundreds of thousands of people each 
year; nuclear weapons are – as not being used – not killing anyone. However, the explosion 
of a single nuclear weapon could kill hundreds of thousands of people in only one day. History 
has shown that wars may be unpredictable and sudden. Who can guarantee that nuclear weap-
ons will never be used again? Second, I also believe that the non-elimination of nuclear weap-
ons is symptomatic for the international system per se. Global justice, reason and moral are 
once again undermined by the so-called Realpolitik. The non-elimination of nuclear weapons 
serves as one of many examples to illustrate this bias. 
This thesis is written as part of the interdisciplinary master programme Human Rights, 
Democracy and International Justice at the Law Faculty of the University of Valencia. As a 
graduate from social science with a focus on international relations, I will combine both, the 
disciplines of international law and international politics, two concepts that are considered to 
be strongly interacting, in order to analyze the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation 
and disarmament.  
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KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS  
Before beginning with the analysis, I will define the key terms and concepts of the thesis, 
which also form part of the title: nuclear weapons, global governance and the concepts of 
idealism and realism.  
1. Nuclear Weapons 
Nuclear weapons are explosive devices that are based on nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, or 
a combination of the two processes. Fission weapons are commonly referred to as atomic 
bombs. Fusion weapons are also referred to as thermonuclear bombs or, more commonly, 
hydrogen bombs. Nuclear weapons produce enormous explosive energy. The blast of this 
energy, which is usually described in equivalent weight of the conventional chemical 
explosive TNT3, produces a strong shock wave, enormous amounts of heat, and lethal 
ionizing radiation.4 
Nuclear fission describes the splitting of a heavy atomic nucleus, such as that of ura-
nium or plutonium, into two or more lighter ones (see Figure 2 on p. 139). Nuclear fission 
results from either radioactive decay or nuclear reaction. Radioactive decay describes the 
naturally occurring nuclear splitting that takes place without external intervention. This type 
of fission, which is also referred to as spontaneous fission, is very rare. Radioactive reac-
tions, however, are artificially triggered either by bombardment of heavy atomic nuclei with 
particles, such as neutrons or protons, or by electromagnetic radiation in the form of gamma 
rays. In the fission process, a large quantity of energy is released, radioactive products are 
formed, and several neutrons are emitted. These neutrons can induce fission in a nearby 
heavy nucleus and release more neutrons that can repeat the process, causing a chain reaction 
in which enormous amounts of energy are released.5 
If controlled in a nuclear reactor, such a chain reaction can provide electricity for soci-
ety’s benefit. If uncontrolled, as in the case of nuclear weapons, it can lead to an explosion 
of inconceivable destructive force. The complete fission of 1 kg of uranium or plutonium, 
for example, would produce a blast which is equivalent to about 17.5 kilotons (17,500 tons) 
of TNT. In comparison: a conventional hand grenade contains about 100 g (0.0001 tons) of 
TNT. The complete fission of 1 kg of uranium or plutonium would hence create a blast 
                                                     
3 Trinitrotoluene (TNT) is a pale yellow, solid organic nitrogen compound used chiefly as an explosive. It is the most 
common chemical explosive, extensively used in munitions and for demolitions. 
4 NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, “nuclear weapon”, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2014, available at: 
 <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421827/nuclear-weapon>. 
5 STEINBERG, Ellis P., “nuclear fission (physics)”, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2013, available at: 
 <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421629/nuclear-fission>. 
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equivalent to 175 million (!) hand grenades. Besides the blast, nuclear weapons produce 
extremely high temperatures (up to 4,000 degrees Celsius) and radiation that causes addi-
tional short- and long-term damage (also referred to as “fallout”).6 
Nuclear fusion, which can be considered as the opposite of nuclear fission, describes 
the joining together of two or more light atomic nuclei, such as that of hydrogen or its iso-
topes7 deuterium and tritium, into a heavier one (see Figure 2 on p. 139). In the fusion pro-
cess, a large quantity of energy is released, even larger than in the fission process. Further-
more, radioactive products such as ionizing radiation are formed and neutrons are emitted, 
but not in such a significant amount as in the fission process. In nature, fusion occurs in the 
sun and other stars and makes them radiate high amounts of energy in form of heat and light. 
In contrast to nuclear fission, nuclear fusion does not trigger chain reaction by itself. Besides, 
large amounts of energy are needed to produce a fusion reaction.8  
Until today, controlled fusion has only been used in science, yet the necessary 
conditions have been largely achieved, suggesting that fusion energy for electric-power 
production could be possible in the future. Uncontrolled fusion has been used to create 
thermonuclear weapons, which are usually constructed in a two-stage design, featuring 
primary, a fission reaction as a trigger, and secondary, the actual fusion reaction. 
Thermonuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons that currently exist. The complete 
fusion of 1 kilogram of deuterium, for example, would produce a blast equivalent to about 
87 kilotons of TNT or 870 million hand grenades.9  
The spread of nuclear weapons is also referred to as nuclear proliferation. The Indian 
physicist Homi Jehangir Bhabha proposed the distinction between horizontal and vertical 
proliferation, whereby horizontal proliferation refers to the increase in the number of 
countries possessing nuclear weapons, and vertical proliferation to the increase or 
improvement of nuclear weapons arsenals of countries that already are in possession of 
nuclear weapons.10 Correspondingly, the term nuclear non-proliferation means the 
prevention of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear disarmament, however, refers to the reduction 
or complete elimination of already existing nuclear weapons. 
                                                     
6 Ibid. 
7 Isotopes are variations of the same element that contain equal numbers of protons and electrons but different numbers of 
neutrons in their nuclei, and hence differ in relative atomic mass but not in chemical properties. Hydrogen, deuterium and 
tritium contain each one proton and one electron. However, hydrogen contains no neutron, deuterium one neutron, and 
tritium two neutrons.  
8 CONN, Robert W., “nuclear fusion (physics)”, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2013, available at:  
<http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421667/nuclear-fusion>. 
9 Ibid. 




2. Global Governance 
The expression global governance goes back to the 1992 publication of James Rosenau and 
Ernst-Otto Czempiel’s “Governance without Government”. Within a short time, it became a 
key term for international relations scholars, who have since then used it in order to examine 
the theory and practice of international institutions such as the United Nations.11 Commonly, 
the term governance is used for any “patterns of rules or practices of governing”, whereby 
“governing” means to “conduct the policy, actions, and affairs of a state, organization, or 
people with authority.”12 However, in recent years, the term has precisely been used to 
denote the regulation of interdependent relations in the absence of overarching political 
authority, such as in enterprises (cooperate governance) or in the international system 
(international or global governance).  
The environmental researcher Adil Najam has defined global governance as “the 
management of global processes in the absence of global government”.13 The UN 
researcher Thomas G. Weiss has given a more detailed definition, which describes global 
governance as:  
“the sum of laws, norms, policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate trans-
border relations between states, cultures, citizens, intergovernmental and nongovernmental or-
ganizations, and the market. It embraces the totality of institutions, policies, rules, practices, 
norms, procedures, and initiatives by which states and their citizens (indeed, humanity as a 
whole) try to bring more predictability, stability, and order to their responses to transnational 
challenges—such as climate change and environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation, and 
terrorism—which go beyond the capacity of a single state to solve.”14 
It is also useful to clarify the difference between international governance and global gov-
ernance, two terms that are likely to be used synonymously. The term international govern-
ance emphasizes the determinant role of nation-states, while the term global governance has 
a more universal meaning, relating not only to nation-states, but to the entire earth population 
as a world society. In other words: while the concept of international governance follows the 
logic of “crossing-borders”, the concept of global governance not only follows the logic of 
“crossing-borders”, but also assumes a world without borders. International governance 
could therefore be seen as a subcategory of global governance.  
                                                     
11 WEISS, Thomas G., “The UN’s Role in Global Governance”, UN Intellectual History Project, Briefing Note Number 15, 
2009, p. 1. 
12 The definitions of “governance” and “governing” are taken from the Oxford English Dictionary Online (OED), available 
at: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com>. 
13 RIAZATI, Saba, “A Closer Look: Professor seeks stronger U.N.”, Daily Bruin, 17 October 2006, available at: 
<http://dailybruin.com/2006/10/17/a-closer-look-professor-seeks>. 
14 WEISS, Thomas G., op. cit., note 11, p. 1f. 
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3. Idealism and Realism 
Idealism and realism are two theoretical concepts traditionally used in philosophy. The stud-
ies of international relations adopted these concepts in order to examine the causes of war 
and peace. Both, idealism and realism, can be derived from two key works of modern polit-
ical and legal philosophy: Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan from 1651 and Immanuel Kant’s Per-
petual Peace from 1795. 
In Leviathan, Hobbes describes the original state of men, the so-called state of nature, as 
a state where there is no common power and all men are equal and free.15, 16 They are subject 
to nothing but the right and law of nature. The right of nature, which is also referred to as jus 
naturale, is the liberty of each man to use his own power for the preservation of his own life. 
Consequently, he is free to do anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he conceives 
as a means for preserving his life, even to oppress or murder one another. The law of nature, 
which is also referred to as lex naturalis, is the obligation of each man to refrain from anything 
that is destructive to his life, even to diminish or omit the means of preserving it.17 
Consequently, the state of nature is a “condition of war of every one against every one”, 
which not only consists in the actual act of war, but in the omnipresent disposition for starting 
a war.18 Therefore, the state of nature is an undesirable state, where there can be no security 
to anyone, no matter how strong or wise, of living as long as envisioned by nature. It hence 
would be reasonable “that every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of 
obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages 
of war.”19 Out of this first general rule of reason, Hobbes deduces the second general rule 
of reason: in order to achieve peace and defence, men should give up their right to everything 
to such an amount as they would demand from other men: “Whatever you require that others 
should do to you, that do ye to them” or the complementary version in Latin: “Quod tibi fieri 
non vis, alteri ne feceris.”20  
                                                     
15 HOBBES, Thomas, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, 
Hamilton, Ontario: McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought, 1999, p. 76. 
16 Hobbes presumes that men are naturally equal and free. They are equal, because possible differences in body 
and mind are not considerable enough that one could significantly benefit from it: “[…] [even] the weakest has 
strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others […]” (ibid., 
p. 76). And they are free, because of the absence of external impediments, which could hinder humans from 
using their power according to their own judgment and reason (ibid.). Note: The term “men” is used synony-
mously for human beings, and includes both, men and women. 
17 Ibid., p. 73. 
18 Ibid., p. 77. 
19 Ibid., p. 80. 




The right to everything can be either given up by simply renouncing it, or by transferring 
it to another. According to the state of nature, this is a voluntary act, since any forcible re-
nunciation or transference would be against the right of nature. However, once the right to 
everything has been renounced or transferred, it cannot be revoked, since revocation would 
be injustice and injury (sine jure) leading back to the undesirable state of nature.21 
The mutual transferring of rights between men is called a contract. The question that 
follows is: How can compliance of a contract be assured and injustice and injury be pre-
vented in a post-state of nature? On the one hand, a contract may be assured by mutual trust. 
However, according to the state of nature, mutual trust is void. Therefore, a contract must be 
assured by a superior “common power […] with right and force sufficient to compel perfor-
mance.”22 The genesis of such common power is described as follows: 
 “The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend [men] from […] the 
injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them […] is to confer all their power and strength 
upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of 
voices, unto one will […] in those things which concern the common peace and safety […]. 
This is […] made by covenant of every man with every man […].”23, 24 
In Perceptual Peace, Kant adopts Hobbes’ theory and applies it to the international system:  
“Nations, as states, may be judged like individuals who, living in the natural state of society – 
that is to say, uncontrolled by external law – injure one another through their very proximity. 
Every state, for the sake of its own security, may – and ought to – demand that its neighbour 
should submit itself to conditions, similar to those of the civil society where the right of every 
individual is guaranteed. This would give rise to a federation of nations […].”25 
Kant suggests that a covenant of peace (foedus pacificum) must be created in order to escape 
the state of nature in the international system and replace it by a state of permanent peace. 
According to reason, states would have to submit themselves to a world republic with a 
supreme law-giving power, which could enforce such covenant of peace. However, states 
are unwilling to give up their sovereignty and therefore, there cannot be a world republic 
                                                     
21 Ibid., p. 81. 
22 Ibid., p. 106. 
23 Ibid. 
24 He furthermore adds: “This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in 
Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that 
mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence” (ibid.). 
25 KANT, Immanuel, Perceptual Peace, 3rd ed., London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917, p. 128. 
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with a supreme law-giving power, but only a free federation between states.26 Kant summa-
rizes the dilemma between the idealist and realist perception of international cooperation as 
follows: 
“For states, in their relation to one another, there can be, according to reason, no other way 
of advancing from that lawless condition which unceasing war implies, than by giving up 
their savage lawless freedom, just as individual men have done, and yielding to the coercion 
of public laws. Thus they can form a State of nations (civitas gentium) […], which will be 
ever increasing and would finally embrace all the peoples of the earth. States, however, in 
accordance with their understanding of the law of nations, by no means desire this, and there-
fore reject in hypothesi what is correct in thesi. Hence, instead of the positive idea of a world-
republic, if all is not to be lost, only the negative substitute for it, a federation averting war, 
maintaining its ground and ever extending over the world may stop the current of this ten-
dency to war and shrinking from the control of law. But even then there will be a constant 
danger that this propensity may break out.”27  
The concepts of both idealism and realism are based on the Kantian assumption that the 
international system is an anarchic system that originates from the state of nature. In 
contrast to nation-states, it neither has a monopoly of force, nor authorities which establish 
comprehensive order. Although there are international institutions such as the United 
Nations, the decisive actors continue to be nation-states. How can international peace and 
security be achieved and permanently maintained under these conditions? In answering 
these questions, idealism and realism suggest different approaches.28 
Idealism is characterized by the belief in human progress. It assumes that human be-
ings are inherently good or at least endowed with reason. Endowed with reason means 
that they are accessible to rational arguments and thus capable to learn. On the long run, 
the capability to learn has to lead to a better world where conflicts can be solved in a 
cooperative and peaceful manner. Ideals like world peace, the protection of universal hu-
man rights, prosperity of all nations, global democracy, and environmental protection can 
eventually be achieved.29  
                                                     
26 Ibid., p. 134 f. 
27 Ibid., p. 136. 
28 MENZEL, Ulrich, Zwischen Idealismus und Realismus, Die Lehre von den Internationalen Beziehungen, 





Contemporary idealists such as the legal and political philosopher Hans Kelsen stick to 
the Kantian assumption that permanent international peace and security can only be obtained 
by means of a world state: 
“The modern State is the most perfect type of a social order establishing a community monopoly 
of force. Its perfection is due to the centralization of the employment of force […] Within the 
State, pacification of inter-individual relations – that is, national peace – is attained in the high-
est possible degree. […] When the question arises how to secure international peace, how to 
eliminate the most terrible employment of force – namely, war – from inter-State relations, no 
answer seems to be more self-evident than this: to unite all individual States or, at least, as many 
as possible, into a World State, to concentrate all their means of power, their armed forces, and 
put them at the disposal of a world government under laws created by a world parliament.”30  
In contrast to idealism, realism is characterized by the assumption that human beings are not 
only inherently good, but also inherently bad. They do not always act by reason, but also by 
desire. The ability to learn and therefore, the ability to solve conflicts in a cooperative and 
peaceful manner is severely limited. That is why states pursue their own goals instead of 
cooperating. They establish their security by increasing their power, especially their military 
power. Peace, which is understood as a state of non-war, is guaranteed by deterrence. The 
security dilemma that derives from knowledge gaps about the other states interests and 
power resources is not solvable, unless one state would accumulate so much power, that it 
would have absolute hegemony above all other states.31  
The realist antipode of Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, criticized the idealist vision of world peace 
as a “fiction” or “normative ideal”. 32 According to Schmitt, the decisive entities of the in-
ternational system are sovereign states, whose very propose is to decide on enemies and, if 
necessary, fight against them.33 There cannot be a world state, since there are no possible 
enemies the humanity as a whole could fight against. The only possible way to escape the 
present state would be the dissolution of the concept of the state per se. However the “inher-
ent reality” is the existence of sovereign states, which fight against each other.34 
In the following theses, I will analyze how the existence of nuclear weapons and its 
implications support either the idealist or the realist perspective on the international system. 
I will come back to this question in the conclusion. 
 
                                                     
30 KELSEN, Hans, Peace through Law, 5th ed., Clark, New Jersey: The Law Book Exchange, 2007, p. 4f. 
31 MENZEL, Ulrich, op. cit., note 28, p. 21. 
32 SCHMITT, Carl, Der Begriff des Politischen, 3rd ed., Berlin: Duncker & Homblot, 1991, p. 22ff. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 54. 
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CHAPTER I - HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS 
Without studying the past, it is hard to understand the present or make predictions about the 
future. Therefore, in the following chapter, I will summarize the key events in the history of 
nuclear weapons. In the first part, I will outline the history of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, beginning with the development of the first atomic bombs. In the second part, 
I will sum up the history of the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarma-
ment, beginning with the foundation of the United Nations. Both parts end with an overview 
of the present situation.35 
1. The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
1.1 The Development of the Atomic Bomb 
The history of nuclear weapons goes back to the end of the 19th century, when French sci-
entists like Antoine Henri Becquerel and Marie and Pierre Curie discovered the principle of 
radioactivity. The presumption that certain elements could contain large amounts of energy 
prompted numerous researchers, like Ernest Rutherford and Frederick Soddy, to speculate 
about the possible uses. Not only scientists, but also writers were inspired by the new dis-
covery. The British author Herbert G. Wells ‘invented’ the atomic bomb already two decades 
before scientists did. His 1914 science fiction novel The World Set Free deals with the dis-
covery of nuclear energy and its applications: on one hand, the nuclear energy production 
for civil use and, on the other hand, the development of atomic bombs for military use. A 
part of the story takes place in 1956, when a second world war breaks out between the Cen-
tral European powers and their allies. The excessive use of atomic bombs “that would con-
tinue to explode indefinitely” and that “were strange even to the men who used them” causes 
numerous European cities to be completely destroyed.36, 37  
                                                     
35 Recommendable introductions to the history of nuclear proliferation and the global governance of nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament are written by: MORALES Pedraza, Jorge, “La Proliferación de Armas 
nucleares: Mito o Realidad?”, IAEA Bulletin, 46:2, 2005, p. 1-21, available at: 
 <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull462/Spanish/nuclear_proliferation_sp.pdf; 
NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, “nuclear weapon”, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2014, 
available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421827/nuclear-weapon>; and SANDERS, Ben, “A 
Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Law Bulletin, 62, 1998, p. 7-24. 
36 WELLS, Herbert George, The World Set Free, Las Vegas: Lits, 2010, p. 43. 
37 From the present point of view, it is quite surprising how realistic Wells predictions about the destructive 
warfare use of nuclear weapons were. Yet, it is also known that Wells had deeply studied the already existing 
works about radioactivity, in particular those of Frederick Soddy, before writing the novel (STRUB, Erik, 
“Soddy, Wells und die Atombombe. Eine literarische Fiktion aus physikalischer Sicht”, Physik Journal, 7, 




In the 1930s, the Austro-Hungarian born physicist Leó Szilárd elaborated the idea of 
creating nuclear chain reactions in order to release energy and thus laid the foundation for 
building the atomic bomb. It is said that he had previously read The World Set Free and 
was inspired by it. His studies were later on advanced by German scientists Otto Hahn, 
Fritz Strassmann, Lise Meitner and Otto Robert Frisch. They experimentally generated 
nuclear splitting by bombarding a uranium solution with neutrons and gave that process 
the name ‘fission’.  
With the rise of Hitler and the imminent outbreak of the Second World War, the 
development of nuclear weapons became increasingly important. In August 1939, Albert 
Einstein wrote a letter to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and expressed his concerns 
about the possibility that Nazi Germany could be carrying out a nuclear weapons 
programme. He pointed out the technological advances that could enable the construction 
of nuclear weapons in the near future and advised the president to drive forward research 
programmes and develop the atomic bomb before the Germans would do so.38 However, 
it was not until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the subsequent 
US declaration of war upon Japan and Germany, when Roosevelt undertook serious 
efforts to develop atomic bombs.  
At the beginning of 1942, the USA began operating its nuclear weapons programme, 
the so called Manhattan Project, which was located in Los Alamos, New Mexico. The 
project was supported by the British and the Canadians, but held secret from other states 
including the allied USSR. The scientific team was led by Robert Oppenheimer, who today 
is considered the ‘father of the atomic bomb’. Oppenheimer was supported by the Austro-
Hungarian born physicist Edward Teller, who had just like Szilárd and Einstein fled from 
Nazi Germany. The Manhattan Project grew to employ more than 130,000 people and cost 
nearly $ 2 billion, which is equivalent to $ 26 billion in 2014.39  
After three and a half years, the Manhattan Project achieved to create the first atomic 
bombs that were fully operational, some containing uranium and others containing 
plutonium. On 16 July 1945, the USA carried out the first nuclear weapons test in the world. 
It was called ‘Trinity’ and tested a plutonium device, codenamed ‘Gadget’, which created a 
                                                     
38 Letter from Albert Einstein to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 2 August 1939, available at:  
<http://research.archives.gov/description/593374>. 
39 The calculation is based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
which is available at: <https://www.minneapolisfed.org>. 
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blast equivalent to 20 kilotons of TNT, far more than any conventional bomb ever used 
before. Thus, the USA became the first nuclear power in the world.40 
1.2 The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki  
When the USA carried out the Trinity Test, Germany had already surrendered and the war 
in Europe was over. The Pacific War, however, was still going on. The news of the success-
ful nuclear weapons test reached the newly designated US President Harry S. Truman at the 
Potsdam Conference41, where he immediately informed the British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill and the Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin about it. A few days later, on 26 July 1945, 
Truman, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, the chairman of the Chinese government, released 
the so-called ‘Potsdam Declaration’42, which outlined the terms of surrender for the Japa-
nese.43 It also stated that if Japan did not surrender immediately it would face “prompt and 
utter destruction”.44  
Nevertheless, the Japanese did not respond to the Potsdam Declaration and Truman 
decided to use the recently developed nuclear weapons to enforce a quick surrender. It is 
also assumed that it may have been a way to test the new weapons in real world conditions, 
to justify the $ 2 bill. costs of the Manhattan Project, to demonstrate military superiority 
towards the USSR and to take revenge for Pearl Harbor.45 After intense consideration, Hi-
roshima was declared to be the primary, Kokura the secondary and Nagasaki the tertiary 
target. All three cities were industrially and militarily significant port cities in southern Japan 
with an estimated population of 340,000–350,000 (Hiroshima), 180,000 (Kokura) and 
240,000–260,000 (Nagasaki). However, the main criteria of the target selection was not the 
industrial and military significance of the cities, but the feasibility of the bombings and the 
“moral effect” they would produce.46  
                                                     
40 Cf. GOSLING, F.G., The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb, rev. ed., Washington, D.C.: Depart-
ment of Energy, 2010; CTBTO [ed.], “Manhattan Project”, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 2014a, available 
at: <http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/manhattan-project>; and CTBTO [ed.], 
“16 July 1945 – ‘Trinity’: world's first nuclear test”, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 2014b, available at: 
<http://ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/16-july-1945-trinity-worlds-first-nuclear-test>. 
41 The Potsdam Conference was the final World War II conference between the USA, Great Britain and the 
USSR. It took place from 17 July until 2 August 1945 and discussed further strategies concerning post-war 
Europe and the Pacific War. 
42 Potsdam Declaration, 26 July 1945, available at: <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html>. 
43 The USSR did not sign the declaration because it had not yet declared war on Japan. 
44 Potsdam Declaration, op. cit., note 42, 13th clause. 
45 BERNSTEIN, Barton J., “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered”, Foreign Affairs, 74:1, 1995, p. 135ff.; and 
DONOHUE, Nathan, “Understanding the Decision to Drop the Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki”, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2012, available at: <http://csis.org/blog/understanding-decision-
drop-bomb-hiroshima-and-nagasaki>. 
46 Cf. MANHATTAN ENGINEER DISTRICT, the [ed.], The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Marston 




On Monday, 6 August 1945, a single B-29 bomber named ‘Enola Gay’ dropped the first 
atomic bomb used in warfare, a uranium device called ‘Little Boy’, on the city of Hiroshima. 
It detonated at an altitude of 580 meters above the ground and created a blast which was later 
estimated to be equivalent to 13 kilotons of TNT. Three days later, on 9 August 1945, a 
single another B-29 bomber named ‘Bockscar’ dropped a second and bigger bomb, a 
plutonium device called ‘Fat Man’ on Nagasaki, because the initial target, Kokura, was 
obscured by clouds that day and could not be attacked. ‘Fat Man’ detonated at an altitude of 
500 meters above the ground and created a blast which was later estimated to be equivalent 
to 21 kilotons of TNT. A few days later, on 15 August 1945, Japan announced its surrender 
and the Second World War was brought to an end.47  
However, the detonation of the atomic bombs caused inconceivable suffering. The 
blasts and resultant firestorms demolished about two thirds of Hiroshima and half of Naga-
saki.48 In both cities the area of total destruction reached a radius of about 1.5 km and the 
temperature of the hypocenter rose up to 3000 - 4000 degrees Celsius.49 Within a radius of 
0.5 km, approximately 90 percent of the habitants died immediately; some of them burning 
to ash and leaving nothing but shadows of their bodies. About 45,000 people in Hiroshima 
and 22,000 in Nagasaki died throughout the same day. Another 19,000 people in Hiroshima 
and 17,000 in Nagasaki died during the following four months. The total death toll including 
long-term consequences such as skin burns, radiation and other severe injuries is estimated 
to be of 136,000 in Hiroshima and 64,000 in Nagasaki. About 22,000 of the death victims 
were Korean nationals, who had been forced to come to Japan as laborers. Approximately 
75 percent of the Hiroshima and more than 99 percent (!) of the Nagasaki death victims were 
civilians. Furthermore, 72,000 people in Hiroshima and 25,000 in Nagasaki were severely 
injured, but survived. Until today, some of the so-called ‘Hibakusha’ (“explosion-affected 
                                                     
47 Cf. ibid., p. 21ff.; and CTBTO [ed.], “6 and 9 August 1945 Hiroshima/Nagasaki”, CTBTO Preparatory 
Commission, 2014c, available at: 
 <http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/6-and-9-august-1945hiroshima-nagasaki>. 
48 NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, “nuclear weapon”, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2014, 
available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421827/nuclear-weapon>. 
49 MANHATTAN ENGINEER DISTRICT, the [ed.], op. cit., note 46, p. 45; and HARWELL, Christine C., “Experi-
ences and Extrapolations from Hiroshima and Nagasaki”, in Harwell, Mark A. and Thomas 
C. Hutchinson [ed.], Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War. Volume II. Ecological and Agricultural 
Effects, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1985, p. 432. 
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people”) suffer from long-term consequences such as cancer. These figures do not include 
prenatal and second generation death and damage.50, 51, 52 
1.3 The Nuclear Arms Race between the USA and the USSR  
The USSR had been carrying out a nuclear weapons programme since 1939, but because of 
the German invasion in June 1941 and lack of funding, the scale of the programme remained 
relatively small. However, the Trinity Test and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
urged the USSR to catch up with the USA. Therefore, Stalin increased the capacities and set 
up a crash programme to develop nuclear weapons as quick as possible. The progress of the 
programme was highly based on espionage efforts, in particular by Klaus Fuchs, Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg and Theodor A. Hall, who supplied the USSR with information from the 
Manhattan Project during and shortly after the Second World War.53 On 29 August 1949, 
years ahead of American predictions, the USSR carried out their first nuclear weapons test. 
It was called ‘RDS-1’ and used a plutonium devise similar to ‘Fat Man’. Thus, the USSR 
became the second nuclear power in the world and brought the atomic hegemony of the USA 
to an end. From that moment on, the USA and the USSR started a nuclear arms race, which 
would last for decades.54 
Because of the successful nuclear weapons test of the USSR, Truman decided to drive 
forward the development of fusion-based thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bombs that would 
have even more explosive force than fission-based nuclear (or atomic) bombs. After about 
three years, the USA achieved to create the first hydrogen bombs and, on 1 November 1952, 
carried out the first thermonuclear weapons test in the world (‘Operation Ivy’). The device 
they used was codenamed ‘Mike’ and caused a blast equivalent to 10.4 megatons of TNT; 
800 times (!) as much as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Only one and a half years later, 
on 12 August 1953, the USSR caught up with the USA and also carried out a thermonuclear 
                                                     
50 OHKITA, Takeshi, “Acute Medical Effects at Hiroshima and Nagasaki”, in Chivian, Eric et al. [ed.], Last 
Aid: The Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War, New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1982a, p. 85f.; and OHKITA, 
Takeshi, “Delayed Medical Effects at Hiroshima and Nagasaki”, in ibid., p. 93f. 
51 The number of victims caused by the detonation of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki spreads 
depending on the data source.  
52 Figures about fetal and neonatal damage are disputed. The examination of children whose mothers had been 
exposed to radiation during pregnancy in between 2 kilometers of the hypocenters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
has revealed a fetal death toll of 27,7 percent, a neonatal death toll of 30,7 percent, and a neonatal retardation 
rate of 26,6 percent (OHKITA, Takeshi, 1982b, op. cit., note 50, p. 100f.). 
53 In 1950, Klaus Fuchs as well as the US American couple Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were arrested because of espionage. 
Fuchs was sentenced to 14 years of prison and released after nine years. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were both sentenced 
to death and executed in 1953. Espionage efforts of Theodor Hall were only discovered in the 1990s (cf. NORRIS, Robert S. 
and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit, note 48). 




test (‘RDS-6’). In contrast to ‘Mike’, the Soviet device was even deliverable. A few months 
later, on 1 March 1954, the USA again caught up and tested their first deliverable hydrogen 
bomb at the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands (‘Castle Bravo Test’). The tested device, 
which was codenamed ‘Shrimp’, created a blast of 15 megatons, more than twice as much 
as expected, and created such a great damage that the atoll became uninhabitable for 
decades.55 
1.4 Cuban Missile Crisis 
With the end of the Second World War, tensions between the USA and the USSR, which 
had been temporarily concealed by the Second World War, revived. Disagreements about 
the future of Germany and the future of the international order reinforced the ideological and 
political divisions between the two states and eventually led to the Cold War. In the 1950s, 
both, the USA and the USSR, followed a tit-for-tat strategy in order to prevent the other one 
from acquiring nuclear supremacy and therefore upgraded their nuclear weapons arsenals in 
terms of quantity and quality. Nuclear weapons tests were used to demonstrate the state of 
the art and to deter the other one. On 30 October 1961, for example, the USSR tested the 
largest nuclear device in history, the so-called ‘Tsar Bomba’, which generated a detonation 
equivalent to 50 Megatons of TNT; almost 4000 times (!) as much as the bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima. However, because of its size and weight it was useless for warfare.56 At the same 
time, the USA and the USSR also developed smaller devices and nuclear missiles that could 
be launched from remote areas far away from the target.  
Even though the vertical proliferation in the USA and the USSR increased rapidly, the 
actual warfare use of (thermo-)nuclear weapons became more and more impracticable. If 
one state had launched a nuclear first strike, the other one would have reacted with a nu-
clear second strike. In the end, it would not matter whether the USA first attacked the 
USSR or the other way around; the outcome would be inconceivable damage on both sides. 
                                                     
55 Cf. CTBTO [ed.], “The United States' Nuclear Testing Programme”, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 
2014d, available at: <http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/the-united-states-nu-
clear-testing-programme>; CTBTO [ed.], “The Soviet Union's Nuclear Testing Programme”, CTBTO Prepar-
atory Commission, 2014e, available at: <http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-test-
ing/the-soviet-unionsnuclear-testing-programme>; and CTBTO [ed.], “1 March 1954 - Castle Bravo”, CTBTO 
Preparatory Commission, 2014f, available at: 
 <http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/1-march-1954-castle-bravo>. 
56 Cf. CTBTO [ed.], “The Soviet Union's Nuclear Testing Programme”, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 
2014e, available at: <http://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/the-soviet-
unionsnuclear-testing-programme>. 
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This Model of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which was developed by game the-
orists, emphasized that starting a nuclear war was not only immoral but also irrational in a 
military sense.57  
Nevertheless, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the brinkmanship between the USA and 
the USSR threatened to escalate and almost led to a nuclear war. When in 1961 the USA 
stationed nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey, the USSR reacted by secretly placing nuclear 
missiles in Cuba. In October 1962, US reconnaissance aircrafts discovered these missiles. 
US President John F. Kennedy immediately informed the public about that and requested 
the USSR to withdrawal the missiles from Cuba. However, USSR General Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev refused to do so. In response, the USA set up a naval blockade in order to hinder 
further nuclear shipments from the USSR to Cuba.  
On 27 October, the so called ‘Black Saturday’, the situation reached its climax when a 
Soviet fleet which was accompanied by nuclear-equipped submarines was stopped by the 
naval blockade. US destroyers attacked the Soviet submarine B-59 and forced it to come to 
the surface. The Soviet crew had official permission to strike back with nuclear weapons in 
case of attack, but one of the three officers of the submarine, Wassili Alexandrowitsch Ar-
chipow, convinced the other two to wait for further order from Moscow. Meanwhile, urgent 
talks were held between US and Soviet diplomats in order to prevent nuclear warfare. Only 
a few hours later, Khrushchev surprisingly pulled off the Soviet fleet. Kennedy and Khrush-
chev had come to an agreement: The USSR would dismantle the nuclear missiles in Cuba 
and, in return, the USA would dismantle their missiles in Turkey. However, the latter would 
not be publically announced as part of the resolution.58 
1.5 Nuclear Armament of Great Britain, France, and China 
The first two decades of the Cold War were not only marked by vertical but also by horizon-
tal proliferation. While the USA and the USSR increased their nuclear weapons arsenals, 
three more countries – Great Britain, France, and China – became nuclear powers.  
In 1940, Great Britain started considering the possibility of creating nuclear weapons. 
During the Second World War, they fully cooperated in the US Manhattan Project and 
sharply reduced their research programmes at home. However, in 1946, the USA unilaterally 
                                                     
57 Cf. JERVIS, Robert, “Mutual Assured Destruction”, Foreign Policy, 133, 2002, p. 40ff.; and MARRERO Rocha, 
Inmaculada, “La proliferación de armas nucleares en la sociedad internacional actual: elementos de continuidad 
y cambio”, in Universidad del País Vasco [ed.], Cursos de Derecho Intenacional y Relaciones Internacionales 
de Vitoria-Gasteiz 2010, Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, Servicio de Publicaciones, 2011, p. 387f.  
58 Cf. NATHAN, James A. and Graham Allison, “The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited”, Foreign Affairs, 91:6, 




terminated the partnership. At that time, the British already had the knowledge, but not the 
technical equipment to produce nuclear weapons themselves. They needed six more years to 
develop their first atomic bomb, an improved version of ‘Fat Man’. On 3 October 1952, 
Great Britain carried out its first nuclear weapons test (‘Hurricane’) and thus became the 
third nuclear power. Five years later, on 8 November 1957, they eventually carried out their 
first thermonuclear weapons test (‘Grapple X’). Subsequently, the USA and Great Britain 
restored the nuclear weapons cooperation by the UK–US Mutual Defense Agreement59, 
which is still in force today.60  
Before the Second World War, France was highly involved in nuclear research. How-
ever, during and after the Second World War, nuclear research discontinued due to political 
and financial instability. It was until the mid-1950s, when France resumed its nuclear re-
search and started a secret nuclear weapons programme. Six years later, on 13 February 
1960, they carried out their first nuclear weapons test (‘Gerboise bleue’) and hence became 
the fourth state to join the nuclear club. Another eight years later, on 24 August 1968, they 
also carried out their first thermonuclear test (‘Canopust’).61 
After the Second World War, the USSR and China became close allies against the 
NATO states. In 1951, they signed an agreement whereby China supplied uranium to the 
USSR in exchange for technical assistance in producing nuclear weapons. However, when 
in the late 1950s the relationship between the two states worsened, the USSR reduced its 
assistance and, in 1959, rejected the donation of an atomic bomb for copying purposes. De-
spite of that, the Chinese made progress by themselves and, on 16 October 1964, carried out 
their first nuclear weapons test (‘59-6’). With China becoming the fifth nuclear power in the 
world, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council had come into the possession 
of nuclear weapons. Three years later, on 17 June 1967, the Chinese also carried out their 
first thermonuclear test (‘no. 6’).62 
                                                     
59 UK–US Mutual Defense Agreement, 3 July 1958, available at: 
<http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/56_4.pdf?_=1316627913>. 
60 Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and CTBTO [ed.], “The United Kingdom’s 
Nuclear Testing Programme”, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 2014g, available at: <http://ctbto.org/nuclear-
testing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/the-united-kingdomsnuclear-testing-programme>. 
61 Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and CTBTO [ed.], “France’s Nuclear 
Testing Programme”, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 2014h, available at: <http://ctbto.org/nuclear-test-
ing/the-effects-of-nuclear-testing/frances-nuclear-testing-programme>. 
62 Cf. NORRIS, Robert S. and Thomas B. Cochran, op. cit., note 48; and CTBTO [ed.], “China’s Nuclear Testing 
Programme”, CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 2014i, available at: <http://ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/the-
effects-of-nuclear-testing/chinas-nuclear-testing-programme>. 
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1.6 Nuclear Armament of Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea  
The nuclear armament of Great Britain, France and China, was followed by the nuclear ar-
mament of four mores states - Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea-, which developed 
nuclear weapons outside the context of the Cold War. 
Shortly after its foundation in 1948, Israel made strong efforts to quickly achieve atomic 
bombs. It is not known much about the Israeli nuclear weapons programme because of its 
secrecy. It is known, however, that Israel was highly supported by the French and British. It 
is furthermore estimated that Israel built its first nuclear devices at the end of the 1960s. In 
1986, whistle blower Mordechai Vanunu sold secret information about the Israeli nuclear 
weapons programme to a British newspaper, which revealed that Israel was in possession of 
nuclear weapons and maybe also thermonuclear weapons. Until today, Israel has not offi-
cially confirmed or denied that it is a nuclear power and there is no evidence that they have 
ever carried out a nuclear weapons test. However, based on the information that has come to 
light, it is widely agreed, that Israel was the sixth state to join the nuclear club.63 
India’s nuclear weapons programme started as early as 1944, but was not too ambitious 
at the beginning. The 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, in which China and India disputed 
about the Himalayan frontier, led India’s government to accelerate its efforts. When in 1964, 
China carried out its first nuclear weapons test, India became even more ambitious. Never-
theless, it took ten more years until they achieved to produce their first nuclear devices. On 
18 May 1974, India carried out its first nuclear weapons test (‘Smiling Buddha’) and thus 
became the seventh nuclear power. Even though they claim also having successfully tested 
a thermonuclear weapon on 11 May 1998 (‘Shakti ‘98’), experts keep arguing about the size 
of the yields and whether any of the tested device really was a hydrogen bomb.64 
Pakistan began to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the early 1970s. 
When India came into possession of nuclear weapons, the Pakistani government intensified 
its efforts. Due to espionage efforts of Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist, who 
had been working for a Dutch nuclear fuel company, Pakistan received important infor-
mation such as blue prints which drove forward the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme 
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significantly. It is not exactly known, when they achieved to produce their first nuclear de-
vices. However, on 28 May 1998, Pakistan carried out its first nuclear weapons test (‘Cha-
gai-I’) in response to India’s nuclear weapons test ‘Shakti ‘98’ and thus became officially 
the eighth nuclear power.65 
North Korea has been suspected of operating a nuclear weapons programme since the 
1980s. As in the case of Israel, there is little information about the programme because of its 
secrecy. In 2012, North Korea declared itself to be a nuclear power. According to their own 
statements, they carried out nuclear weapons tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. The latter was 
confirmed by foreign institutes and hence it is highly agreed that North Korea became the 
ninth and most recent nuclear power.66 
1.7 Other Countries 
In total, about 30 countries have sought nuclear weapons, of which ten are known to have 
succeeded.67 Before 1945, Germany and Japan had unsuccessfully tried to achieve nuclear 
weapons and were forced to stop their efforts with the end of the Second World War. In the 
following decades, several countries had started nuclear weapons programmes but voluntar-
ily decided to end them.68 The Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which as Soviet successor 
states inherited nuclear weapons from the USSR, transferred their weapons to Russia. 69 
South Africa started a secret nuclear weapons programme in the late 1970s. In 1985, 
the government decided to produce seven nuclear devices similar to ‘Little Boy’. When in 
1989 six of these were completed, the production was ceased due to international pressure. 
Over the next 18 months the devices were dismantled, the uranium was made unsuitable for 
weapon use, and all of the components and technical documents were destroyed. 70 
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Libya started a secret nuclear weapons programme in the 1980s. As in the case of Pa-
kistan, it was supported by nuclear scientist Qadeer Khan, who supplied the Libyan govern-
ment with information and technical equipment. The programme busted in 2003, when the 
US Navy intercepted and diverted a freighter to Tripoli which was carrying thousands of 
centrifuge components. In December 2003, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi publicly 
announced that the programme would be terminated and let inspectors supervise its complete 
dismantle. 71 
Iraq began a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the 1970s, using the claim of 
civilian use as a cover. In 1981, Israeli aircrafts bombed the nuclear reactor ‘Osirak’ and 
severely set back the Iraqi efforts. Iraq was not able to restore the damage and, subsequent 
to the First Gulf War in 1990/91, they discontinued their nuclear weapons programme due 
to international pressure.72 
Iran has been suspected of having employed a secret nuclear weapons programme since 
the late 1970s. However, the Islamic Revolution (1979) and the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) 
interfered with the programme. In the late 1980s, efforts were resumed with the support of 
Qadeer Khan. In 2002, an Iranian opposition group in Paris denounced the existence of secret 
uranium enrichment facilities in Iran and called for international action. Until today, officials 
and experts have been disputing about the actual extent of the Iranian nuclear weapons pro-
gramme and the future development of it remains to be seen.73 
1.8 The Present Situation  
Today, nine states – the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, 
and North Korea – are in possession of atomic bombs and thus make part of the ‘nuclear 
club’. It is assumed that all of them but Pakistan and North Korea are also in possession of 
hydrogen bombs, whereby the existence of Israeli and Indian hydrogen bombs is not proven. 
According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), there are an estimated 
16,000 warheads in the world’s combined stockpile of nuclear weapons, of which 4,200 are 
considered operational. The USA and Russia are estimated to possess each between 7,000 
and 8,000 devices, which together corresponds to 95 percent (!) of the combined stockpile. 
The UK, France and China are assumed to hold between 200 and 300 devices each; Israel, 
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Pakistan, and India about 100 devices each; and North Korea less than 10 devices.74 Addi-
tionally, nuclear weapons are currently stored in five more countries: Under NATO nuclear 
weapons sharing, the United States has provided Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands 
with about 10 – 20 devices each and Italy and Turkey with about 60 – 70 devices each.75 
More than 125,000 nuclear warheads have been produced since 1945. The global peak 
was reached in 1986 with a total of 64,500 stockpiled warheads. Since then, the number of 
warheads has permanently decreased (see Figure 3 on p. 139). However, in the ultimate two 
decades, the pace of reduction has been slowing. The USA, Russia, Britain and France keep 
decreasing their arsenals, while China, Pakistan, and India keep increasing theirs. Israel 
maintains a relatively steady level and North Korea – even though trying – lacks the capa-
bility to amplify its arsenal.76 However, none of the nuclear powers appears to be planning 
the elimination of its nuclear weapons anytime soon. Instead, nuclear stockpiles are con-
stantly modernized and upgraded with billions of dollars.77 
Furthermore, until today, 2,055 nuclear tests were carried out worldwide. The majority 
by the USA (1,032) and the USSR (715), followed by France (210), Great Britain and China 
(45 each), India and North Korea (3 each) and Pakistan (2). Israel is the only nuclear power 
who has – according to the present knowledge – never carried out a nuclear weapons test. 
Since 1990, the number of nuclear tests has declined drastically and since 1998, North Korea 
has been the only state carrying out such (see Figure 4 on p. 140).78 
The political scientist Inmaculada Marrero Rocha suggests a division between horizon-
tal proliferation in the context of the Cold War (bipolar proliferation) and horizontal prolif-
eration outside the context of the Cold War (post-bipolar proliferation). The end of the Cold 
War notwithstanding, Russia and the USA remain by far the most powerful nuclear-weapon 
states. They still possess thousands of weapons which are kept on high alert. In addition, the 
world faces a number of regional proliferation challenges, most recently by the North Korean 
and the presumed Iranian nuclear weapons programme. Moreover, terrorist groups and other 
non-state actors are increasingly engaging in illegal proliferation activities. According to the 
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), more than 146 cases of illicit trafficking and 
other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and radioactive materials were 
recorded in 2013. Furthermore, instability in the Maghreb and the Middle East has increased 
nuclear risks. 79  
Gonzalo de Salazar explains the horizontal proliferation by means of six political and 
strategic functions of nuclear weapons, which motivate states to employ such. These func-
tions, which derive from the concepts of prestige, power and security, are: to ensure state 
survival; to ensure the defense of national borders against external threats; to dominate and 
defend state territory; to establish or maintain prestige and a favorable hierarchic position; 
to maintain the credibility towards (potential) allies; and to reach a hegemonic position, by 
filling power gaps or competing with other states.80 It is indeed considerable that the (at-
tempted) proliferation of nuclear weapons is highly connected to international conflicts such 
as World War II, the Cold War, the Sino-Indian Conflict, the Middle East Conflict(s) and, 
most recently, the US ‘War’ against terrorists and ‘rogue states’.  
Looking at the history, it can be concluded that horizontal proliferation has taken place 
slowly but surely. One new state has come into the possession of nuclear weapons approxi-
mately every five years since the Second World War and many more states could build nu-
clear weapons should they choose to do so.81 Furthermore, the complete nuclear disarma-
ment of nuclear powers is very rare. Out of the ten states that came into possession of nuclear 
weapons, South Africa has been the only one that subsequently dismantled its programme, 
and there are few prospects that this will change in the near future. The Japanese Foreign 
Minister Fumio Kishida concludes the development of nuclear proliferation in the last dec-
ades as follows: 
“After the Cold War, a nuclear-free world appeared to be within reach. However, the lack of a 
collective sense of ownership allowed the issue to fade from the public consciousness. Despite 
the establishment of a peaceful post–Cold War order, proliferation continued. Nuclear risks 
became more diverse.”82 
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2. The Global Governance of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
2.1 The Foundation of the United Nations  
Concomitant with the Second World War, US President Theodor Roosevelt and British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill started to rethink international governance with a view to 
the future post-war world. On 14 August 1941, they published a joint declaration of their 
conclusions, the so-called ‘Atlantic Charter’83. The first five clauses of the declaration af-
firmed international principles like territorial sovereignty, democracy, economic coopera-
tion, and social welfare. The latter three clauses called for international peace, freedom of 
seas, and the establishment of a permanent system of general security: 
“[The President of the United States of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom, Winston S. Churchill,] believe that all of the nations of the world, for 
realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since 
no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by 
nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, 
pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the dis-
armament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable 
measure which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.”.84 
On 1 January 1942, the USA, Great Britain, the USSR, China and 22 other states signed the 
‘Declaration by United Nations’85, and thus pledged adherence to the Atlantic Charter’s prin-
ciples. In the following, several conferences were held in order to realize the ideas of the 
Atlantic Charter. At the Moscow Conference on 30 October 1943, the USA, Great Britain, 
the USSR, and China called for the establishment of an international organization to main-
tain peace and security. The goal was reaffirmed by the USA, Great Britain, and the USSR 
at the Teheran Conference on 1 December 1943. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference be-
tween 21 September and 7 October 1944 and the Yalta Conference on 11 February 1945, the 
USA, Great Britain, the USSR, and China agreed on the aims, structure and functioning of 
the organization.  
According to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, six principal bodies were to constitute the 
international organization which would be known as the United Nations: the General As-
sembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, 
the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. The final results of the Conferences 
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were written down in the ‘Charter of the United Nations’86, the constitutive document of the 
organization. In its preamble it declared as its main goals: to establish international peace 
and security and prevent future generations from war; to use armed force only in the common 
interest; to reaffirm the faith in fundamental human rights; to set measures in order to enforce 
international justice; and to promote economic and social progress. 
At the San Francisco Conference on 26 June 1945, just a few weeks before the atomic 
bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 50 states signed the Charter. On 24 October 1945, 
just a few weeks after the bombings, the Charter was ratified by all signatory states and came 
into force.87 
2.2 UN Disarmament Bodies  
Since its foundation, the UN has established various bodies that deal with disarmament mat-
ters. These include: the First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission 
(UNDC), the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Advisory Board on Disarmament Mat-
ters (the Advisory Board), the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNI-
DIR), and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). 
The First Committee, which is also referred to as Disarmament and International Secu-
rity Committee, is one of the six main committees of the General Assembly. It deals with all 
disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter, in particular 
those concerning the arms control and disarmament, such as the promotion of cooperative 
arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of arma-
ments. The Committee works in close cooperation with the UN Disarmament Commission 
and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament and directly influences the agenda-set-
ting of the GA, including general debate, thematic debate, and action on drafts.88 
The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was initially established in 1952. It was to 
work under the Security Council and had a general mandate on all kinds of disarmament 
questions. However, it met only occasionally after 1959. Subsequent to the General Assem-
bly’s first Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I) in 1978, the UNDC was transferred to 
a subsidiary organ of the GA. The UNDC convenes annually and focuses on a limited num-
ber of agenda items from the whole range of disarmament issues, including one on nuclear 
                                                     
86 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter>. 
87 UN [ed.], “History of the United Nations Charter”, United Nations, 2014a, available at:   
<http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/charter_history.shtml>. 





disarmament. Over the years, the UNDC has formulated consensus principles, guidelines, 
and recommendations on a number of subjects, which have been endorsed by the GA. How-
ever, in the past decade, it has not been able to agree on a substantial outcome.89 
The GA’s first Special Session on Disarmament not only decided on the restructuring 
of the UN Disarmament Commission, but also the establishment of the Advisory Board on 
Disarmament Matters, the Conference on Disarmament, and the UN Institute for Disarma-
ment Research. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (the Advisory Board) started 
working in 1978. It has since then served to advise the Secretary-General on matters within 
the area of arms limitation and disarmament, including on studies and research under the 
patronage of the UN or institutions within the UN system. The Advisory Board holds two 
sessions a year, alternating between New York and Geneva.90  
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) convened its first meeting in 1979. From then 
on, it has served as the ‘single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum’ of the interna-
tional community. The CD is a formally independent body even though highly linked to the 
UN. It derived from other Geneva-based negotiating fora, which include the Ten-Nation 
Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 
(1962-68), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-78). The CD deals 
practically with all multilateral arms control and disarmament problems, in particular with 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, prevention of nuclear war, and effective inter-
national arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the threat or use of nu-
clear weapons. Since its foundation, the CD grew from 40 to 65 state members. The CD 
holds annual sessions in Geneva and conducts all its work by consensus. It is financed by 
the UN and reports at least once a year to the General Assembly.91 
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was established as 
an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations in 1980. It has since 
then conducted independent research on disarmament and security. The work programme is 
reviewed annually and approved by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, which 
also functions as the UNIDIR’s Board of Trustees. The Director of UNIDIR reports yearly 
to the General Assembly.92 
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The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) was originally established upon the 
recommendation of the General Assembly’s second Special Session on Disarmament 
(SSOD-II) in 1982. In 1992, it was renamed to Centre for Disarmament Affairs; in 1997, 
Department for Disarmament Affairs; and in 2007, United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs. UNODA provides substantive and organizational support for norm-setting in the 
area of disarmament, including nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It also provides 
information on multilateral disarmament issues to UN member states and state parties to 
multilateral agreements, intergovernmental organizations and institutions, departments and 
agencies within the UN system, research and educational institutions, civil society, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, the media, and the general public.93, 94 
2.3 The International Agency of Atomic Energy (IAEA) 
Besides the various UN disarmament bodies mentioned above, the United Nations also cre-
ated a body to explicitly deal with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. As mentioned 
before, the very first resolution of the General Assembly 1(I) 95 of 24 January 1946, called 
for the “establishment of a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of 
atomic energy”, and thus established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission 
(UNAEC). UNAEC was composed of one representative from each member state of the 
Security Council plus Canada. Its tasks were to make specific proposals for extending inter-
national exchange of basic scientific information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy; for 
control of nuclear energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only; for the elimination of 
all national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass 
destruction; and for effective safeguards such as inspection and other means to protect com-
plying states against possible hazards.96 
In 1946, the US representative of UNAEC, Bernard Baruch, proposed the so-called 
‘Baruch Plan’97, a plan that recommended the establishment of a control system of atomic 
energy in order to stop the manufacture of atomic bombs; dispose existing bombs according 
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to the terms of the treaty; and access full information as to the know-how for the production 
of atomic energy. The USA offered to make its full contribution, but only if the system of 
control and its possibility to adopt penalties against violations of the treaty would not be 
subject to the right of veto. However, the plan was criticized for being hypocritical and un-
realistic. The Baruch Plan was eventually passed by the Commission, but not agreed to by 
the USSR who abstained on the vote in the Security Council. Even though efforts to pass the 
Baruch Plan continued in 1947 and 1948, an agreement became more and more unlikely. 
When in 1949, the USSR carried out their first nuclear weapons test, the Commission dis-
continued its work. 98 
Two years later, in 1951, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 502 (VI) 99 of 
11 January 1952, which officially disbanded UNAEC and replaced it by the United Nations 
Commission of Disarmament (UNCD), which was to “prepare proposals to be embodied in 
a drafty treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed 
forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass de-
struction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition 
of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.”100  
In 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower held the so-called ‘Atoms for Peace 
Speech’101 before the UN General Assembly. He called upon the states “principally in-
volved”, namely the USA and the USSR, “to seek ‘an acceptable solution’ to the atomic 
armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world.” 
Furthermore, they should “make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium 
and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency.” Such an agency should 
be set up under the aegis of the United Nations and devise methods to promote the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy. The speech is assumed to have initiated the creation of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency which succeeded in the following years.102 
In 1955, governmental representatives from Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Por-
tugal, South Africa, Great Britain, and the USA began to draft the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). One year later, in 1956, four more countries, the USSR, 
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Czechoslovakia, India, and Brazil, joined the Drafting Committee. The same year, the Stat-
ute of the IAEA103 was completed and approved by 81 states. It incorporated both, promo-
tions in order to facilitate the peaceful use of nuclear energy and restrictions in order to 
prevent its military use. On 29 July 1957, the Statute came into force.104 
2.4 The Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
On 20 November 1959, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 1380 (XIV)105, which 
suggested the establishment of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, which was to 
consider the possibility of an international agreement by which the nuclear-weapon states 
would agree not to hand over control of those weapons to other states, and non-nuclear-
weapon states would agree not to seek such weapons. In the following years, the UN General 
Assembly adopted further resolutions, which encouraged the drafting of a non-proliferation 
treaty. In 1967, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee considered two identical 
drafts of a non-proliferation treaty, which were submitted separately by the USSR and the 
USA, as well as a number of subsequent amendments by other members. 106 
The draft was repeatedly revised by the Committee and eventually recommended by the 
UN General Assembly. The final version of the so-called ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons’107 was based on three pillars: (1) nuclear non-proliferation, (2) nuclear 
disarmament and (3) the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Treaty opened for signature on 
1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. Subsequently, the IAEA established, 
in accordance with Article III of the NPT, a Safeguards Agreement108 to ensure the compli-
ance of non-nuclear-weapon states, which had signed the NPT.109 
As provided by Article VIII (3) of the NPT, there have been five-yearly Review Con-
ferences in order to evaluate and improve the operation of the Treaty. Except for 1980 and 
1990, all Review Conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration. The 1995 
Review Conference, which according to Article X(2) of the NPT was to decide whether the 
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Treaty should continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional fixed period, 
opted for the former. Moreover, in 1997, the IAEA approved an Additional Protocol 
(INFCIRC/540)110, which further strengthened the Safeguards System under the NPT.111 
2.5 Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) 
Since 1959, several international treaties have been launched to create nuclear-weapon-free 
zones (NWFZs). NWFZs are specific regions in which states commit themselves to refrain 
from acquiring nuclear weapons and to develop and use nuclear energy solely for peaceful 
purposes. They might go beyond the provisions of the NPT since research on and stationing 
of nuclear weapons as well as the dumping of radioactive waste can also be prohibited.112  
The first NWFZ was the1959 ‘Antarctic Treaty’113. It was followed by the 1967 ‘Outer 
Space Treaty’114; the 1967 ‘Treaty of Tlatelolco’115 (Latin America and the Caribbean); the 
‘1972 Seabed Treaty’116; the 1979 ‘Moon Agreement’117; the 1985 ‘Treaty of Rarotonga’118 
(South Pacific); the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok119 (Southeast Asia); the 1996 ‘Treaty of Pelin-
daba’120 (Africa); and the 1998 ‘Semipalatinsk Treaty’121 (Central Asia). 
According to the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the estab-
lishment of NWFZs is to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms 
and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. Article VII of the NPT ex-
plicitly encourages the establishment of NWFZs stating that “nothing in this Treaty affects 
the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total ab-
sence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories”.122 
In its resolution 30/3472123 of 11 December 1975, the General Assembly defined a 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as “any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of 
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the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, 
has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby (a) the statute of total absence 
of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the 
delimitation of the zone, is defined; [and] (b) an international system of verification and 
control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that 
statute.” The GA furthermore demands nuclear-weapon states “(a) to respect in all its parts 
the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which 
serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone; (b) to refrain from contributing in any 
way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a 
violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention; [and] (c) to refrain from using or 
threatening to use nuclear weapons against the states included in the zone.” This should 
be safeguarded by an “international instrument having full legally binding force, such as 
a treaty, a convention or a protocol.”124 
All of the NWFZs mentioned above are recognized by the General Assembly. Be-
sides, there is also a number of states that voluntarily or through external pressure declared 
themselves as NWFZs. New Zealand (1987), the Philippines (1987), Mongolia (1992) and 
Austria (1999) have voluntarily declared themselves as NWFZs and established legal 
frameworks to enforce their declaration. Iraq (1991) was pressured to declare itself as a 
NWFZ by the UN Security Council after the First Gulf War. However, only Mongolia has 
been officially recognized as a NWFZ by the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, there 
are ongoing debates about further establishments of NWFZs in Northeast Asia, the Middle 
East, South Asia, the Southern Hemisphere, and the Arctic, yet without notable pro-
gress.125 
2.6 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)  
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the USA and the USSR began to negotiate bilateral and 
multilateral agreements to stop the nuclear arms race they had been pushing on. In this time, 
several treaties were launched to restrict the testing of nuclear weapons. The 1963 ‘Partial-
Test-Ban Treaty’ (PTBT)126, which was agreed upon by the USA, the USSR and Great Brit-
ain, banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater and in space. It was followed by 
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the 1974 ‘Threshold Test-Ban Treaty’ (TTBT)127 and the 1976 ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
Treaty’ (PNET)128, both bilateral agreements between the USA and the USSR, which pro-
hibited nuclear testing that exceeded yields of 150 kilotons. However, it lasted until 1990, 
when the USA and the Russian Federation as the successor state of the Soviet Union agreed 
on verification protocols and both treaties came into force.129 
In 1991, the Russian Federation declared a comprehensive moratorium on nuclear test-
ing, which was followed by a US moratorium. During this time, negotiations on a universal 
and internationally verifiable Test-Ban Treaty were pushed forward. At the 659th Conference 
on Disarmament (CD) on 10 August 1993, member states adopted the decision to begin 
negotiations on a ‘Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’ (CTBT). The CD created an 
Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate the Treaty, which resulted to be difficult since the interests 
of nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states were widely divergent.130  
In 1996, after more than two years of intense negotiations, a final draft was presented 
to the CD. It demanded all state parties “not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion 
or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at 
any place under its jurisdiction or control” and to “refrain from causing, encouraging, or in 
any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other 
nuclear explosion” (Article 1, CTBT).131 However, India blocked the adoption of the Treaty 
which – due to the principle of consensus – had to be agreed upon by all CD members. 
Subsequently, the Treaty was passed to the General Assembly and eventually adopted by 
resolution 50/245132 of 10 September 1996. Subsequently, it opened for signature. 
After the adoption of the CTBT by the General Assembly, a Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was established in 
order to promote the signing and ratification of the CTBT; to ensure the implementation of 
its provisions; and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among member 
states. According to Article XIV of the CTBT, 44 designated states that were listed in An-
nex 2 of the Treaty had to ratify it before it came into force. These so-called ‘Annex 2 States’ 
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were states which participated in the CTBT’s negotiations between 1994 and 1996 and pos-
sessed nuclear reactors at that time. However, until today, three of these states – North Korea, 
India, and Pakistan – have neither signed nor ratified the Treaty. Five more of these states – 
China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the USA – have signed the Treaty but not ratified it. Although 
the CTBTO organizes three-yearly ‘Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into force of the 
CTBT’ (also referred to as ‘Article XIV Conferences’) there has been little progress in the 
ratification process.133 
2.7 Bilateral Disarmament Agreements between the USA and the USSR 
Besides the nuclear test ban treaties, the USA and the USSR also adopted several bilateral 
disarmament agreements. In 1972, both states signed and ratified two agreements to halt the 
growth in their strategic arms: the ‘Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty’134 and the ‘Interim Agree-
ment’. They are together referred to as the first ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Talks’135 
(SALT I) and limited both the number of (defensive) anti-ballistic systems136 and (offensive) 
ballistic missiles in each country. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was furthermore 
strengthened by the 1974 Protocol137 that allowed the USA and the USSR to deploy only 
one anti-ballistic missile system each. 
In 1979, the USA and the USSR signed the ‘Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Of-
fensive Arms’138, which were also referred to as the second ‘Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks’ (SALT II). The primary goal of SALT II was to replace the temporarily limited In-
terim Agreement with a long-term comprehensive Treaty providing broad limits on ballistic 
weapons systems for both sides. Although SALT II had not been ratified neither by the USA 
nor by the USSR, both states announced that they would comply with the provisions of the 
Treaty as long as the other one did. 
In 1987, the USA and the USSR signed the ‘Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty’139, also referred to as the ‘INF Treaty’, which entered into force in 1988. It stipulated 
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the complete elimination of all US and Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles with ranges of 500-
5,500 kilometers and their infrastructure within 3 years of entry into force.140 
Four years later, in 1991, the USA and the USSR furthermore signed the ‘Treaty on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms’ (START I)141, by which the two 
sides compromised to reduce their strategic offensive arms, including nuclear warheads, as 
to the level provided in the Treaty within seven years of entry into force. However, five 
months after the signing, the USSR dissolved and the Treaty had to be renegotiated. In 1992 
the Lisbon Protocol142 was adopted in order to adapt START I to the new situation. Accord-
ing to the Protocol, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine were recognized as the 
post-Soviet parties to START I, but only Russia was designated a nuclear-weapon state. Two 
years later, in 1994, the Treaty finally entered into force.  
Meanwhile, Russia and the USA had already started negotiations on further reductions. 
In 1993, both states signed the second ‘Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms’ (START II)143. However, multiple political disaccords between Russia and 
the USA, particularly concerning the Persian Gulf and the Balkans, delayed the ratification 
process. Eventually it was ratified by the USA in 1996 and by Russia in 2000. However, it 
never came into force. In 2002, in spite of strong international criticism, the USA withdrew 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to expand their national missile defense system in 
order to protect the country against nuclear attack. As a reaction, Russia denied to ratify 
START II. 
Notwithstanding the tense situation between Russia and the USA, negotiations on a 
third ‘Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms’ (START III) 
had started as early as 1997. It was to continue START I and START II and further reduce 
strategic arms. Because of the failure of START II, START III included an ‘exit-clause’ and 
had therefore less binding character than START I and START II. The final draft whose 
name was changed to ‘Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty’ (SORT)144 was signed in 2002 
and ratified by both states in 2003.145 
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In 2009, the Russia and the USA continued START negotiations. Although they proved 
to be more difficult than expected, an agreement was reached within a year. In 2010, the 
‘New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’ (New START)146 was signed by both parties. The 
same year, it was ratified by the USA and one year later, in 2011, by Russia. The targets set 
by New START are some 30 percent below the levels set by SORT in 2002. The new limits 
are to be reached within seven years after ratification, which is in 2018.147 
2.8 The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons 
On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations, issued, at the request of the General Assembly, an Advisory Opinion about 
the ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Threat of Nuclear Weapons’148. The Court decided that 
there was in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization 
or comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
(para. 105(2) A/B); that a threat or use of nuclear weapons, which is contrary to Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the UN Charter (prohibition of the use of force) and that fails to meet all the 
requirements of Article 51, is unlawful (para. 105(2) C); and that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable 
in armed conflict particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian 
law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which ex-
pressly deal with nuclear weapons (para. 105(2) D). 
By a narrow majority, the Court decided that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would 
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in 
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. However, in view of the current state 
of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court could not conclude 
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an 
extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake 
(para. 105(2) E). At last, the Court stated, that there existed an obligation to pursue in good 
faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects 
under strict and effective international control (para. 105(2) F). 
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2.9 The Present Situation 
Since its foundation, the United Nations have created a whole machinery of bodies which 
deal with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. On one hand, the UN efforts have been 
pushing forward nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament significantly: the creation of the 
International Atomic Energy, the Non-Proliferation-Treaty, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, 
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were highly connected to the UN and its subsidiary 
bodies. On the other hand, the UN has not achieved to establish agreements to impose 
complete non-proliferation and disarmament for all of its members. That is why, in 2013, 
the GA set up the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward 
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a 
world without nuclear weapons (the Working Group).  
Today, out of the 193 member states of the United Nations, 162 form part of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and 189 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All nuclear-
weapon states but North Korea form part of the IAEA and all states, including both nuclear-
weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), but North Korea, India, 
Pakistan, and Israel form part of the NPT. North Korea, had signed the NPT in 1986 and the 
Statute of the IAEA in 1974, but withdrew from the NPT in 1993 and from the IAEA 1994. 
Today, the NWS, which developed nuclear weapons before the NPT came into force – that 
is China, France, Russia, the UK, and the USA – are referred to as official nuclear-weapon 
states, while, the NWS, which developed nuclear weapons after the NPT came into force 
– that is India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea – are referred to as unofficial nuclear-
weapon states. 
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) considers the NPT as a 
“watershed”. Before the entry in force of the NPT, many countries considered acquiring 
nuclear weapons. Some took concrete steps to build them. After 1970, few did so.149 
However, the post-NPT proliferation of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea; the 
frustrated nuclear weapons programmes of Libya and Iraq; and the suspected nuclear 
weapons programme of Iran show that horizontal proliferation has not been stopped by 
the NPT. 
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Furthermore, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones today cover more than half of the world’s 
landmass. They encompass 119 states and 18 other territories, where approximately 1.9 
billion people live.150 However, that means, that 77 states are not being part of a NWFZ 
and that the vast majority of people, approximately 6.1 billion, do not live in NWFZs. The 
geographical distribution of NWFZ reveals a north-south disparity: While the southern 
continents including the Antarctica, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Australia, 
and Oceania are completely covered by NWFZs, Europe and North America are 
completely free from NWFZs, and less than a fourth of Asia is covered by NWFZs.  
Moreover, bilateral and multilateral Test Ban Agreements have decreased the number 
of nuclear tests drastically since 1990. Even though, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
which was signed by 183 states and ratified by 162 states, has not yet come into force, 
there have only been three nuclear weapons tests since 1996. 
However, some nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, especially the 
nuclear disarmament agreements between the USA and the USSR/Russia, which have 
decreased the number of warheads from approximately 64,500 warheads to 16,000 since 
1986, took place beyond the United Nations system. The Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice, by contrast, has so far not displayed any substantial 
influence on the nuclear weapons regime.  
The present time is furthermore marked by a stagnation of nuclear disarmament 
efforts. The aim of reaching ‘global zero’ has mainly been replaced by the aim of 
maintaining the status quo. While powerful steps were taken to impede further horizontal 
proliferation, few steps were taken to impede vertical proliferation or promote nuclear 
disarmament. The 2004 Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel even considered that the 
international community was “approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-
proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”151  
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Marrero Rocha criticized the undermining of nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament commitments in a similar way: 
“The proliferation of new nuclear-weapon states and the possibility of nuclear terrorists attacks 
have converted into useful arguments by means of which international powers justify the reit-
erated delay in complying their nuclear disarmament commitment with and the non-contribu-
tion to alternative solutions which increase an over-all solution to the problem.”152 
Looking at the history of the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarma-
ment, two facts can be concluded: First, global governance has created instruments that, in 
general, significantly helped the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear arms. Second, 
global governance was neither able to completely disarm existing nuclear powers, nor to 
prevent the creation of new nuclear powers. 
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CHAPTER II - ACTORS AND TOOLS 
In the second chapter, I will examine the efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and disarma-
ment of four key actors within the United Nations family: the General Assembly, the Secu-
rity Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the International Court of Justice. 
Before doing so, I will briefly refer to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which builds the working basis for these actors. Then, I will describe the structures, 
functions and powers of the actors, analyze their efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation 
and disarmament and, at last, give a critical reflection. 
1. The Charter of the United Nations 
According to Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations153, its purposes are: to maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to international peace and security (para. 1); to develop 
friendly relations among nations based on the principles of equality and self-determination 
of the people, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace (para. 2); 
to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, so-
cial, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for hu-
man rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion (para. 3); and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attain-
ment of these common ends (para. 4). 
For these purposes, Article 2 sets certain principles which the United Nations and its 
members should act upon. On one hand, paragraphs 2 to 5 establish responsibilities of the 
member states towards the United Nations, which are: to fulfill in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter (para. 2); to settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security, and justice, 
are not endangered (para. 3); to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (para. 4); to 
give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present 
Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations 
is taking preventive or enforcement action (para. 5). The United Nations may also force non-
members to comply these principles if necessary for the maintenance of international peace 
and security (para. 6). 
                                                     





On the other hand, paragraphs 1 and 7 establish, in accordance with Article 1 para-
graph 2 of the UN Charter, the principle of state sovereignty. They claim that all members 
are sovereign and equal (para. 1) and that nothing contained in the Charter authorizes the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; except for the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (ac-
tion with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression) 
(para. 7).  
Thus, we can determine a possible area of tension between the purposes of the United 
Nations on one side and the principle of state sovereignty on the other side 
2. The General Assembly 
2.1 Structure, Functions and Powers 
The General Assembly (GA) is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ 
of the United Nations. It consists of all 193 Members of the UN, which are represented by 
up to five delegates. The GA has the competence to discuss any questions or any matters 
within the scope of the UN Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs 
provided for in the UN Charter, and – except of any questions on which the Security Council 
is acting upon – may make recommendations to the members of the UN or to the Security 
Council or to both on any such questions or matters.154 
According to Article 11 of the UN Charter, the GA may in particular: consider the gen-
eral principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, which 
include the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (para. 1); 
discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought 
before it by any member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state 
which is not a member of the United Nations (para. 2); and call the attention of the Security 
Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security (para. 3). 
Furthermore, the GA has, as any principle organ, the competence to establish subsidiary 
organs in accordance with the UN Charter.155 
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The GA meets in regular annual sessions and in special sessions that can be convoked 
by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the mem-
bers of the UN. Each member state has one vote. Decisions of the General Assembly on 
important questions are made by a two-thirds majority of the member states present and 
voting. These questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. Decisions on less important questions, are made by a simple 
majority of the members present and voting. Decisions of the General Assembly are not 
binding. Member states are not obliged to carry out the decisions of the GA.156 
2.2 Disarmament Bodies 
The GA was the first UN actor to take concrete steps in terms of nuclear weapons. As men-
tioned before, the very first resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946157 called for the “establish-
ment of a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy” 
and triggered the foundation of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC).  
Not only UNAEC, but all (!) UN disarmament bodies described in Chapter 1.2.2, 
namely the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee), the 
United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the Conference on Disarmament (CD), 
the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research 
(UNIDR), and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) were established by the 
General Assembly.158 
Moreover, the foundation of the IAEA was strongly influenced by the GA: The United 
Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), which was established by the GA in 1946 
but suspended in 1951, can be seen as the predecessor of the IAEA; Eisenhower’s Atoms for 
Peace Speech, which was held in the General Assembly in 1953, drove forward the negoti-
ations that eventually led to the foundation of the IAEA; and resolution 810(IX)[A] of 4 De-
cember 1954 “Concerning an International Atomic Agency” explicitly encouraged the UN 
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member states to establish the IAEA as quick as possible. After the foundation of the IAEA, 
the General Assembly adopted resolution 1145(XII) of 14 November 1957, which described 
the IAEA as an “autonomous international organization in the working relationship with the 
United Nations” and defined the relationship between the two organizations.  
Furthermore, the most recent UN body in terms of nuclear weapons, the ‘Open-ended 
Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament ne-
gotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons’, was 
established by resolution 67/56 of 4 January 2013. 
2.2 Special Sessions on Disarmament 
In 1978, in 1982 and in 1988, the General Assembly held three special sessions on disarma-
ment. Only the first special session on disarmament (SSOD-I), which took place from 23 
May to 30 June 1978, succeeded in a final document (S-10/2 of 30 June 1978). The main 
focus of SSOD-I, which was highly influenced by the US-Soviet nuclear arms race, was on 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In the foreword of the final document, the Gen-
eral Assembly stated that it was “alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed 
by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race” and that it was “con-
vinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, [was] essential 
for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace 
and security.”159  
In the subsequent declaration the GA described nuclear weapons as “an unprecedented 
threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most 
destructive weapons ever produced” and noted that “existing arsenals of nuclear weapons 
alone [were] more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth” (para. 11). The GA therefore 
demanded a ‘programme of action’ in order to achieve “the general and complete disarma-
ment under effective international control”, in particular of nuclear weapons (para. 43 
and 47). It proposed: the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nu-
clear-weapon systems; the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and 
their means of delivery; the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons 
purposes; a comprehensive programme for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles 
                                                     
159 GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Document S-10/2, Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its Tenth 
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of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elim-
ination at the earliest possible time; the cessation of nuclear weapons testing by all states; 
the timely conclusion of the strategic arms limitation talks between the USA and the USSR; 
the protection of NNWS against the use and threat of nuclear weapons; and the assurance 
and further establishment of NWFZs (para. 50-52, 59 and 60).160  
The final document also emphasized the role of the General Assembly, which “[had] 
been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of 
disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament 
measures” and therefore proposed the strengthening of the ‘disarmament machinery’, by 
restructuring the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the creating the UN Con-
ference on Disarmament, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and the Advisory 
Board on Disarmament Matters (para. 115) (see Chapter 1.2.2).161 
SSOD-I was considered an event of historic significance. However, the hopes that were 
raised by it would not to be fulfilled. SSOD-II, which took place from 7 June to 10 July 
1982, was unable to agree on a final document. Though the concluding document of 
SSOD-II, S-12/32 of 9 July 1982162, reaffirmed the final document of SSOD-I, it observed 
that the recommendations of SSOD-I had remained largely unimplemented. A number of 
important negotiations had either not yet begun or already been suspended, and efforts of 
the Committee on Disarmament and other disarmament bodies had produced little results:  
“The arms race, however, in particular the nuclear-arms race, has assumed more dangerous 
proportions and global military expenditures have increased sharply. In short, since the adop-
tion of the Final Document in 1978, there has been no significant progress in the field of arms 
limitation and disarmament and the seriousness of the situation has increased” (para. 59).163 
Even though the international climate had considerably improved in the late 1980s, 
SSOD-III, which took place from 31 May to 26 June 1988, could not agree on a final docu-
ment either. Since 1995, the General Assembly has been calling for a fourth session on dis-
armament. It established a working group in 2003 and another one in 2007 to discuss the 
agenda and the possibility of establishing a preparatory committee. However, the realization 
of SSOD-IV is not yet in sight.164   
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2.3 Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
The GA has – not only in their special sessions on disarmament but also in their regular 
sessions – intensely dealt with nuclear weapons. Until today, it has adopted hundreds (!) of 
resolutions referring to all aspects of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Searching 
GA resolutions in the United Nations Bibliographic System under the key words “atomic” 
and “nuclear” in the category “Subject (All)” leads to 942 results.165 Out of these results, 73 
can be regarded as irrelevant to nuclear weapons, leaving 869 relevant results.166 Since 1946 
there has been a steady increase in resolutions, with an average of 1.4 resolutions per year 
in the first ten sessions to an average of 18.3 resolutions in the last ten sessions. Notably, 
there has been a slight downturn of resolutions during the critical years of the Cold War (first 
half of the 1960s) and a boom of resolutions at the end of the Cold War (during the 1980s) 
(see Figure 5 on p. 141). 
The resolutions can broadly be divided into twelve categories: (1) non-proliferation and 
nuclear disarmament in general, (2) the International Atomic Energy Agency, (3) the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, (4) nuclear weapon free zones, (5) nuclear test banning, (6) bilateral 
nuclear arms agreements between the USA and the USSR/Russia, (7) protection of NNWS 
against the use or threat of nuclear weapons, (8) the Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, (9) case-based 
resolutions, (10) the prohibition of fission material commerce for nuclear weapons, (11) 
investigation and public awareness, and (12) peaceful uses of nuclear energy; whereby some 
resolutions relate to more than one category. 
(1) Resolutions on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in general represent the 
largest share. Since the above mentioned first resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946 to the 
present, the GA has constantly adopted resolutions that demand the complete disarmament 
of all nuclear weapons, inter alia: resolution 41/59F “General and complete disarmament: 
nuclear disarmament” of 3 December 1986, which was reiterated in 1987 and 1988167; 
resolution 39/148[K] “Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and 
prevention of nuclear war” of 17 December 1984, which was reiterated four times between 
1985 and 1990; resolution 44/116D “Nuclear disarmament” of 15 December 1989, which 
                                                     
165 Investigation as of 1 September 2014. 
166 A listing of all GA resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is annexed on page 113. Note: 
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was reiterated 20 times (!) between 1990 and 2013; resolution 49/75H “Nuclear disarmament 
with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons” of 15 December 1994, which 
was reiterated five times between 1995 and 1999; resolution 55/33[R] “A path to the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons” of 20 November 2000, which was reiterated four times 
between 2001 and 2004; resolution 60/56 “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: 
accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” of 8 December 
2005, which was reiterated eight times between 2006 and 2013; and resolution 65/72 “United 
action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” of 8 December 2010, which was 
reiterated three times between 2011 and 2013. 
(2) There are, as already mentioned in Chapter 2.2.2, several GA resolutions related to 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The GA triggered the foundation of the 
IAEA by resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946 and resolution 810(IX)[A] and established a 
cooperation relationship between the UN and the IAEA by resolution 1145(XII) of 14 
November 1957, which inter alia tasks the IAEA to report annually to the GA.168  
(3) The GA adopted various resolutions on the genesis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and its aftermath. It pushed negotiations of the NPT by resolution 1380 (XIV) 
“Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons” of 20 November 1959, which 
was reiterated in 1960 and 1961, and by resolution 2028(XX) “Non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons” of 19 November 1965, which was reiterated in 1966 and 1967. When the 
negotiations on the NPT had been accomplished, the GA adopted the NPT by resolution 
2373(XXII) of 12 June 1968 and recommended it to its members. Until today, the GA 
convenes the NPT Review Conferences and adopts resolutions on their outcomes.169 
(4) The GA has furthermore adopted scores of resolutions both on the establishment 
and the implementation of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). It defined the terms and 
conditions of NWFZs by resolution 3472(XXX)[B] of 11 December 1975 and, in accordance 
with resolution 3472(XXX)[B], recommended: the Outer Space Treaty170, the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Carribean)171, the Seabed Treaty172, the Moon 
Agreement173, the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific)174 and the Treaty of Pelindaba 
(Africa)175. The GA has also adopted resolutions, which support Mongolia's self-declared 
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nuclear-weapon-free status176, the Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia)177, the Semipalatinsk 
Treaty (Central Asia)178 and, in general, a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere.179 
Moreover, the GA has demanded the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the 
Middle East.180 
(5) As early as 1958, the GA demanded the complete suspension of nuclear weapons 
tests and the negotiation of a treaty insuring such suspension.181 Since then, it has adopted 
scores of resolutions recalling this demand, for example resolution 1649(XVI) “The urgent 
need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control” of 8 
November 1961, which was reiterated 25 times between 1962 and 1990, and resolution 
35/145A “Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons” of 12 December 1980, which 
was reiterated ten times between 1981 and 1990. The GA furthermore urged the negotiations 
on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by resolution 46/29 of 6 December 
1991, which was reiterated four times between 1992 and 1995. After the negotiations had 
been concluded, the GA adopted the CTBT by resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996 and 
called on all states to sign it. Since 1999, the GA has been pushing the signing and ratification 
of the CTBT in order to achieve its entry in force.182 For this purpose the GA has also created 
a cooperation relationship between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).183  
(6) Since the early 1980s, the GA has also encouraged bilateral nuclear arms 
negotiations between the USA and the USSR/Russia, for example by resolution 37/78A 
“Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations” of 9 December 1982, which was reiterated 20 times 
between 1983 and 2010. These resolutions called on both states to sign bilateral treaties, 
particularly, on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, such as SALT and 
START. 
(7) As early as 1948, the GA demanded the prohibition of nuclear weapons.184 In 1962, 
it officially declared the prohibition of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and regarded 
                                                     
176 Initially by resolution 53/77D of 4 December 1998, which was reiterated seven times between 2000 and 
2012. 
177 Initially by resolution 62/31of 5 December 2007, which was reiterated three times between 2009 and 2013. 
178 Initially by resolution 65/49of 8 December 2010, which was reiterated in 2012. 
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the use of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons as a direct violation of the UN Charter.185 
Simultaneously, the GA started demanding the conclusion of a convention on the 
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.186 However, in the following years, there had 
been little progress. Therefore, in 1978, the GA additionally started calling for the 
conclusion of an international convention to at least assure non-nuclear weapon states 
against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.187 Until today, the GA has been requesting 
negotiations on both, an international convention universally prohibiting the use or threat 
of nuclear weapons and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon 
states against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.188 
(8) The GA furthermore requested the International Court of Justice on the Legality of 
Nuclear Weapons by resolution 49/75K and adopted 18 follow-up resolutions on the 
advisory opinion189, which urge nuclear weapon states to fulfill their nuclear disarmament 
obligations under Article VI of the NPT. 
(9) The GA has also adopted some case-based resolutions. Between 1977 and 1991, for 
example, it adopted resolutions on the South African nuclear weapons programme190, and 
between 1978 and 1993, on the Israeli nuclear weapons programme191, calling upon both 
states to renounce their nuclear weapons arsenals and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
In 2005 and 2007 it has furthermore adopted resolutions on nuclear terrorism192. 
(10) Resolutions referring to investigation include general studies on nuclear 
weapons193, studies on the effects of atomic radiation194 and studies on the climatic effects 
of nuclear war195. So far, there had been only one resolution referring to public awareness 
calling for the “informing and enlightening of the world society as to the dangers of the 
armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons”196. 
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(11) Moreover, since 1993, the GA has adopted a number of resolutions in which it 
encourages the negotiation of an international treaty banning the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons use197.  
(12) Besides, it has adopted several resolutions on the peaceful use of atomic energy for 
civil purposes198. 
2.4 Critical Reflections 
The efforts of the General Assembly in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament 
are considerable. The establishment of several disarmament bodies, the holding of three spe-
cial sessions on disarmament and the adoption of numerous resolutions, which cover all as-
pects of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, emphasize its high level of dedication 
towards a nuclear weapons free world. 
However, the General Assembly has no enforcement power. It is only able to make non-
binding recommendations to the members of the UN or to the Security Council. Yet, reso-
lutions against the nuclear weapons regime are precisely addressed to nuclear-weapon states 
who oppose and reject to implement these. The same occurs with the Security Council whose 
five permanent members are such nuclear-weapon states. Therefore, many of the above men-
tioned resolutions, even if adopted by large majorities and reiterated several times, are not 
becoming reality.  
Resolution 68/39 “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implemen-
tation of nuclear disarmament commitments” of 5 December 2013, for example, was adopted 
by 171 against 7 votes with 5 abstentions. It might not be surprising that the 7 votes against 
the resolutions were from nuclear-weapon states (France, Great Britain, India, Israel, North 
Korea, Russia, and the United States) as well as 2 of the 5 abstentions (China and Pakistan).  
In spite of the fact that the General Assembly has no enforcement power, it has signifi-
cantly contributed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by establishing an inter-
governmental discussion platform which has been constantly pushed by GA based disarma-
ment bodies. The creation of important international institutions and treaties in terms of nu-
clear non-proliferation and disarmament, such as the IAEA and the NPT, were strongly in-
fluenced by General Assembly efforts.  
                                                     
197 Resolution 48/75L of 16 December 1993, resolution 53/77I of 4 December 1998, which was reiterated five times 
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The political scientist M.J. Peterson furthermore hints at critics that characterize Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions as complicated, incomprehensible and “outpaced by real-world 
events”. Yet he objects, that the GA has the greatest potential in agenda-setting, issue and 
problem definition, policy design, and norm development. The GA permits first, the intro-
duction of new ideas and its transmission to public authorities and the social society, and 
second, the debate and change of existent ideas through a multi-perspective deliberative pro-
cess.199 According to Peterson, this is one of the most important features of global govern-
ance: 
“When the members can get beyond least-common-denominator sentiments or employing lan-
guage so vague that governments are free to interpret resolutions in different even directly op-
posite ways, the Assembly can still provide the global endorsement or condemnation that Inis 
Claude long-ago identified as one of the primary functions of the United Nations.”200 
He concludes that GA resolutions have been important in keeping nuclear non-proliferation 
and disarmament on the global agenda. Yet, the domestic politics of states are more consti-
tutive for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament than international pressure.201 
 
3. The Security Council 
3.1 Structure, Functions and Powers 
The Security Council (SC) has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. It consists of five permanent and ten non-permanent members. The 
five permanent members are China, France, Russia as successor of the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain, and the USA. The ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly 
for terms of two years. The SC takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the 
international peace and security and may, if found necessary, adopt peaceful or forcible 
measures to counter possible threats.202 
According to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the SC calls upon disputing parties to settle 
their conflicts by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of set-
tlement. According to Chapter VII, it can also impose sanctions or authorize the use of force 
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to maintain or restore international peace and security. The SC is also responsible for for-
mulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. As well as 
the GA, the SC may establish subsidiary organs in accordance with the UN Charter.203 
Each member of the SC is represented by one delegate and has one vote. Decisions of 
the SC on procedural matters require the vote of at least nine members. Decisions on all 
other matters require the vote of at least nine members including the votes of all permanent 
members. That is why the permanent members are also referred to as “veto powers”, since 
they are able to prevent the adoption of any substantive draft resolution, regardless of the 
level of international support for the draft. In contrast to the General Assembly, decisions of 
the Security Council are binding. All members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter.204 
3.2 Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament  
Compared to the GA, the SC has only adopted a few resolutions relating to nuclear weapons. 
Searching SC resolutions in the United Nations Bibliographic System under the key words 
“atomic” and “nuclear” in the category “Subject (All)”, as done before with the GA 
resolutions, leads to 37 results. Out of these results, one can be regarded as irrelevant to 
nuclear weapons, leaving 36 relevant results. Notably, only eight resolutions were adopted 
before 2003; the majority of 28 resolutions has been adopted afterwards (see Figure 6 on 
p. 141).205, 206 
The SC resolutions can be divided into two categories: (1) Non-Proliferation in general 
and (2) case-based resolutions, whereby the first group consists in (a) resolutions 
corresponding to the reports of the Atomic Energy Commission between 1947 and 1949; (b) 
resolutions on the protection of non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT in 1968 and 
1995; and (c) resolutions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destructions since 2004. 
(1a) The three resolutions the SC adopted between 1947 and 1949 in correspondence to 
the reports of the Atomic Energy Commission had no substantive outcome and were even-
tually discontinued due to the suspension of the Commission.207  
                                                     
203 Cf. ibid., Article 7 paragraph 2 and Article 29. 
204 Cf. ibid., Article 27. 
205 A listing of all SC resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is annexed on page 137. As in 
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proliferation and disarmament may be tagged with the key words “atomic” or “nuclear”. 
206 Note: Complete reference information of all resolutions and official documents cited in this chapter can be 
consulted from the section ‘References’ and from Table 2 on p. 137. 
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(1b) After almost twenty years, in which the Security Council had not agreed on any 
resolutions concerning nuclear weapons, it adopted resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 on the 
protection of non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT. The resolution considered the 
use or threat of nuclear weapons as a threat to international peace and security and assured 
protection to non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of nuclear weapons. It was 
due to bring non-nuclear weapon states to sign the NPT in spite of security doubts. 
The assurance was reiterated by resolution 984 of 4 November 1995, which also re-
ferred to declarations of the permanent members of the SC, restricting the possible use of 
nuclear weapons. Russia, Great Britain, the USA, and France undertook that they would not 
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT except in the case 
of an aggression against them, their allies or states they had a security commitment with, 
carried out or sustained by a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nu-
clear-weapon state. China, however, undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and 
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-
weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances.208 On 24 September 2009, the 
SC adopted resolution 1887 (2009) by which it reaffirmed the NPT and the IAEA as well as 
general issues concerning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament such as the ratification 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the negotiation of a treaty ban-
ning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. 
(1c) In the aftermath of 9/11, the SC adopted resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 on the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The resolution 
considered the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as a threat to inter-
national peace and security and called on all member states to fulfil their obligations in rela-
tion to arms control and disarmament and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. The SC expressed its concern about the threat of nuclear terrorism and therefore 
obliged all states, to refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that at-
tempted to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chem-
ical or biological weapons, and to adopt and enforce laws which prohibit and prevent the 
proliferation of these weapons. The SC furthermore created the 1540 Committee in order to 
supervise the implementation of the resolution. The mandate of the 1540 Committee, which 
was initially limited to two years, was prolonged for another two years 2006, for another 
three years in 2008 and for another ten years in 2011.209,210 
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(2) Moreover, the SC has adopted a series of case-based resolutions. In 1981, it con-
demned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak, yet without further conse-
quences.211 Ten years later, in 1991, the SC condemned Iraq for having violated their IAEA 
safeguards and demanded immediate and full compliance of these.212  
The SC has furthermore adopted several resolutions on North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
programme. In 1993, the SC condemned North Korea’s intention to withdraw from the NPT 
and urged North Korea to reconsider its announcement.213 In 2006, the SC condemned North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and demanded its immediate suspension. In addition, 
the SC required all member states to restrain from transactions with North Korean involving 
material, technology or financial resources connected to North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
programme.214 The same year, the SC adopted resolution 1718 of 16 October 2006 by which 
it imposed sanctions against North Korea due to its first nuclear weapons test. According to 
Article 41 of the UN Charter, it established an embargo on military equipment, goods and 
services related to the development of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruc-
tion; an embargo on luxury goods; and a travel ban and assets freeze on designated persons 
and entities directly or indirectly related to the nuclear weapons programme. The SC also 
created the 1718 Committee in order to supervise the implementation of the resolution.215 
Since then, the SC has reiterated and intensified sanctions against North Korea and set up a 
Panel of Experts to assist the 1718 Committee.216, 217 
Besides, in 1998, the SC condemned nuclear weapons tests, which were previously con-
ducted by India and Pakistan, and demanded that not only India and Pakistan but all states 
refrained from further nuclear tests in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.218  
Most recently, the SC has also adopted several resolutions on the presumed Iranian nu-
clear weapons programme. In 2006, the SC called upon Iran to suspend all enrichment-re-
lated and reprocessing activities, including research and development, which was to be ver-
ified by the IAEA.219 Since Iran did not respond to this request, the SC adopted resolution 
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217 Cf. UN [ed.], “1718 Committee”, United Nations, 2014k, available at:  
<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/>.  
218 Resolution 1172 of 6 June 1998. 
219 Resolution 1696 of 31 July 2006. 
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1737 of 23 December 2006 and imposed sanctions similar to those against North Korea. 
According to Article 41 of the UN Charter, it established an embargo on goods and services 
related to the development of nuclear weapons as well as a travel ban and assets freeze on 
designated persons and entities related directly or indirectly to the presumed nuclear weap-
ons programme. The SC also created the 1737 Committee in order to supervise the imple-
mentation of the resolution. Since 2007, the SC has reiterated and intensified sanctions 
against Iran and set up a Panel of Experts to assist the 1737 Committee.220, 221 
3.3 Critical Reflections 
In contrast to the General Assembly, which pursues a policy towards reaching global zero, 
the Security Council aims to maintain the status quo. While it takes powerful steps to impede 
further horizontal proliferation, it only makes gradual efforts to encourage general nuclear 
disarmament. The only UN body with enforcement power is characterized by the fact that 
all of its permanent members, which have a right of veto, are in possession of nuclear weap-
ons. These rather oppose self-restrictive policies in terms of vertical nuclear non-prolifera-
tion and disarmament. 
Even though in 2009, the SC reaffirmed the aim of achieving a nuclear weapons free 
world, there have been few efforts towards this aim.222 Resolution 1887 of 24 September 
2009, for example, urged nuclear disarmament measures as established by Article VI of the 
NPT; the further ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); and 
the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. 
Following the resolution, Russia and the USA, signed and ratified New START, making 
bilateral nuclear disarmament commitments, yet outside the context of the Security Council. 
Furthermore, China and the USA have still not ratified the CTBT and the negotiation of a 
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons has not even started.  
Besides, the obligation to formulate plans for the establishment of a system for the reg-
ulation of armaments as established by Article 26 of the UN Charter has not been fulfilled 
at all. Consequently, the Security Council – in terms of nuclear non-proliferation and dis-
armament – works rather as an inter-governmental forum between the five official nuclear-
weapon states than a global governance body. All efforts of the General Assembly and the 
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Security Council depend on the political will of the five permanent members, who at the 
same time are the most powerful nuclear-weapon states in the world. 
Ernie Regehr argues that the permanent members of the Security Council follow a non-
sustainable strategy of nuclear non-proliferation. On the long run, the rise of new nuclear 
weapons cannot be prevented through coercion but only through conviction. However, by 
adhering to the nuclear weapons regime, the permanent members of the Security Council set 
a bad example and raise doubts about the credibility of the NPT: 
“The Security Council cannot credibly make the disarmament rules, even though nuclear dis-
armament enjoys overwhelming global support among populations and governments, because 
the P-5/N-5 – the five that could be the core rule-makers – are not prepared themselves to be 
legally bound by such rules.”223 
He concludes that the Security Council urgently needs to agree on concrete disarmament 
measures as established by Article VI of the NPT, including instruments, such as the IAEA 
safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon states, which verify the compliance of disarmament 
measures, in order to encourage discernible progress towards the complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons.224 
 
4. The IAEA  
4.1 Structure, Functions and Powers 
The IAEA is an independent international organization related to the UN system through a 
permanent working relationship established by GA resolution 1145(XII) of 14 November 
1957. Its main objectives are, on one hand, the promotion of nuclear technologies for peace-
ful purposes and on the other hand, the prevention of nuclear technologies for military pur-
poses.  
In order to promote nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, the IAEA has the func-
tion: to encourage and assist research, development and practical application of atomic en-
ergy for peaceful uses; and therefore to make provision for materials, services, equipment, 
and facilities; to foster the exchange of scientific and technical information; and to encourage 
the exchange of training of scientists and experts.225  
                                                     
223 REGEHR, Ernie, “The Security Council and Nuclear Disarmament”, in Boulden, Jane et al. [ed.], The United Nations and 
nuclear orders, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009, p. 44. 
224 Ibid., p. 44ff. 
225 Cf., IAEA Statute, 23 October 1956, Article III.A, available at: <http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html>. 
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In order to prevent nuclear technologies for military purposes, the IAEA has the func-
tion: to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and 
other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information are not used for any military 
purpose; to apply such safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral 
arrangement, or at the request of a state, to any of that state’s activities in the field of atomic 
energy; to establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in collaboration with 
the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned, 
standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property; 
and to acquire or establish any facilities, plant and equipment to carry out its authorized 
functions.226 
The IAEA is to conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter to promote peace and international co-operation; with the policies of the UN 
towards worldwide disarmament; and with any international agreements following such pol-
icies.227 The IAEA furthermore submits annual reports on its activities to the UN General 
Assembly and, when appropriate, to the Security Council.228 
The functions of the IAEA are carried out by its three main bodies: the General Confer-
ence, the Board of Governors, and the Secretariat. The General Conference is one of two 
policy-making bodies of the IAEA. It consists of all 162 member states, which are each 
represented by one delegate who may be accompanied by alternates and by advisers. The 
General Conference meets in regular annual sessions and in special sessions that may be 
convened by the Director General at the request of the Board of Governors or of a majority 
of members. The General Conference may discuss any questions or any matters within the 
scope of the IAEA Statute or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for 
in the Statute, and may make recommendations to IAEA members, to the Board of Gover-
nors or to both.229 
The second policy-making body of the IAEA is the Board of Governors (the Board). It 
consists of 32 or more member states. At least ten members are designated by the Board for 
a term of one year. These are the ten member states most advanced in the technology of 
atomic energy, plus the members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy from 
world regions that are not represented by the first ten. Another 22 members are elected by 
the General Conference for a term of two years with due regard to equitable representation 
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of all world regions on the Board as a whole, so that the Board at the end consists of at least 
five representatives of the area of Latin America, four representatives of the area of Western 
Europe, three representatives of the area of Eastern Europe, four representatives of the area 
of Africa, two representatives of the area of the Middle East and South Asia, one representa-
tive of the area of South East Asia and the Pacific, and one representative of the area of the 
Far East. The Board has authority to carry out the functions of the IAEA in accordance with 
the Statute. It meets at such times as it may determine, usually five times a year. It also 
prepares annual reports of the IAEA and specific reports if required by the UN or any other 
organization which is related to the IAEA. All reports have to be submitted by the General 
Conference.230 
The Secretariat is tasked with running the IAEA. It is divided in six major departments: 
management, nuclear sciences and applications, nuclear energy, nuclear safety and security, 
technical cooperation, and safeguards and verification.231 
4.2 IAEA Safeguards under the NPT 
One of the main tasks of the IAEA is to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any 
bilateral or multilateral arrangement such as the NPT. 232, 233 As mentioned in Chapter 1.2.4, 
the NPT234 consists of three pillars: (1) nuclear non-proliferation, (2) nuclear disarmament 
and (3) the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Referring to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear-
weapon state parties undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over nuclear weap-
ons to other states, nor to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to man-
ufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or the control over nuclear weapons (Article I 
of the NPT). Non-nuclear-weapon state parties undertake not to receive nuclear weapons or 
control over nuclear weapons, nor to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons (Article II of the NPT). The latter furthermore undertake to accept safe-
guards, as laid down in an agreement with the IAEA (Article III.1 and III.2 of the NPT).235 
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In return, all state parties to the NPT receive the right to develop research, production 
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity 
with Articles I and II of the NPT. They are allowed to exchange equipment, materials and 
scientific and technological information and encouraged to cooperate with other states or 
international organizations for peaceful purposes (Article IV of the NPT).236 
Furthermore, all state parties to the NPT undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, on nuclear disarma-
ment, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective inter-
national control (Article V of the NPT).237  
In accordance with Article III.1 and III.2 of the NPT, the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement (the Safeguards Agreement) has been adopted by document INFCIRC/153/(Cor-
rected)238 of June 1972. It is based on assessments of the correctness and completeness of 
declarations on nuclear material and nuclear-related activities employed by NNWS. Verifi-
cation measures include on-site inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. 
Although the Safeguards Agreement authorizes the IAEA to verify the absence of unde-
clared nuclear material and activities, the tools available to do so are limited. That is why 
the Safeguards Agreement was strengthened by the Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540(Cor-
rected)239 of September 1992, which grants complementary inspection authority to that pro-
vided under the Safeguards Agreement.240 Until today, the Safeguards Agreement has en-
tered into force in 175 NNWS and the Additional Protocol in 115 NNWS.241 
According to Article VII.C of the Statute, the IAEA Board of Governors is to report any 
case of non-compliance of safeguards arrangements under the IAEA to all its members, the 
UN Security Council, and the UN General Assembly. If the recipient state fails to take fully 
corrective action within a reasonable time, the IAEA may curtail or suspend assistance being 
provided by the IAEA or by a member and call for the return of materials and equipment 
made available to the recipient member. The IAEA may also suspend any non-complying 
member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership. However, in-depth 
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measures concerning the non-compliance of safeguards under the NPT can only be imple-
mented by the Security Council.242 
4.3 Verification and Compliance of the NPT 
There are five mayor cases referring to the non-compliance of the Safeguards Agreement 
under the NPT. These include: Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria.  
Iraq joined the IAEA in 1959 and signed the NPT in 1968. The Safeguards Agreement 
came into force in 1972. Since the mid-1970s, Iraq had been suspected of having a nuclear 
weapons programme. However, because of the absence of evidence, Iraq’s civil nuclear pro-
gramme was suported by the IAEA in accordance with the right to peaceful use established 
by the Statute of the IAEA and the NPT. Nevertheless, suspicions of a military nuclear pro-
gramme did not diminish and eventually led to the Israeli attacks on Iraq’s nuclear reactor 
Osirak (see Chapter 1.1.7).243 In 1981, the IAEA strongly condemned the Israeli attack, and 
voted to discontinue all technical assistance to Israel. They also considered to suspend Israel 
from the IAEA. However, due to pressure from the USA, which backed Israel by temporarily 
withdrawing from the IAEA and ceasing all its contributions (the main financial source of 
the IAEA), no further steps were taken.244 
During the First Gulf War, suspicions of an Iraqi nuclear weapons programme arose 
again. In 1991, the SC adopted a resolution, which set out terms for a formal cease-fire. It 
furthermore emphasized Iraq’s obligations under the NPT and demanded Iraq to uncondi-
tionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. It also requested Iraq to submit a 
declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all nuclear weapons-related items to the 
IAEA and to accept urgent on-site inspection of the IAEA and the destruction, removal, or 
rendering harmless of all such items.245 IAEA teams working in co-operation with the UN 
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) gradually unveiled the full extent of Iraq’s large 
clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Subsequently, the IAEA Board of Governors de-
clared that Iraq had been violating the Safeguards Agreement and reported this to the Secu-
rity Council. Afterwards, they carried out inspections and operations to dismantle all nu-
clear-weapons related items. The fact that Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme had been on-
going for several years, without being detected by the IAEA, led to sharp criticism and to 
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the creation of the Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540(Corrected)246 of September 1992 
mentioned above.247  
North Korea signed the Statute of the IAEA in 1974 and the NPT in 1985. In 1992, after 
lengthy negotiations and under growing international pressure, North Korea also brought 
into force the Safeguards Agreement. However, the IAEA was unable to verify that the initial 
report sub-mitted by North Korea covered all nuclear material they really had. In 1993, the 
IAEA requested a special inspection of two locations that appeared to be nuclear waste 
stores, which were not listed in the initial report. After North Korea had rejected the request, 
the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that North Korea was violating the Safeguards 
Agreement and reported this to the Security Council. Shortly after that, North Korea gave 
notice of its withdrawal from the NPT. However, due to international pressure, North Korea 
suspended the withdrawal before it came into effect. One year after, in 1994, North Korea 
definitely withdrew from the IAEA and suspended the Safeguards Agreement. Negotiations 
between the USA and North Korea led to a new agreement, which was to substitute the 
Safeguards Agreement: the USA would provide two light water reactors to North Korea and, 
in return, North Korea would freeze and ultimately dismantle their nuclear weapons pro-
gramme. The agreement also stipulated that the IAEA would be allowed to monitor the 
freeze. Nonetheless, in the following years, little progress was made to implement the agree-
ment.248  
In October 2002, the USA alleged North Korea of secretly continuing its nuclear weap-
ons programme in spite of the new agreement. In November 2002, the IAEA requested in-
formation about the suspected programme, but received no reply. In December, the IAEA 
once more insisted that North Korea should reply and cooperate with the IAEA and empha-
sized that unregistered nuclear activities would constitute a violation of North Korea’s inter-
national commitments. After that, North Korea expelled all IAEA inspectors, removed sur-
veillance equipment from its nuclear facilities, and declared its withdrawal from the NPT. 
The IAEA Board of Governors once again condemned North Korea’s non-compliance and 
reported this to the UN Security Council. Notwithstanding the actions taken by the IAEA 
and the Security Council, North Korea continued its nuclear weapons programme, and by 
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carrying out its first nuclear weapons test in 2006, caused a serious backlash for the IAEA 
and the NPT.249 
Iran joined the IAEA in 1958, signed the NPT in 1968 and brought into force the Safe-
guards Agreement in 1974. In 2002, suspicions arose that Iran was operating a nuclear weap-
ons programme. In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been secretly enriching uranium 
and producing plutonium and thus repeatedly and over an extended period of time failed to 
meet its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement. Shortly after that, Iran signed the Ad-
ditional Protocol, but did not ratify it. In the following, the IAEA repeatedly called on Iran 
to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, but Iran rejected the demand claiming its 
programme was for peaceful purposes only. Meanwhile, France, Great Britain, and Germany 
started negotiations with Iran, but little progress was made. In 2005, the IAEA declared that 
Iran’s withholding of information on its nuclear programme constituted a non-compliance of 
the Safeguards Agreement and, in 2006, reported this to the UN Security Council. In spite 
of a series of sanctions adopted by the SC (see Chapter 2.3.2) and serious tensions between 
Iran and other countries, particularly Israel and the USA, Iran has not withdrawn from the 
IAEA or the NPT, and continues partially cooperating with the IAEA. However, the situation 
continues to be opaque and the outcome remains to be seen.250 
Libya acceded the IAEA in 1963, the NPT in 1968, and brought into force the Safe-
guards Agreement in 1980. For about 20 years, it had been carrying out a nuclear weapons 
programme without the IAEA taking notice of it. When in 1993 the US Navy revealed the 
programme, Libya immediately announced to dismantle it and to adopt the Additional Pro-
tocol. In 2004, the IAEA confirmed Libya’s non-compliance of the Safeguards Agreement 
and, in the following years, monitored the dismantling of the Libya’s nuclear weapons pro-
gramme.251 
Syria as well as Libya joined the IAEA in 1963 and the NPT in 1968, but brought into 
force the Safeguards Agreement in 1992. In 2007, Israel unilaterally bombed a building in 
Syria which it believed was a nuclear reactor under construction. Syria denied the allegations 
and allowed inspectors of the IAEA to visit the site. In 2011, the IAEA released a report 
which assessed that the destroyed facility indeed was a reactor, and reported this as a non-
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compliance to the UN Security Council. An IAEA investigation into the matter is still ongo-
ing, with progress hindered by limited Syrian cooperation and the Syrian Civil War. 252 
4.4 Critical Reflections 
In 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its former General Director 
Mohamed El Baradei were jointly awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize 2005 “for their efforts 
to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way”.253 However, the IAEA 
safeguards system under the NPT has been criticized for multiple reasons.  
First, the dual system of supporting nuclear energy for civil use on the one hand and 
preventing its military use on the other hand is highly disputed. It is assumed that some 
nuclear weapons programmes, for example the North Korean, originated from IAEA-based 
support of nuclear technology for civil use. 
Second, the IAEA Statute as well as the NPT and the safeguards under the NPT are 
voluntary state commitments and therefore lack universality. 162 UN member states form 
part of the International Atomic Energy Agency and 189 of the NPT. North Korea, India, 
Pakistan, and Israel are the only UN member states, which do not form part of the NPT. 
Furthermore, both the Statute of the IAEA and the NPT offer the possibility to withdraw. 
Article XVIII paragraph D of the Statute of the IAEA establishes:  
At any time after five years from the date when this Statute shall take effect […] or whenever a 
member is unwilling to accept an amendment to this Statute, it may withdraw from the Agency by 
notice in writing to that effect given to the depositary Government referred to in paragraph C of 
article XXI, which shall promptly inform the Board of Governors and all members.254 
Furthermore, Article X paragraph 1 of the NPT stipulates that: 
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if 
it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the 
supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the 
Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall in-
clude a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.255 
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However, the NPT does not define what is to be understood as “extraordinary events”. North 
Korea’s withdrawal from both, the IAEA and the NPT, emphasizes the fragility of member 
state commitments and reduces the credibility of the IAEA and the NPT.  
Third, the IAEA is subject to legal and technical restrictions. Legal gaps were tried to 
be filled by the Additional Protocol, which has only been ratified in 124 states until today. 
Technical gaps are due to financial, instrumental and personnel deficiencies. Both of the 
gaps facilitate secret nuclear weapons programmes that cannot be discovered by the IAEA. 
National intelligence services form a clandestine parallel system to the IAEA safeguards 
system. 
Fourth, another aspect of criticism refers to the NPT, which divides the international 
community in official nuclear-weapon states, non-official nuclear-weapon states and non-
nuclear-weapon states. It is criticized that the NPT has ‘legitimated’ the official nuclear-
weapon states, which are furthermore accused of undermining Article VI of the NPT, which 
urges all states to pursue negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control.256 
Fifth, the IAEA is also suspected of being subject to political influences and acting 
beyond its competences. The acting of the IAEA after the US withdrawal from the IAEA in 
order to back Israel after the Osirak attack, gives one example of political influence. More-
over, the IAEA has been criticized of acting impartial and beyond its competences in the 
contemporary case of Iran. The American Lawyer Daniel H. Joyner argues that the IAEA 
was applying measures of the Additional Protocol, even though it has not come into force in 
Iran yet: 
“It must be remembered that the IAEA is not a general policeman of international nuclear en-
ergy law. It is not the ‘UN’s nuclear watchdog’, as the media is so fond of calling it. The agency 
is an independent international organization, which was created through a treaty -- an instru-
ment of international law. As such, it has only the international legal personality and the limited 
mandate of legal authority, which are provided both in the agency's statute and in its bilateral 
Safeguards Agreements with member states.”257 
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5. The International Court of Justice 
5.1 Structure, Functions and Competences 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 
The Court’s tasks are to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted 
to it by states (continuous cases) and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred 
to it by authorized UN organs and specialized agencies (advisory proceedings). The Court 
is composed of 15 judges, who are elected by both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council for terms of nine years. The legal sources of the Court are international treaties and 
conventions in force, international custom, the general principles of law, and judicial deci-
sions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. Moreover, if the parties agree, 
the Court can decide a case ex aequo et bono258, that means, without limiting itself to existing 
rules of international law.259 
Only states may be parties to continuous cases. By signing the UN Charter, a state mem-
ber of the UN undertakes to comply with any decision of the Court in a case to which it is a 
party. It is rare for a decision not to be implemented. A state which finds that the other side 
has failed to implement a decision of the Court, may address the Security Council, which is 
empowered to recommend or decide upon the measures to be taken to give effect to the 
judgment.260 
Advisory proceedings before the Court are open solely to five organs of the United 
Nations and to 16 specialized agencies within the UN system. The UN General Assembly 
and Security Council may request advisory opinions on “any legal question”. Other UN or-
gans and authorized specialized agencies such as the IAEA can only do so with respect to 
“legal questions arising within the scope of their activities”. When it receives a request for 
an advisory opinion, the Court, in order to give its opinion with full knowledge of the facts, 
is empowered to hold written and oral proceedings. After the consultation procedures, the 
Court delivers the advisory opinion at a public sitting. It is of the essence of such opinions 
that they are advisory, and – unlike the Court’s judgments – have no binding effect. The 
requesting organ, agency or organization remains free to give effect to the opinion by any 
means open to it, or not to do so.261  
                                                     
258 Latin for “according to the right and good” means that a judge may decide not only pending on the existing rules and 
law but on moral principles such as fairness and equability.  
259 Cf. Charter of the United Nations, op. cit., note 153, Chapter XIV; and ICJ, “How the Court works”, International Court 






5.1 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice published the ‘Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’262 upon the request of the General As-
sembly in 1994, which asked the Court if the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted 
in any circumstance under international law. In its conclusions the Court decided: 
A. Unanimously, that  
“there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization 
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”; 
B. By eleven votes to three votes263, that  
“there is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and 
universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such”; 
C. Unanimously, that  
“a threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 
4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is 
unlawful”; 
D. Unanimously, that  
“a threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the 
international law applicable in armed conflict particularly those of the principles and rules 
of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and 
other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons;” 
E. By seven votes to seven votes264, by the President’s casting vote265,  
“that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of inter-
national law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of hu-
manitarian law;  
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its 
disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the 
very survival of a State would be at stake”; 
F. Unanimously, that  
“there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations 
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international con-
trol.” 
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The Court considered that the most directly relevant applicable law is that relating to the use 
of force according to the UN Charter; the law applicable in armed conflicts; and any relevant 
treaties on nuclear weapons (para. 34). Before examining the applicable law sources, the 
Court emphasized the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons: 
“The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They 
have the potential to destroy al1 civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet. The radia-
tion released by a nuclear explosion would affect health, agriculture, natural resources and de-
mography over a very wide area. Further, the use of nuclear weapons would be a serious danger 
to future generations. Ionizing radiation has the potential to damage the future environment, 
food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic defects and illness in future generations” 
(para. 35). 
UN Charter 
The Court first addressed the question of the legality or illegality of nuclear weapons under 
the provisions of the UN Charter. Article 2 paragraph 5 of the UN Charter prohibits the use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. However, the UN Charter 
provides two exceptions: First, Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defence if any armed attack occurs and second, Article 42 of the Charter author-
izes the Security Council to take military enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter 
VII of the Charter. The Court furthermore noted that these provisions do not refer to specific 
weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed (para. 37-39).  
The Court then brought into mind that the exercise of the right of self-defence is, ac-
cording to customary international law, subject to the principles of necessity and proportion-
ality. This condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter. The proportionality princi-
ple may not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence in all circumstances. 
But at the same time, a use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, 
in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict 
which comprise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. The very nature 
of nuclear weapons and their profound risks are further considerations to be taken in mind 
by states believing they can exercise a nuclear response in self-defence in accordance with 
the requirements of proportionality (para. 40-44). 
In order to lessen or eliminate the risk of unlawful attack, states sometimes signal that 




integrity or political independence. Whether a signaled intention to use force if certain events 
occur is or is not a ‘threat’ within Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter depends on the circum-
stances. The notions of ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of force under Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter 
stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case was illegal – for 
whatever reason – the threat to use such force would likewise be illegal (para. 47 and 48). 
International Law on Nuclear Weapons 
Having dealt with the provisions given in the UN Charter, the Court addressed the question 
whether there are specific rules in international law regulating the legality or illegality of the 
use or threat of nuclear weapons per se. First, the Court rejected that nuclear weapons should 
be treated in the same way as poisoned weapons under the Second Hague Declaration of 
1899, the Hague Convention IV of 1907, and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as these do not 
define what is to be understood by ‘poison’ or ‘poisoned weapons’, and different interpreta-
tion exists, usually referring to weapons whose prime or even exclusive effect is to poison 
or asphyxiate (para. 54-56). The Court then stipulated that, until now, weapons of mass de-
struction have been declared illegal by specific instruments and that, although in the last 
two decades, many negotiations have been conducted with regard to nuclear weapons, they 
have not resulted in a treaty of general prohibition of the same kind as for bacteriological 
and chemical weapons (para. 57 and 58).266 
The Court stipulated that the present nuclear-weapons treaties deal exclusively with 
acquisition, manufacture, possession, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons, without 
specifically addressing their threat or use. They point to an increasing concern in the 
international community with these weapons and could therefore be seen as foreshadowing 
a future general prohibition of the use of such weapons, but do not constitute such a 
prohibition per se. Although the Treaties of Tlatelolco (NWFZ in Latin America) and 
Rarotonga (NWFZ in the South Pacific) and their Protocols, as well as the declarations made 
by the permanent members of the Security Council in connection with the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty generally restrict the use of nuclear weapons, they reserve exemptions in certain 
circumstances. Thus, they cannot be interpreted as a comprehensive and universal 
conventional prohibition on the use, or threat of nuclear weapons (para. 59-63).  
                                                     
266 The Court is referring to the ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction’ of 10 April 1972, which prohib-
its the possession of bacteriological and toxic weapons and reinforces the prohibition of their use, and the Con-
vention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction of 13 January 1993, which prohibits al1 use of chemical weapons and requires the destruction 
of existing stocks.  
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International Customary Law and International Humanitarian Law  
The Court then examined whether a prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons can 
be derived from customary international law. The Court did not consider itself able to find 
an opinio juris267 prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons per se. It referred to the General 
Assembly, which annually adopts resolutions requesting the member states to conclude a 
convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance. These resolutions 
reveal the desire of a very large section of the international community, but the emergence, 
as lex lata268, of a customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such 
is hampered by the continuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris on the one hand, 
and the still strong adherence to the practice of deterrence on the other hand (para. 65-73).  
The Court not having found a conventional rule of general scope, nor a customary rule 
specifically proscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons per se, then dealt with the ques-
tion whether recourse of nuclear weapons must be considered as illegal in the light of the 
principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, as estab-
lished by the Hague and the Geneva Conventions (para. 74 and 75).  
There are two main principles of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, which 
are based on the distinction of combatants and non-combatants. The first principle is the 
protection of civilians; states must never make civilians the object of attack and must conse-
quently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military 
targets. The second principle is the prohibition to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants; 
it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating 
their suffering. In application of that second principle, states do not have unlimited freedom 
of choice regarding to the weapons they use. The Court likewise referred, in relation to these 
principles, to the Martens Clause, which was first included in the Hague Convention II of 
1899 and which has proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of 
military technology. A modern version of that clause is to be found in Article 1 paragraph 2 
of the 1977 Additional Protocol, which reads as follows: 
“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and com-
batants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived 
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public con-
science.” 
                                                     
267 The expression opinio juris refers to a norm that derives from customary law. 




Humanitarian law, at a very early stage, prohibited certain types of weapons either because 
of their indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians or because of the unnecessary suf-
fering caused to combatants, that means, a harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve 
legitimate military objectives. Accordingly, if the use of weapons would not meet the re-
quirements of humanitarian law, a threat to use such would also be contrary to that law. 
Furthermore, these fundamental rules apply to all states whether or not they have ratified the 
conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of inter-
national customary law as established in the Nuremberg Trials (para. 78 and 80).  
The Court noted that most of the principles and rules of humanitarian law had evolved 
prior to the invention of nuclear weapons and that the Conferences of Geneva of 1949 and 
between 1974-1977 did not specifically deal with nuclear weapons. However, in the Court’s 
view, it cannot be concluded from this that the established principles and rules of humani-
tarian law applicable in armed conflict do not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion 
would be incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles 
in question and the Martens Clause (para. 85-87). 
The Court then referred to the principle of neutrality as established in Article I of the 
Hague Convention V of 1907: 
“The principle of neutrality, in its classic sense, was aimed at preventing the incursion of bel-
ligerent forces into neutral territory, or attacks on the persons or ships of neutrals. Thus: the 
territory of neutral powers is inviolable.” 
The Court stipulated that as in the case of the principles of humanitarian law applicable in 
armed conflict, international law leaves no doubt that the principle of neutrality, which is of 
a fundamental character similar to that of the humanitarian principles and rules, is applicable, 
to all international armed conflict, whatever type of weapons might be used (para. 88-90). 
The Court furthermore found that the applicability of the principles and rules of human-
itarian law and of the principle of neutrality to nuclear weapons is hardly disputed, but the 
conclusions to be drawn from this applicability are controversial. The Court observed that 
none of the states advocating the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under certain cir-
cumstances, including the ‘clean’ use of smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear weapons, has 
indicated what, supposing such limited use were feasible, would be the precise circum-
stances justifying such use; nor whether such limited use would not tend to escalate into the 
all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons. This being so, the Court did not consider that it 
had a sufficient basis for a determination on the validity of this view (para. 90-94).  
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The Court was however not able to determinate whether the use or threat of nuclear 
weapons was illegal in any circumstance due to their inherent and total incompatibility with 
the law applicable in armed conflict. It indicated that the principles and rules of law appli-
cable in armed conflict make the conduct of armed hostilities subject to a number of strict 
requirements. Thus, methods and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction 
between civilian and military targets, or which would result in unnecessary suffering to com-
batants, are prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, the use of 
such weapons in fact seems reconcilable with respect for such requirements. Nevertheless, 
the Court considered that it did not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with 
certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily contrary to the principles and 
rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance (para. 95).  
Moreover, the Court emphasized the fundamental right of every state to survival and 
self-defence and the practice referred to as ‘policy of deterrence’, to which a considerable 
part of the international community has adhered to for many years (para. 96). According to 
the present state of international law viewed as a whole, the Court observed that it could not 
reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by 
a state in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival would be at 
stake (para. 97).  
Obligation to Nuclear Disarmament 
At last, the Court referred to the obligation to nuclear disarmament as recognized by Article 
VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: 
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarma-
ment, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective interna-
tional control.” 
The Court also hinted at the first General Assembly resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946, 
which unanimously adopted to set up a commission whose terms of reference included mak-
ing specific proposals for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and 
of al1 other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. In a large number of subsequent 
resolutions, the General Assembly has reaffirmed the need for nuclear disarmament. Thus, 
in resolution 808 A (IX) of 4 November 1954, which was likewise unanimously adopted, it 
concluded “that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and 




providing for: … (b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons 
and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing 
stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes.” The same conviction has been expressed 
outside the United Nations context in various instruments.  
The Security Council reaffirmed in its resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 “the need 
for all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to comply 
fully with al1 their obligations” and urged “all States, as provided for in Article VI of the 
Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and com-
plete disarmament under strict and effective international control which remains a universal 
goal.” The importance of fulfilling the obligation expressed in Article VI of the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was also reaffirmed in the final document of the 
Review and Extension Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, held from 17 April to 12 May 1995.  
5.3 Critical Reflections 
The crucial and the most controversial point of the Advisory Opinion is conclusion E, which 
states that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law”, but leaves open whether “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be 
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of 
a State would be at stake.” By doing so, the Court de facto denies to answer the advisory 
question and leaves open the possibility that nuclear weapons might be permitted under in-
ternational law in extreme circumstances. The close vote of conclusion E and the individual 
statements and dissident opinions of the judges implicate the controversy of the decision.  
First, the Court broadly considered the legality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons 
under Article 2, paragraph 5 (general prohibition of use of force), Article 51 (inherent right 
of self-defence), and Article 42 (military enforcement measures authorized by the Security 
Council) of the UN Charter. However, the Court did not discuss the legality of nuclear weap-
ons under Article 1(1) of the UN Charter (maintenance of international peace and security), 
questioning if nuclear weapons would have to be considered as a threat to international peace 
and security per se. 
Second, the Court argued that there are no specific rules in international law explicitly 
regulating the legality or illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, nuclear 
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weapons could not be treated in the same way as poisoned weapons under the Second Hague 
Declaration269 of 1899, the Hague Convention IV270 of 1907 and the Geneva Protocol271 of 
1925 as different interpretation exists about the terms ‘poison’ or ‘poisoned weapon’. The 
Geneva Protocol of 1925 establishes that: 
 “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, mate-
rials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world […].” 
It is indisputable that ionizing radiation is poisonous.272 The Court adopted a restrictive in-
terpretation by saying that “different interpretation exists, usually referring to weapons 
who’s prime or even exclusive effect is to poison or asphyxiate.” However, the Geneva Pro-
tocol of 1925 does not indicate any restrictions as does for example Protocol III to the Con-
vention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons273, 
which defines an “incendiary weapon” as a weapon or munition which is ‘primarily’ de-
signed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons.” In contrary, the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925 includes “all analogous liquids, materials or devices”. The Court’s decision 
to exclude nuclear weapons from the Geneva Protocol of 1925, therefore severely under-
mines radiation effects of nuclear weapons.  
Third, the Court also denied the existence of international costmary law. The Court 
paradoxically justified its decision by the “still strong adherence to the practice of deter-
rence” (para. 73), a practice whose legality was before called into question (para. 48). In 
other words, it justified the absence of customary international law with the presence of a 
lawfully doubted state practice. 
Forth, the Court referred to the ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
                                                     
269 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899, available at: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/IN-
TRO/150?OpenDocument>. 
270 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations con-
cerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, available at: <http://www.icrc.org/ap-
plic/ihl/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038bfd6>. 
271 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacte-
riological Methods of Warfare, 17 June 1925, available at: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/280?OpenDocu-
ment>. 
272 The standard reference work Principles and Methods of Toxicology, for example, defines poison as “any 
substance (chemical, physical, biological) that is harmful or destructive to a biological (living) system”. It 
furthermore dedicates an entire chapter to ionizing radiation and a subchapter on the effects of nuclear weap-
ons) (HAYES, Wallace A., Principles and Methods of Toxicology, 5th ed., New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008, 
p. 699 – 772; 1826)  
273 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), 10 October 1980, 




Destruction’274 of 10 April 1972 to conclude from it that such convention does not exists for 
nuclear weapons. However, the Court failed to acknowledge that the Convention also impli-
cated costmary international law by stipulating that all states acted “with a view to achieving 
effective progress toward general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and 
elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction […].” 
Fifth, in a more general sense, nuclear weapons can be seen in line with biological and 
chemical weapons forming the group of “weapons of mass destruction” or the so-called 
“ABC-weapons”. Their purpose, namely the “mass destruction”, universally objects the 
most essential principles of humanitarian law: the protection of civilians and the prohibition 
to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants. Customary international law explicitly pro-
hibited biological and chemical weapons before nuclear weapons were invented and would 
likewise have prohibited nuclear weapons if the Cold War and the subsequent proliferation 
of such weapons, had not undermined the international will to do so. Yet, the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons does not – as the Court argues – justify the non-prohibition of nuclear 
weapons. It rather calls for the rectification of this state practice in accordance with the cor-
rect application of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, international customary law and international 
humanitarian law; a step the Court decided not to make. 
In his declaration, Judge Vereshchetin, who was in favor of conclusion E, suggested 
that the Court should “remain within its judicial function and should not act as a legisla-
tor.”275 This issue has raised a controversial debate among legal scholars. David Kennedy, 
for example, described the advisory opinion as “lengthy and equivocal”.276 In contrast to 
Judge Vereshchetin, he states that it proved the “return of politics to law”.277 He argues that 
the judges failed to take a clear legal position and to act with good faith, defending humani-
tarian values.278 He sees the ICJ trapped between “moralism and the apology of process”; 
“legal passivity and action”; “fact and law”.279  
                                                     
274 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biolog-
ical) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 10 April 1972, available at: < http://www.icrc.org/ihl/IN-
TRO/450?OpenDocument>. 
275 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Legality of the Threat or Use of Threat of Nuclear Weapons (Declara-
tion of Judge Vereshchetin), Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996,., p. 280/58, available at: <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/7505.pdf> 
276 KENNEDY, David, „Nuclear Weapons Case“, in Boisson de Chazournes, Laurens and Philippe Sands [ed.], 
International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge University Press, 
1999, p. 462. 
277 Ibid., p. 463. 
278 Ibid., p. 464. 
279 Ibid., p. 469f. 
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He concludes that: 
“There is a broad story of international law and institutions – a turn from law to politics, and 
then a nervous glance back over the shoulder, perhaps a return to law, to law at once as politics 
and antidote to politics. And there is the movement within international law from form to pro-
cess – followed by an uncertain recoil against the procedural. But most of all we find a polemic 
for the law itself, claiming now both to embrace the perils of nuclear war and hold them at bay. 
In that, this is a story less about nuclear weapons than about law – a story which invites our 
rebellion, our insistence on an honest confrontation with the perils and possibilities of the nu-
clear age. But in the end, if we wish to speak more about nuclear weapons, we must speak more 
about the law, speak in a way this case is silent, about the law which emboldens states as war-
riors and structures deterrence as rational […].”280 
Martti Koskenniemi criticizes the decision of the ICJ in a similar way. He argues that legal 
decisions must be based on ‘reason’ and not as political decisions on ‘passion’. The virtue 
of lawyers is therefore the ability to stick to legal methods and abstain from all political or 
other non-legal influences.281 The ICJ failed to comply with this virtue by participating in a 
“doctrinal practice that puts its hope in the contrast of legal reasoning to ideology, philoso-
phy and political prophecy [and] ends up as a collection of makeshift apologies.”282 As Ken-
nedy, he asserts that conclusion E derived from a severe conflict between law and politics, 
two concepts that, in his opinion, cannot be distinguished precisely.283 He claims that any 
definite decision of the Court would have implicated a clear political statement. The Court, 
however, circumvented this problem by not giving a definite decision at all. The main issue 
at stake, the “possible mass killing of innocent people by nuclear weapons”, was thus under-
mined by the conflict between law and politics. 284 After broadly discussing the role of the 
judges, Koskenniemi concludes that they focused too much on complying legal formalities 
instead of saying what was intrinsically right: 
“As lawyers, we need to be able to say that we know that the killing of the innocent is wrong 
not because of whatever chains of reasoning we can produce to support it, or who it was that 
told us so, but because of who we are. Without so defining ourselves, how could we possibly 
be trusted to do the right thing in the unique and precarious situations in which that passion is 
triggered?”285 
                                                     
280 Ibid., p. 472. 
281 KOSKENNIEMI, Martti, “Faith, Identity, and the Killing of the Innocents: International Lawyers and Nuclear 
Weapons”, Leiden Journal of International Law, 10:10, 1997, p. 137. 
282 UNGER, R.M., cited in ibid., p. 138. 
283 Ibid., p. 140f. 
284 Ibid., p. 143. 
285 Ibid., p. 162. 
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CHAPTER III - THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
In the third chapter, I will apply theoretical approaches which serve to explain both, the 
armament and proliferation of nuclear weapons and the achievements and failures of the 
global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These include Game The-
oretic Models, the Sagan-Waltz Controversy, and the Global Governance Problématique 
according to Weiss and Thakur. 
1. Game Theory 
1.1 The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Game theory is a mathematical method that infers rational choice behavior in situations of 
social conflict, in which the success of the individual depends not only on its own actions, 
but also on the actions of others. Modern game theory is based on the 1944 book Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Since then, 
it has become a key methodology in economic science and also influenced other disciplines 
such as sociology and political science.286 
The Theory is built on the concept of the homo oeconomicus, which suggests that hu-
man beings are self-interested and rational actors. They constantly aim to maximize their 
utility and thereby dispose of all information required to make rational choices. This concept 
was later on applied not only to individuals, but also to collective actors. The theory assumes 
that actors cooperate in order to maximize their utility. However, in certain situations they 
might not cooperate even if it would maximize the utility of the two parties. This problem, 
which plays an important role in game theory, is referred to as the prisoners’ dilemma.287  
The prisoners’ dilemma was developed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950 
and subsequently formalized by Albert W. Tucker. Today there exist plenty of versions of 
the prisoners’ dilemma, of which the most common goes like this: Two prisoners are accused 
of having jointly committed a robbery, which is sentenced to three years of prison, but the 
police do not have enough evidence to convict them. Without confession the prisoners could 
only be charged for possession of stolen goods, which is sentenced to one year of prison. 
Therefore, the police offer each prisoner a deal: If one confesses the crime and betrays the 
other, he will be released without sentence. If both confess, they will be each sentenced to 
two years of prison. Both prisoners are held in solitary confinement and cannot communicate 
                                                     
286 Cf. BRAMS, Steven J.  and Morton D. Davis, “game theory”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014, available at: 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/224893/game-theory>. 
287 Ibid. 
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with each other. Consequently, there are three possible outcomes: (1) if one confesses and 
the other does not, the former will be released and the latter will be sentenced to 3 years; (2) 
if neither confesses, each will be sentenced to 1 year; and (3) if both confess, each will be 
sentenced to 2 years.  
The possible individual outcomes, which are also referred to as payoffs, can be visual-
ized in a matrix: 
  prisoner 2 
 
prisoner 1 
 remains silent confesses total 
remains silent 
P1: 1 year,  
 P2: 1 years  
P1: 3 years,  
P2: 0 years 
P1: 4 years 
confesses 
P1: 0 years,  
P2: 3 years 
P1: 2 years,  
P2: 2 years 
P1: 2 years 
 
total P2: 4 years P2: 2 years 
 
Individually, it is more beneficial for each prisoner to confess no matter how the other acts. 
The prisoner would either be released (in case the other one remained silent) or sentenced to 
2 years of prison (in case the other one also confessed). The total of both possible outcomes 
would thus be of 2 years of prison. If the prisoner remained silent, he would be either sen-
tenced to 1 year of prison instead of being released (in the case the other one also remained 
silent) or to 3 years of prison instead of 2 years (in the case the other one confessed). The 
total of both possible outcomes would then be of 4 years of prison, twice as much as in case 
of confession. 
The possible collective outcomes, that is the combined sentences of both prisoners, can 




Collectively, it would be more beneficial for both prisoners to remain silent. They would be 
each sentenced to 1 year of prison and together to 2 years of prison, which would be the 
lowest amount of all possible combined outcomes. The dilemma therefore consists in the 
fact that the individually and the collectively most beneficial strategy contradict: If both 
  prisoner 2 
prisoner 1 
 remains silent confesses 
remains silent 2 years 3 years 
confesses 3 years 4 years 
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prisoners opt for the individually most beneficial choice “confession”, they achieve the col-
lectively least beneficial outcome (4 years of prison). 
In the prisoners’ dilemma, cooperation in form of collective action is hindered by the 
fact that the prisoners cannot communicate with each other. However, if they could com-
municate with each other, there would still remain the risk of being betrayed by the other. 
The actors do not dispose of all information required to make a complete rational choice. 
1.2 Application of the Prisoners’ Dilemma on the Soviet-US Arms Race 
Since the 1960s, the prisoners’ dilemma has been applied to scores of areas, inter alia to the 
Soviet-US nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Analogously to the original model, the 
Soviet Union and the US are described as two actors, which can decide between two possible 
choices: nuclear armament or disarmament. There are again three possible outcomes: (1) if 
one state arms while the other disarms, the former will be secure of nuclear attack, while the 
other one will be insecure (unilateral nuclear armament); (2) if both states arm, both states 
will be insecure of nuclear attack (bilateral nuclear armament); (3) if both states disarm, 
both states will be secure of nuclear attack (bilateral nuclear disarmament). The possible 
outcomes for both states can again be visualized in a matrix:288 
  USSR 
 
USA 
 disarm arm total 
disarm 
USA: 3,  
  USSR: 3  
USA: 1,  
  USSR: 4  
 USA: 4  
arm 
USA: 4,  
  USSR: 1  
USA: 2 
 USSR: 2 
 USA: 6 
 
total  USSR: 4   USSR: 6 
 
Individually, it is more beneficial for each state to arm no matter how the other acts. The 
state would either achieve nuclear superiority (in case the other one disarmed) or draw even 
with the other one (in case the other one also armed). The total of both possible outcomes 
would thus be a payoff of 6. If the state disarmed, it would either draw even with the other 
state instead of achieving nuclear superiority (in the case the other one also disarmed) or it 
would end up with nuclear inferiority instead of drawing even (in the case the other one 
                                                     
288 Since the outcome cannot be measured quantitatively as in the original prisoners’ dilemma, the payoffs are 
symbolized by numbers. The most preferred outcome is indicated with a ‘4’, and the least preferred outcome 
is indicated with a ‘1’. It is assumed, that both sides ideally prefer to arm while the other side disarms to 
maximize their military security. 
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armed). The total of both possible outcomes would then be a payoff of 4; two less than in 
case of armament. 
The possible collective outcomes can also be visualized in a matrix: 
  USSR 
USA 
 disarm arm 
disarm 6 5 
arm 5 4 
Collectively, it would be more beneficial for both states to disarm. They would each achieve 
a payoff of 3 and together of 6, which would be the highest amount of all possible combined 
outcomes. The dilemma therefore consists again in the fact that the individually and the 
collectively most beneficial strategy contradict: If both states opt for the individually most 
beneficial choice “armament”, they achieve the collectively least beneficial outcome (a pay-
off of 4). In comparison to the prisoners, who cannot communicate, states indeed are able to 
do so. However, the risk that one state betrays the other is fairly high since payoffs rise by 
successfully doing so.289 
 
2. The Sagan-Waltz-Controversy 
2.1 Neorealism 
Neorealism, or structural realism, is a theory of international relations, which was developed 
by international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of International 
Politics. It derived from classical realist theory as of Hans J. Morgenthau and Edward H. Carr 
and is – similarly to the above described game theoretical approach – based on economic 
theory and empirical observations mainly referring to the Cold War. Waltz asserts that the 
international system consists of states (units) and international relations (structures).290 The 
two main features of Waltz’s theory are (1) the anarchic order of the international system 
and (2) the distribution of power among states.  
                                                     
289 Cf. PLOUS, Scott, “The nuclear arms race: prisoner’s dilemma or perceptual dilemma?”, Journal Of Peace 
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In the tradition of classic realism, Waltz asserts that the international system is an anar-
chic system because there is no legitimate monopoly of force such as a world government. 
Because of this anarchic order, international relations are characterized by mistrust and in-
security. States are never certain of the other states’ intention and suffer from permanent 
threat of war. In order to counter this security dilemma, states act in accordance with the 
principle of self-help.291 States are described as “unilateral actors, who, at a minimum, [seek] 
their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination”. Therefore, they 
either increase their economic and military strength (internal efforts) or create alliances with 
other states (external efforts).292  
Depending on their resources, states have different capabilities of power.293 The distri-
bution of power in the international system may be dominated by one, two, or many super-
powers (unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity). The distribution of power is likely to 
change until a balance of power is achieved, in which the power capabilities of opposing 
states or state alliances are equilibrated. Such balance of power was achieved during the 
Cold War and prevented a ballistic confrontation between the two blocs.294 
2.2 Kenneth N. Waltz: “More May Be Better” 
In his later work, Waltz attempted to support his neorealist approach by analyzing the impact 
of nuclear weapons on the Cold War and on international politics in general. In his 1981 
publication “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better”, he argues that the 
gradual spread of nuclear weapons has contributed to international peace and security in the 
past and is likely to do so in the future. His thesis is mainly based on the observation that the 
post-World War II era has been the most peaceful era in the 20th century, whereby he defines 
peace as the “absence of general war among the major states of the world”. He claims that 
the “high ability of the postwar international system to absorb changes and to contain con-
flicts and hostilities” is linked to the invention and proliferation of nuclear weapons.295  
Waltz reemphasizes that states coexist in an anarchic system, in which self-help is the 
principle of action. The most important way in which states must help themselves is by 
providing for their own security. The chances of peace rise if states can achieve their own 
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security without using force. They can do so by either defence or deterrence, which are not 
to be confused: 
“How can one state dissuade another state from attacking? One way to counter an intended attack is 
to build fortifications and to muster forces that look forbiddingly strong. To build defenses so pa-
tently strong that no one will try to destroy or overcome them would make international life perfectly 
tranquil. I call this the defensive ideal. The other way to counter an intended attack is to build retal-
iatory forces able to rain unacceptable punishment upon a would-be aggressor. ‘To deter’ means to 
stop people from doing something by frightening them.”296 
War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains. States are not 
inclined to run major risks for minor gains. If states can score only small gains because large 
ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight. Waltz argues that many wars might 
have been avoided had their outcome been foreseen. Yet, uncertainty about outcomes does 
not work decisively against the fighting of wars in conventional wars, but countries armed 
with conventional weapons go to war knowing that even in case of defeat their sufferings 
will be limited. This is not the case with nuclear weapons: 
“Calculations about nuclear war are made differently. If countries armed with nuclear weapons go 
to war with each other, they do so knowing that their suffering may be unlimited. In a conventional 
world, one is uncertain about winning or losing. In a nuclear world, one is uncertain about surviving 
or being annihilated.”297 
Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, nobody dares to start a 
war. Therefore, nuclear weapons can be seen as a “deterrent ideal”. In short: “If a state has 
nuclear weapons or enjoys their protection then that state will not be subject to a war in 
which its vital interests are at stake.”298 
Waltz also addresses the fear of irresponsible use und incapacity of self-control among 
nascent nuclear-weapon states and the fear of nuclear proliferation among non-state actors, 
but rejects them as “unrounded”. This fear has always existed and never be proved to become 
true: “New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dan-
gers than some of the old ones have been.”299 He then concludes: 
“The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons, 
responsibly used, make wars hard to start. Nations that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives 
to use them responsibly. […] Because they do, the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to 
be welcomed than feared.”300 
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2.3 Scott D. Sagan: “More Will Be Worse” 
In 1994, political scientist Scott D. Sagan outlined an antithesis to Waltz’ approach which 
was initially titled “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, 
and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons” and later renamed to “More Will Be Worse”. 
His organizational approach is mainly based on the assumption that “military organiza-
tions, unless professionally managed through a checks- and balances system of strong civil-
ian control, are unlikely to fulfill the operational requirement for stable nuclear deterrence” 
and that “there are strong reasons to believe that future nuclear-armed states will lack the 
positive mechanism of civilian control”, because “many current and emerging proliferator 
have either military-run governments or weak civilian-led governments in which the profes-
sional military has a strong and direct influence on policymaking.”301  
Sagan argues, that the assumption of rationality as derived from economic theory is 
only an assumption and not an empirically tested fact: “Political scientists often assume high 
degrees of rationality, not because it is accurate, but because it is helpful: it provides a rela-
tively simple way of making predictions, by linking perceived interests with expected be-
havior.”302 Realists like Waltz “have confused prescriptions of what rational states should 
do with predictions of what real states will do.”303 
According to Sagan, there are two major impediments to pure rationality in organiza-
tional behavior: First, large organizations function within a severely bounded rationality and 
second, complex organizations commonly have multiple conflicting goals, and the process 
by which objectives are chosen and pursued is strongly political.304 Furthermore, military 
leaders are more inclined to use military force than civilian leaders. This is due to several 
reasons, such as the self-selection into the profession, the subsequent professional socializa-
tion, and the pure and short-minded military logic they are accustomed to.305 
He concludes that military organizations that are not subject to a checks- and balances 
system of strong civilian control, are inclined to deterrence failures and accidental use of 
nuclear weapons contrary to national interests.306 
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2.4 Continuation of the Debate 
In further articles, Waltz and Sagan discussed the applicability of their approaches to differ-
ent cases, such as the nuclear armament of India and Pakistan in the context of the Cashmere 
Conflict, or the (possible) nuclear armament of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran in the context of 
(possible) US invasion. Waltz argues that the nuclear armament of India and Pakistan has 
created a balance-of-power and a state of security and peace between the two countries.307 
Sagan counters that the state between India and Pakistan is neither secure nor peaceful.308 
Waltz furthermore argues, that nuclear armament was the only option for Iraq, North 
Korea, and Iran to secure themselves from US invasion. While Iraq failed to achieve nuclear 
weapons and hence suffered its third US invasion, North Korea achieved nuclear weapons 
and thus impeded a US invasion. Waltz claims that, consequently, the nuclear armament of 
Iran would be rational in order to secure themselves from US invasion. It would furthermore 
stabilize the Middle-East by establishing a balance of power between Israel and the US on 
one side and Iran on the other side. He also claims that Iraq, North Korea, and Iran would be 
interested and capable in keeping their nuclear weapons safe, and that they could only use 
them as deterrence since any first strike would be retaliated with a second strike.309 Sagan 
counters, that military organizations in Iraq, North Korea, and Iran lack a checks- and bal-
ances system of strong civilian control, which makes irrational first-strike use against the 
interests of civilian population probable. Furthermore, he hints at the risk of nuclear prolif-
eration to non-state actors and nuclear terrorism.310  
Conclusively, they also debate if nuclear zero would be the best option, whereby they 
focus on the role of the United States. Both refer to the 2009 Prague Speech, in which US 
president Obama promised, that “the United States will take concrete steps toward a world 
without nuclear weapons”. Subsequently he was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize “pri-
marily for his work on and commitment to nuclear disarmament.”311  
Waltz opposes nuclear zero, because of three reasons: first, nuclear-weapon states have 
no interest in giving up their nuclear weapons and therefore won’t do so; second, since nu-
clear-weapon states won’t give up their nuclear weapons, the only way for non-nuclear-
weapon states threatened by nuclear-weapon states, to ensure their security is becoming a 
nuclear-weapon state; and third, even in the event that all nuclear-weapon states agreed on 
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nuclear zero, it would be impossible to control the dismantle of all nuclear weapons because 
of the security dilemma.312  
Waltz describes Obama’s words as “rhetoric coming from the White House”. He argues, 
that the United States show in fact no intention of dropping its nuclear forces below the 
second-strike level. He thereby refers to what Obama said subsequent to his promise in the 
2009 Prague Speech: “Make no mistake: as long as these weapons exist, the United States 
will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal, to deter any adversary and guarantee that 
defense to our allies.”313  
Waltz argues that, on one hand, states with nuclear weapons arsenals are secure from 
severe attack, but, on the other hand, states without nuclear weapons arsenals are vulnerable 
to severe attack from states with nuclear weapon arsenals. States with nuclear weapons have 
never fought one another. However, violent conflicts still exist, but they take place in the 
“periphery of international politics”. In particular, the United States has been “beating up 
poor and weak states”. Since 1983, the US has invaded six countries, beginning and ending 
with Iraq: 
“Like any dominant power, the US is a looming threat in the minds of many international lead-
ers. When President George W. Bush identified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as forming an axis 
of evil in January of 2002, and when he then ordered the invasion of one of them, what were 
the other two to think? It would make sense for them to believe that they might be next, and in 
that case to take steps to deter the United States from invading. But how can any state hope to 
deter a world-dominant power? Conventional defense and deterrence strategies have histori-
cally proven ineffective against the United States, so, logically, nuclear weapons are the only 
weapons capable of dissuading the United States from working its will on other nations.”314 
He then asks: “If somehow world leaders blundered into an agreement to pursue nuclear 
zero, then what would any nuclear country with sensible leaders do?” and answers: “cheat.” 
The ban of nuclear weapons would be impossible to police and enforce, and countries would 
be tempted to break rules. And because some might cheat all would have strong incentives 
to do so.315 Waltz concludes:  
“With the dawn of nuclear age, peace has prevailed among those who have nuclear weapons or 
enjoy their protection. Those who like peace should love nuclear weapons. They are the only 
weapons ever invented that work decisively in effect that we should eliminate the cause of the 
extensive peace that the nuclear world has enjoyed” (ibid., 223). 
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Sagan, on the other hand, supports nuclear zero and argues that Obama is right to declare 
that the United States seeks a world without nuclear weapons and take concrete steps toward 
that long-term goal. His argumentation is once again based on the threat of nuclear terrorism: 
“First, the most dangerous nuclear threats to the United States today and on the horizon are 
from terrorists and potential new nuclear powers […]. Second, the spread of nuclear weapons 
to new states, and indirectly to terrorist organizations, will be made less likely if the United 
States and other nuclear-armed nations are seen to be working in good faith toward disarma-
ment. […] 
The choice we face […] is between creating a nuclear-weapons-free world or living in a 
world with many more nuclear-weapons states. And if there are more nuclear nations, and more 
atomic weapons in global arsenals, there will be more opportunities for terrorists to steal or buy 
the bomb.”316 
He admits that the realization of nuclear zero cannot be guaranteed by verification measures. 
However, this uncertainty would not impede nuclear zero, if states would retain the option 
to rearm. If one state would secretly rearm, than it would have to be aware that other states 
could also rearm. There would still be a latent form of nuclear deterrence even in a nuclear-
free world. States could furthermore protect themselves from possible secret nuclear attacks 
by employing ballistic missile defenses.317 Sagan concludes: 
“In medieval times, European mapmakers placed the words hic sunt dracones (here be dragons) 
at the edge of the known world. Disarmament critics today are like those medieval mapmakers, 
fearing that we are entering unknown territory fraught with hidden nuclear monsters. But these 
dragons are fantasies. The genuine strategic challenges we face in creating a secure nuclear-
free world—adequate verification, enforcement of violations and mutual-defense deploy-
ments—are challenges that can be met over time. And the world we are heading toward if we 
fail to find safe paths to mutual and verifiable disarmament—a world crowded with nuclear-
weapons states and terrorist temptations—is even more fraught with danger.”318  
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3. The Global Governance Problématique according to Weiss and Thakur 
3.1 The Five Global Governance Gaps 
In 2010, the international scholars, Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur published the 
book Global governance and the UN, in which they analyzed the achievements and chal-
lenges of such. They introduce their approach by portraying the Problématique of Global 
Governance. First they observe, that even though there is no world government, the world 
is characterized by a vast amount of functioning cross-border interactions. Indeed, disrup-
tions and threats are rare and in many instances less frequent in the international domain than 
in many sovereign countries that should have effective functioning governments: “That is to 
say, international transactions are typically characterized by order, stability, and predictabil-
ity.”319 The question, which derives from this observation is: How is the world governed 
even in the absence of a world government? The answer, Weiss and Thakur argue, lies in 
the concept of global governance. Global governance is defined as “the sum of laws, norms, 
policies, and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate relations among citizens, soci-
ety, markets, and the state in the international arena – the wielders and objects of interna-
tional public power.”320 The limits of global governance, which they call the “refrain” of 
their book are described as follows: 
“The role of global governance institutions is restricted to containing the contagion. […] Global 
governance can play a facilitative and constraining role, but it rarely plays a determinant and 
predominant role. The authority and capacity for the latter is vested almost exclusively in do-
mestic public authorities.”321 
Furthermore, the evolution of intergovernmental institutions to facilitate international re-
sponses lags behind the emergence of collective problems with trans-border, especially 
global dimensions.322 
The major global governance institution is the United Nations. Thereby, they distinct 
between three United Nations: the first United Nations consists of the intergovernmental 
arena of the UN, where the 193 member states discuss issues and make recommendations 
and decisions; the second United Nations consists of the UN machinery itself, that is the 
bodies and staff members in the UN system, mainly the secretariat, which can be considered 
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as the international civil service; the third United Nations consist of non-state actors, such 
as market institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, academics or 
the civil society in general, which influence UN policies.323  
The deficits of global governance, in particular of the United Nations, can be explained 
by five gaps: knowledge gaps, normative gaps, policy gaps, institutional gaps, and compli-
ance gaps. The first gap is the knowledge gap: “Often little or no consensus exists about the 
nature, causes, gravity, and magnitude of a problem, either about empirical information or 
theoretical explanations. And there is often disagreement over the best remedies and solu-
tions to these problems.”324  
Two examples for knowledge gaps are global warming and nuclear weapons. Neither 
of which was known when the UN Charter was signed and possible threats deriving from 
them as well as potential strategies to counter possible threats are highly disputed. Further-
more, policy issues are often framed by ideological positions. On one hand, the UN is an 
important actor to fill knowledge gaps and overcome ideological positions. On the other 
hand, it is questionable, if ideological positions can be overcome by filling knowledge gaps: 
“How useful are additional empirical data and theoretical explanations in the face of domi-
nant world views or entrenched ideologies? Can new information and experiences guide 
policymakers, or are they largely irrelevant?”325 
The second gap is the normative gap, whereby ‘norm’ is defined in an ethical sense as 
a “pattern of behavior that should be follows in accordance with a given value system – the 
moral code of a society, a generally accepted standard of proper behavior.”326 Weiss et al. 
argue, that reaching consensus about universally acceptable norms is enormously difficult. 
One example for filling a normative gap was the creation of the universal human rights, 
which was a long and complex process. The UN assumes an ambiguous role in filling nor-
mative gaps: 
“As a universal organizations, the UN is an exceptional forum for seeking normative consensus 
on how best to deal with global problems […]. At the same time, the UN is a maddening forum 
because dissent by powerful states or mischief by large coalitions of less powerful states means 
either that no action occurs or that agreement is possible only on a lowest common denomina-
tor.”327  
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The third gap is the policy gap, whereby ‘policy’ is defined as “an interlinked set of govern-
ing principles and goals and the agreed programmes of action to implement those principles 
and achieve those goals.”328 Such policies are for example the Kyoto Protocol, which is to 
combat global warming, and the NPT, which is to combat the threat of nuclear weapons. 
Global governance highly depends on who the relevant policy makers are: national authori-
ties or international organizations? National authorities usually apply a boundary-based sep-
aration between domestic and foreign policies and seek to mediate the two fields. This is not 
the idea of global governance, since the whole globe is supposed to be their stage. However, 
the two UN policy making organs, the Security Council and the General Assembly, operate 
as intergovernmental forums, and therefore are directly steered by national authorities: 
“While the source and scale of most of today’s pressing challenges are global and any effec-
tive solution must also be global, the policy authority for tackling them remains vested in 
states.”329 
The forth gap is the institutional gap, whereby the ‘institution’ is used in two senses: as 
“formal organizational entities” as well as “regimes – recurring and stable patterns of behav-
ior around which expectations converge”.330 Weiss and Thakur argue that if “policy is to 
escape the trap of being ad hoc, episodic, judgmental, and idiosyncratic, it must be housed 
within an institution that has resources and autonomy.”331 Institutional gaps can refer to the 
fact that there is no global institution, which may address certain policy problems, or that 
there is a global institution, which may address certain policy problems, but lacks the support 
of key states. For example, before the International Criminal Court (ICC) came into force, 
there was no permanent institution to counter international crimes, which could only be 
judged on an ad hoc basis. However, when the ICC came into force in 2002, the US, Russia, 
and China, denied its recognition and decreased its authority severely. The institutional gap 
is striking within the UN system because no powerful global institutions with overarching 
authority and resources exist. Even the most powerful international institutions, such as the 
Security Council, often lack appropriate resources or authority or both.332 
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The fifth and final gap is the compliance gap: 
“Compliance measures must include mechanisms to identify defections and defectors from 
agreed-upon norms and commitments in the realm of international governance as well as in-
centives that reward the cooperation and disincentives that punish defection (including the use 
of force to bring those who have not complied back into line).”333  
Compliance consists of three steps: implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. How-
ever, the question is, who has the authority, responsibility, and capacity to monitor and en-
force commitments that have been made and obligations that have been accepted? For ex-
ample, how can the compliance of international treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the 
NPT be ensured? The only global institution that can legitimately enforce the compliance of 
international obligations is the Security Council. All other actors, such as member states, 
other UN bodies, and non-state actors, are restricted to calling attention to noncompliance 
and push to compliance by non-forcible means. The most relevant and typical examples of 
compliance gaps are in the area of international peace and security. For example, even 
though Article 47 of the UN Charter calls for standing UN military forces, no such exists. If 
the Security Council decides to enforce the compliance of international obligations by for-
cible means it has to “beg and borrow troops” in order to execute its decision.334 
3.2 Application of the Global Governance Gaps to the Nuclear Weapons Regime 
Knowledge Gaps 
There is broad agreement about the danger and destructiveness of nuclear weapons. The 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings as well as the numerous nuclear weapons tests have pro-
vided the international community with sufficient empirical evidence. However, there is 
broad disagreement about the best policy strategies to counter the existence of nuclear weap-
ons. Indeed, the two most radical opinions, as described in Chapter 2.3.2, are completely 
opposite. The so called ‘nuclear pessimists’, such as Scott D. Sagan, call for the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons. They consider nuclear weapons as a threat to international 
peace and security and fear a nuclear strike, which in the worst-case could lead to a nuclear 
world war. Therefore, global governance has to adopt measures to enforce complete nuclear 
disarmament and prevent nuclear proliferation. The so-called ‘nuclear optimists’, such as 
Kenneth N. Waltz, however, call for the maintenance and possible gradual proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. They consider nuclear weapons as a chance for international peace and 
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security and claim that nuclear weapons are not employed to be used, but only to deter. They 
do not cause nuclear wars but prevent conventional wars. Therefore, global governance 
should not seek nuclear disarmament, nor horizontal non-proliferation in any case. Besides 
those two extremes, there are opinions which defend the status quo. They tolerate the present 
nuclear-weapon states, but do not tolerate further horizontal proliferation. 
Furthermore, the global governance of nuclear weapons is framed by ideological posi-
tions. Nuclear pessimists identify nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as a necessary 
step towards the ideal state of peace and pacifism. Nuclear optimists, however, perceive 
nuclear weapons as a necessary evil in a realist state of anarchy and insecurity. Nuclear 
weapons are often justified by the need and right to self-defense against external threats such 
as enemy states and terrorists.  
The UN is an important actor to fill knowledge gaps and overcome ideological positions 
in terms of nuclear weapons. Its various disarmament bodies, in particular the UN Institution 
for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), whose mission is to “assist the international commu-
nity in finding and implementing solutions to disarmament and security challenges”,335 gen-
erate a considerable amount of empirical data and theoretical explanations to facilitate nu-
clear disarmament. However, it is questionable, if filling the knowledge gaps helps over-
coming ideological positions: How useful are empirical data and theoretical explanations, if 
the five permanent members of the Security Council stick on their nuclear weapons arsenal 
in terms of self-defense? 
Normative Gaps 
There is no international treaty that condemns the existence of nuclear weapons.  One of the 
most powerful norms since 1945, however, has been the taboo against their use. Indeed, 
since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, nuclear weapons have never been used again. 
Weiss and Thakur argue that: 
“Norms, not deterrence, have anathematized the use of nuclear weapons as unacceptable, im-
moral, and possibly illegal – even for states that have assimilated such weapons into military 
arsenals and integrated them into military commands and doctrines.”336 
There is not only a taboo on warfare use, but also on nuclear weapon tests. However, history 
shows that it was a long process to impose the taboo of nuclear weapon tests. Since 1958, 
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the GA has been demanding the complete suspension of nuclear weapon tests and the nego-
tiation of a treaty insuring such suspension. Even though today, more than 50 years later, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has still not come into force, the norm indeed has, and since 
1996 the only country who has carried out nuclear weapons tests, North Korea, has been 
condemned by the international community for doing so. Weiss and Thakur emphasize the 
role of the UN in the norm generating process as follows: 
“The unique legitimacy of the United Nations, especially of the General Assembly, is the chief 
explanation for why so many declarations and resolutions were first adopted in the UN before 
producing conventions and treaties in the UN and elsewhere; this is an example of norms fol-
lowed by laws. Even treaties that are negotiated outside UN forums are often submitted to the 
UN machinery for formal endorsement. This process has no bearing on the legal standing of a 
treaty but substantially enhances its moral weight.”337 
However, the General Assembly’s norm generation efforts also demonstrate the limits of 
such. The GA has been adopting scores of resolutions referring to the complete disarmament 
of nuclear weapons, which received a large majority among UN members, and therefore 
could be considered as a broadly accepted norm among the international community. How-
ever, this norm has neither achieved resonance in the Security Council nor in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.  
Policy Gaps 
Even though there are plenty of international treaties concerning nuclear weapons, such as 
the NPT, NWFZs, the CTBT and bilateral arms reduction treaties between Russia and the 
USA, there is no treaty on the prohibiting nuclear weapons such as on biological or chemical 
weapons, which can be referred to as a policy gap. 
Weiss and Thakur argue that global governance is more likely to happen, if the relevant 
policy makers are international organizations instead of national authorities. The relevant 
policy makers of the global governance of nuclear weapons, however, are primarily national 
authorities, which apply a boundary-based separation between domestic and foreign policies, 
whereby national interests are likely to come before international (or global) interests. If 
national authorities of nuclear-weapon states opt for nuclear disarmament they run the risk 
of decreasing their national security and their international power. They therefore would 
have to make a national sacrifice to support an international goal, which is difficult to defend 
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at the domestic level, in particular when the opposition can use strategies of insecurity, such 
as threats of “enemy states” or terrorists, to politicize society. 
Both the General Assembly and the Security Council operate as intergovernmental in-
struments. It is not surprising that all nuclear-weapon states and partially their allies disable 
the elimination of the nuclear weapons regime. Even though, a broad majority of the inter-
national community supports the elimination of the nuclear weapons regime, they have nei-
ther the capability nor the authority to fill the policy gap. On the contrary, the fact that all 
permanent members of the Security Council are nuclear-weapon states reinforces the policy 
gap: The veto of only one of these states would suffice to block a treaty on the prohibition 
of nuclear weapons, even if all other 192 UN member states supporteded it. 
Institutional Gaps 
As described in Chapter 1.2.1, the UN has established several institutions, which deal with 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: the First Committee (Disarmament and Interna-
tional Security Committee), the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, the UN In-
stitute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR), and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs 
(UNODA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the only institu-
tion that – besides the Security Council – has decisive competence is the Conference on 
Disarmament, which formally does not form part of the UN system: “The CD is in the par-
adoxical position of being the UN’s sole disarmament legislative forum while not being a 
true UN body.”338 
The CD – as well as the Security Council – operates as an intergovernmental forum, 
which leads to a policy gap again. Since the CD conducts its works by consensus, any of the 
65 member states can block any policy proposal. Since all of the nine nuclear-weapon states 
form part of the CD, only little progress towards nuclear non-proliferation or disarmament 
has been made. Even though the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was negotiated by the CD, 
it had to be past to the General Assembly because of India’s rejection. Since then, the CD 
has been unable to even start negotiations on certain issues, such as a ban on fissile materials. 
Weiss and Thakur claim that there is a “widespread sense that the UN has become dys-
functional and moribund as a forum for negotiating arms control and disarmament treaties” 
and hint to Kofi Annan citing, in which he said that the CD “faces a crisis of relevance 
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resulting in part from dysfunctional decision-making procedures and the paralysis that ac-
companies them.”339 
Compliance Gaps 
In accordance with the security dilemmas described in Chapter 3.1, the global governance 
of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament faces various compliance gaps, which nega-
tively affect already existing treaties as well as possible future treaties: 
“Nuclear arms control faces a four-part crisis: some NPT states are engaged in undeclared nu-
clear activities, other states have failed to honor their disarmament obligations, some states are 
not party to the NPT, and some nonstate actors seek to acquire nuclear weapons.”340 
The international community has established compliance measures, such as the safeguards 
system under the NPT, which provide mechanisms to identify defections and defectors of 
the NPT. However, these measures are connected to three compliance gaps: first, they are 
only valid for states who have agreed to them (implementation gap); second, they proved to 
be insufficient even in cases where states have agreed to them (monitoring gap); and third, 
the consequences in case of non-compliance are unclear (enforcement gap).  
The fact, that in spite of the NPT, four more states came into possession of nuclear 
weapons and several others attempted to do so, emphasizes the several compliance gaps 
enabling them to do so. In the case of India, Israel and Pakistan, compliance of the NPT 
could not be assured because they had not ratified the NPT. There was no legal base to 
implement any measures preventing nuclear proliferation (implementation gap). In other 
states, such as Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria, clandestine nuclear weapons programmes 
were established even though they had ratified the NPT. The IAEA thus failed to detect these 
programs (monitoring gap). 
Improved monitoring measures require increased authority of the IAEA as provided in 
the Additional Protocol and increased resources of the IAEA (budget, staff, technology, etc.). 
However, both the adoption of the Additional Protocol as well as the increase of IAEA fund-
ing depend on the member states of the NPT and the IAEA. 
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Nuclear weapons have spread slowly but surely. One new state has come into the possession 
of nuclear weapons approximately every five years since the Second World War. Today, 
nine states – the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North 
Korea – are in possession of atomic bombs and thus make part of the ‘nuclear club’. It is 
assumed that all of them but Pakistan and North Korea are also in possession of hydrogen 
bombs. Five more states – Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey – are pro-
vided with US atomic bombs as part of NATO’s nuclear weapons sharing. In total, about 30 
countries have sought nuclear weapons, but voluntarily or forcibly decided to stop them. 
It can be observed that the (attempted) proliferation of nuclear weapons occurs in the 
contexts of international conflicts such as World War II, the Cold War, the Sino-Indian Con-
flict, the Middle East Conflict(s), the Gulf War(s) and, most recently, the US ‘War’ against 
terrorists and ‘rogue states’. Moreover it can be determined that the complete disarmament 
of nuclear weapons is very rare. So far, South Africa has been the only state that developed 
nuclear weapons and subsequently dismantled its programme. There are little prospects that 
other states will follow this unique example.  
Contemporarily, three more tendencies of nuclear proliferation can be observed: first, 
nuclear-weapon states seek to impede the rise of further nuclear-weapon states, but adhere 
to their own nuclear weapons arsenals; second, some non-nuclear-weapon states are sus-
pected to seek nuclear weapons, but seem unable to achieve them due to capability gaps or 
international pressure; and third, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors, 
particularly terrorists, is seen as a looming threat to international security.  
The global debate about nuclear weapons is practically as old as nuclear weapons them-
selves. On one hand, there have been gradual achievements concerning the global govern-
ance of nuclear weapons: the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), have considerably contributed to 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, bilateral and multilateral test ban and 
disarmament agreements have decreased the number of nuclear tests to almost zero and the 
number of warheads from 64,500 to 16,000 warheads since 1986. On the other hand, global 
governance failed to achieve comprehensive nuclear disarmament. There are still enough 
nuclear weapons in existence to blow up the entire surface of the earth.  
Looking at the history of the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and dis-
armament, it can be concluded that global governance has created instruments that, in gen-
eral, significantly helped the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons, but 
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neither achieved to prevent the creation of new nuclear powers, nor to establish concrete 
steps towards complete nuclear disarmament. 
The present is furthermore marked by a stagnation of nuclear disarmament efforts. The 
aim of reaching global zero has been mainly replaced by the aim of maintaining the status 
quo. Since the beginning of the 21st century, powerful steps were taken to impede further 
horizontal proliferation, but few steps were taken to impede vertical proliferation or promote 
further nuclear disarmament.  
The United Nations, which came into existence at the very same time nuclear weapons 
did, have played a key role in the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and dis-
armament ever since. The very first resolution of the General Assembly, resolution 1(I) of 
24 January 1946, demanded the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Since then, the 
General Assembly has created several disarmament bodies, held three special sessions on 
disarmament, and adopted hundreds of comprehensive resolutions in order to achieve global 
zero. The Security Council, in contrast, has only adopted a few selective resolutions in order 
to prevent further states from becoming nuclear powers and thus maintain the status quo.  
The General Assembly, however, has no enforcement power. It is only able to make 
non-binding recommendations to the members of the UN or to the Security Council. Yet, 
resolutions against the nuclear weapons regime are precisely addressed to the nuclear-
weapon states, who oppose them and deny to implement them voluntarily. The same occurs 
with the Security Council: since all of its five permanent members are nuclear-weapon states, 
they can easily prevent the adoption of any resolution and their forcible implementation by 
their right to veto. Therefore, many of the General Assembly’s resolutions, even if adopted 
by large majorities and reiterated scores of times, are not being enforced. We can therefore 
conclude that the two main organs of the United Nations, the General Assembly and the 
Security Council, assume two contradictory positions: The General Assembly has the polit-
ical will, but not the legal competence to enforce measures in order to realize global zero. 
The Security Council, in contrast, does have the legal competence to enforce measures in 
order to realize global zero, but not the political will to do so. 
In spite of the fact that the General Assembly has no enforcement power, it has signifi-
cantly contributed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by establishing an inter-
governmental discussion platform which has been constantly pushed by UN disarmament 
bodies. The creation of important international institutions and treaties in terms of nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament, such as the IAEA and the NPT, were strongly influenced 
by General Assembly efforts.  
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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and the adoption of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 are considered as the most important achievements of 
the global governance towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. However, they 
are criticized for various reasons: First, the dual system of supporting nuclear energy for 
civil use on the one hand and preventing its military use on the other hand is suspected of 
leading to further horizontal proliferation. It is assumed that some nuclear weapons pro-
grammes, for example the North Korean one, originated from IAEA-based support of nu-
clear technology for civil use. Second, the IAEA Statute as well as the NPT and the safeguard 
system under the NPT are voluntary state commitments and therefore lack universality. 
North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel, for example, are the only UN member states, which 
do not form part of the NPT. Furthermore, both the IAEA and the NPT offer the possibility 
to withdraw. Third, the IAEA is subject to legal and technical restrictions. Legal gaps that 
derived from the initial Safeguards Agreement were filled by the Additional Protocol in or-
der to ensure not only of the correctness of state declarations but also the completeness. 
However, 60 non-nuclear-weapon states which form part of the NPT have not ratified the 
Additional Protocol and twelve of these have not even ratified the initial Safeguards Agree-
ment. Challenges ensuring member states compliance of the NPT result furthermore from 
technical gaps due to financial, instrumental and personnel deficiencies. Fourth, another as-
pect of criticism refers to the NPT, which divides the international community in official 
nuclear-weapon states, non-official nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. 
It is argued that the NPT has discriminatorily legitimized the official nuclear-weapon states 
and de-legitimized all other (future) nuclear-weapon states. The official nuclear-weapon 
states are furthermore accused of undermining Article V of the NPT, which urges all states 
to pursue negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control. And fifth, the IAEA is suspected of being subject to political 
influences and dependencies, for example in connection with the USA, who is the largest 
contributor of the IAEA. 
In 1994, the General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to clarify 
the legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, hoping that International Law would 
enforce, what International Politics failed to do. In 1996, the Court constituted that there 
exists neither customary nor conventional international law which specifically authorized or 
prohibited the threat or use of nuclear weapons. However, the threat or use of nuclear weap-
ons would be contrary to Article 2 paragraph 4 (prohibition of the use of force) and fail the 
requirements of Article 51 of the UN Charter (inherent right of self-defense) in terms of 
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necessity and proportionality. The threat or use of nuclear weapons would furthermore vio-
late international law applicable in armed conflicts, particularly international humanitarian 
law. Nevertheless, the Court could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, 
in which the very survival of a state would be at stake. It thus left a loophole, which failed 
to counteract the nuclear weapons regime. The Court qualified this statement by adding that 
there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations 
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international con-
trol. If the nuclear-weapon states fulfill this obligation remains to be seen. 
Game theoretical approaches explain the discrepancy between the ideal state (global 
zero) and the real state (ongoing horizontal proliferation and lack of comprehensive disarma-
ment) by the security dilemma. They argue that collectively, it would be most beneficial for 
the international community to completely disarm all nuclear weapons, so that all states 
would be secure of nuclear attacks. However, even if all states would agree on complete 
nuclear disarmament, they could not ensure that all states complied with their commitments. 
Therefore, individually, states rather choose to adhere to their nuclear weapons arsenals or 
create such, than running the risk of being subject to possible nuclear threat.  
Kenneth N. Waltz argues that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons has contributed to 
international peace and security in the past and is likely to do so in the future. His thesis is 
mainly based on the observation that since the end of the Second World War and the rise of 
the nuclear weapons regime, there has been no general war among the major states of the 
world. Waltz emphasizes that states coexist in an anarchic system, in which self-help is the 
principle of action. The most important way in which states must help themselves is by 
providing for their own security. If a state has nuclear weapons or enjoys their protection 
then it will not be subject to a war in which its vital interests are at stake. Waltz also addresses 
the fear of irresponsible use und incapacity of self-control of nascent nuclear-weapon states 
and the fear of nuclear proliferation amongst non-state actors, but rejects them as ‘un-
rounded’. New nuclear-weapon states as rational actors will be as concerned as the old ones, 
or even more concerned. He furthermore argues that the nuclear weapons regime has created 
a global hegemony of nuclear-weapon states, and that the proliferation to further states such 
as Iran would equilibrate the international system. 
The antipode of Kenneth N. Waltz, Scott D. Sagan, sharply criticizes Waltz’ ideas. His 
organizational approach is mainly based on the assumption that military organizations, un-
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less professionally managed through a checks- and balances system of strong civilian con-
trol, are unlikely to fulfill the operational requirement for stable nuclear deterrence and that 
there are strong reasons to believe that nascent nuclear powers will not fulfill these require-
ments. He argues that Waltz’ thesis is based on the assumption that states always act ration-
ally, which has not always been the case. He therefore considers the fear of irresponsible use 
und incapacity of self-control of further nuclear-weapon states and the nuclear proliferation 
amongst non-state actors as justified. He concludes that the further proliferation of nuclear 
weapons constitute a threat to international peace and security and must be prevented. 
Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur analyze the limits of global governance. They 
claim that the role of global governance institutions is restricted to “containing the conta-
gion”. Global governance rather plays a facilitative and constraining role. National public 
authorities remain those who play the determinant and predominant role.  
The major global governance institution is the United Nations. Thereby, they distinct 
between three United Nations: the first United Nations consists of the intergovernmental 
arena of the UN, where the 193 member states discuss issues and make recommendations 
and decisions; the second United Nations consists of the UN machinery, that is the bodies 
and staff members in the UN system, mainly the secretariat, which can be considered as the 
international civil service; the third United Nations consists of non-state actors, such as mar-
ket institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, academics, or the 
civil society in general, which influence UN policies.  
The deficits of global governance, in particular of the United Nations, can in general be 
explained by knowledge gaps, normative gaps, policy gaps, institutional gaps, and compli-
ance gaps. The global governance of nuclear weapons is subject to all of these gaps, but 
especially to the latter three, which severely impede the progress of nuclear disarmament. 
The UN plays an important role in filling these gaps, but – at the end – national authorities 
are those who make the decisions. National authorities, however, are likely to prefer national 
interests before international/global interests – in the field of security more than in any other 
field. This is in particular the case of nuclear disarmament: If national authorities of nuclear-
weapon states opt for nuclear disarmament they run the risk of decreasing their national 
security and their international power (undesired national outcome). Therefore, they reject 
comprehensive nuclear disarmament (desired global outcome). 
The bias between global governance on the one hand and state politics on the other hand 
forms the ever-repeating dilemma not only in terms of nuclear weapons but in terms of 
countless controversial patterns in the international system.  
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The analysis has shown that the question – Why has it not yet been possible to bring the 
nuclear weapons regime to an end and why are prospects about a nuclear weapon free future 
so bleak? – has many answers. Nonetheless, the three main causes identified in this thesis 
are: (1) lack of political will of NWS, (2) lack of unequivocal international legislation and 
jurisprudence, and (3) lack of comprehensive control of non-proliferation and nuclear dis-
armament. 
In the beginning, I linked this question to the concepts of idealism and realism. We may 
now be able to conclude, if the existence of nuclear weapons and its implications support 
either the idealist or the realist perspective on the international system. On the one hand, we 
could see the international system as an anarchic system uncontrolled by external law, in 
which states are permanently threatened by war. On the other hand, we could see the inter-
national system as an international federation of states that are subject to international law, 
which establishes peace and security. 
In terms of nuclear weapons, the international system neither matches with the first nor 
with the second scenario, but something in-between. There is international law that severely 
restricts the nuclear weapons regime and seeks for nuclear non-proliferation and disarma-
ment. However, it has not been comprehensively and effectively applied yet. 
Hobbes and Montesquieu are considered as two of the most important precursors of 
democratic and constitutional states. Their idealist concepts of national peace and security 
may have seem unrealistic at the time they lived, but eventually became reality. It was a long 
and painful road until the first democratic and constitutional states evolved and many states 
– if not most – have not reached the end of the road yet. Kant is considered as an important 
precursor of international law and global governance. His idealist concept of international 
peace and security may seem unrealistic at the moment, but might become reality in the 
future. Therefore, Schmitt is wrong when he depreciates Kant’s ideas and those of Kelsen 
as “fictions” and sticks to the reality. He thereby neglects human progress. The human his-
tory has even shown a continuous “process of humanity combining into ever larger and more 
stable units for the purpose of governance – first the family, then the tribe, then the city-
state, and then the nation – a process which presumably would eventually culminate in the 
entire world being combined in one political unit.”341 
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The current nuclear weapons regime challenges the international community. It harshly 
contradicts the ideal of permanent international peace and security, as well as basic princi-
ples of international law such as universality, equality and nondiscrimination. A world with-
out nuclear weapons may seem illusionary at the moment. However, that does not mean, that 
we have to adjust ourselves to the ‘cruel’ reality, but it gives us the chance to change the 
present and seek a better future. 
What can be done to improve the global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament? The 1999 Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
urged for a Security Council reform, new normative principles, operational arrangements, 
finance compliance and new sources of financing, to deal effectively with international se-
curity problems in the 21st century.342 Indeed, abolishing the right to veto of the permanent 
members of the Security Council or giving the General Assembly the power to enforce its 
solution, would – in theory – facilitate and accelerate nuclear disarmament. Therefore, this 
could be considered as the ideal solution. However, – in practice – such reformation would 
not work. Adopting nuclear disarmament policies without the agreement of the nuclear pow-
ers, in particular the permanent members of the Security Council, would lead to nothing, but 
incompliance.  
Solution must therefore be adjusted to the fact that nuclear powers have a privileged 
role in the international system, or to say it in Orwell’s words: All animals are equal, but 
some animals are more equal than others. Consequently, there is no way to force nuclear 
powers to disarm. They have to voluntarily agree to nuclear disarmament. So, how do we 
make nuclear powers voluntarily agree to nuclear disarmament? 
The first United Nations, which consists of the 193 member states, has to further pro-
mote nuclear disarmament and keep calling the threat of nuclear weapons – a threat that has 
been rather pushed into the background during the last years – back into the consciousness 
of state authorities and civil society. The second United Nations, which consists of the UN 
bodies and staff members in the UN system, has to push nuclear-weapon states to further 
negotiate nuclear disarmament agreements. The International Court of Justice has hereby the 
important task to ensure that the “obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion 
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective inter-
national control” is being fulfilled by nuclear weapons. Both, the second United Nations and 
the third United Nations, which consist of non-state actors, such as NGO’s, think tanks, 
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academics, or the civil society in general, play an important role in terms of information and 
education towards state authorities and civil society. They have to lobby nuclear non-prolif-
eration and disarmament on national and international level and pressure decision makers. 
All these efforts have to be accompanied by further development of an effective international 
security system that has the competency and capability to universally supervise nuclear dis-
armament and non-proliferation and counteract the security dilemma. 
Next year marks the 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Naga-
saki, which will coincide with the upcoming Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review 
Conference. This occasion will offer an important opportunity to advance the vision of a 
world free of nuclear weapons.  






“We believe that political scientists should try to help improve government policy. We study 
international politics because we believe it matters and that it influences all of our lives. We 
also write about international politics because we believe that strong scholarship can influ-
ence policymaking by challenging underlying beliefs, discovering and interpreting new evi-
dence, and providing new ideas and arguments” (Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz).343 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: GA Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (1945-2013) 
Symbol Title Date Voting Summary344 
A/RES/1(I) Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Dis-
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24.01.1946 Y: 47, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 
4, TVM: 51 
A/RES/191(III) Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission 04.11.1948 Y: 40, N: 6, A: 4, NV: 
7, TVM: 58 
A/RES/192(III) Prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction by one-third of the armaments 
and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council 
19.11.1948 Y: 43, N: 6, A: 1, NV: 
8, TVM: 58 
A/RES/299(IV) International Control of Atomic Energy 23.11.1949 Y: 49, N: 5, A: 3, NV: 
2, TVM: 59 
A/RES/496(V) International control of atomic energy 13.12.1950 Y: 47, N: 5, A: 3, NV: 
5, TVM: 60 
A/RES/502(VI) Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all ar-
maments; international control of atomic energy 
11.01.1952 Y: 42, N: 5, A: 7, NV: 
6, TVM: 60 
A/RES/808(IX)[A] Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all ar-
maments : report of the Disarmament Commission; Conclusion of an interna-
tional convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition 
of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction 
04.11.1954 Y: 57, N: 1, A: 0, NV: 
2, TVM: 60 
A/RES/808(IX)[B] Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all ar-
maments : report of the Disarmament Commission; Conclusion of an interna-
tional convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition 
of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction 
04.11.1954 adopted without vote 
A/RES/808(IX)[C] Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all ar-
maments : report of the Disarmament Commission; Conclusion of an interna-
tional convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition 
of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction 
04.11.1954 Y: 56, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 
2, TVM: 60 
A/RES/810(IX)[A] Concerning an international atomic agency 04.12.1954 adopted without vote 
A/RES/810(IX)[B] Concerning the international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic en-
ergy 
04.12.1954 adopted without vote 
A/RES/913(X) Effects of atomic radiation 03.12.1955 adopted without vote 
A/RES/912(X) Peaceful uses of atomic energy 03.12.1955 adopted without vote 
A/RES/914(X) Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all ar-
maments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction 
of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of 
mass destruction 
16.12.1955 Y: 56, N: 7, A: 0, NV: 
13, TVM: 76 
A/RES/1115(XI) Authorization for the Advisory Committee established by General Assembly 
resolution 810 (IX) to negotiate on behalf of the United Nations an agreement 
to establish relations between the United Nations and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency 
11.01.1957 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1011(XI) Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all ar-
maments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction 
of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of 
mass destruction 
14.02.1957 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1145(XII) Agreement governing the relationship between the United Nations and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
14.11.1957 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1146(XII) Authorization to the International Atomic Energy Agency to request advisory 
opinions of the International Court of Justice 
14.11.1957 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1149(XII) Collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the 
dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects 
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14.11.1957 Y: 71, N: 9, A: 1, NV: 
1, TVM: 82 
A/RES/1147(XII) Effects of atomic radiation 14.11.1957 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1148(XII) Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all ar-
maments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction 
of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of 
mass destruction 
14.11.1957 Y: 56, N: 9, A: 15, 
NV: 2, TVM: 82 
A/RES/1242(XIII) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 30.10.1958 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1252(XIII)[D] Question of disarmament; the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weap-
ons tests; the reduction of the military budgets of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of 
the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries 
04.11.1958 Y: 75, N: 0, A: 3, NV: 
3, TVM: 81 
A/RES/1252(XIII)[B] Question of disarmament; the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weap-
ons tests; the reduction of the military budgets of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of 
the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries 
04.11.1958 Y: 55, N: 9, A: 12, 
NV: 5, TVM: 81 
A/RES/1252(XIII)[C] Question of disarmament; the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weap-
ons tests; the reduction of the military budgets of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
04.11.1958 Y: 75, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 
4, TVM: 81 
                                                     
344 Y=Yes; N=No; A= Abstentions; NV=Non-Voting; Total Voting Membership. 
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Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of 
the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries 
A/RES/1252(XIII)[A] Question of disarmament; the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weap-
ons tests; the reduction of the military budgets of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and France by 10 to 15 per cent and the use of part of 
the savings so effected for assistance to the under-developed countries 
04.11.1958 Y: 49, N: 9, A: 22, 
NV: 1, TVM: 81 
A/RES/1347(XIII) Effects of atomic radiation 13.12.1958 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1344(XIII) Report of the Secretary-General on the 2nd United Nations International Con-
ference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 
13.12.1958 Y: 77, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 
5, TVM: 82 
A/RES/1355(XIV) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 03.11.1959 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1376(XIV) Progress report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of 
Atomic Radiation 
17.11.1959 Y: 78, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 
4, TVM: 82 
A/RES/1380(XIV) Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons 20.11.1959 Y: 68, N: 0, A: 12, 
NV: 2, TVM: 82 
A/RES/1379(XIV) Question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara 20.11.1959 Y: 51, N: 16, A: 15, 
NV: 0, TVM: 82 
A/RES/1402(XIV)[A] Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests 21.11.1959 Y: 78, N: 0, A: 2, NV: 
2, TVM: 82 
A/RES/1402(XIV)[B] Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests 21.11.1959 Y: 60, N: 1, A: 20, 
NV: 1, TVM: 82 
A/RES/1503(XV) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 12.12.1960 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1531(XV) Possibilities of increasing voluntary contributions to the Operational Fund of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency 
15.12.1960 Y: 84, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 
15, TVM: 99 
A/RES/1576(XV) Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons 20.12.1960 Y: 68, N: 0, A: 26, 
NV: 5, TVM: 99 
A/RES/1574(XV) Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation 
20.12.1960 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1577(XV) Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests 20.12.1960 Y: 88, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 
6, TVM: 99 
A/RES/1578(XV) Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests 20.12.1960 Y: 83, N: 0, A: 11, 
NV: 5, TVM: 99 
A/RES/1617(XV) Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfillment of General As-
sembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 
21.04.1961 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1632(XVI) Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obliga-
tions of States to refrain from their renewal; The urgent need for a treaty to 
ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control 
27.10.1961 Y: 87, N: 11, A: 1, 
NV: 4, TVM: 103 
A/RES/1629(XVI) Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation 
27.10.1961 Y: 74, N: 0, A: 17, 
NV: 9, TVM: 100 
A/RES/1648(XVI) Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obliga-
tions of States to refrain their renewal  
06.11.1961 Y: 71, N: 20, A: 8, 
NV: 4, TVM: 103 
A/RES/1649(XVI) The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective in-
ternational control 
08.11.1961 Y: 71, N: 11, A: 15, 
NV: 6, TVM: 103 
A/RES/1651(XVI) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 23.11.1961 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1652(XVI) Consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone 24.11.1961 Y: 55, N: 0, A: 44, 
NV: 4, TVM: 103 
A/RES/1653(XVI) Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weap-
ons 
24.11.1961 Y: 55, N: 20, A: 26, 
NV: 2, TVM: 103 
A/RES/1665(XVI) Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons 04.12.1961 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1762(XVII) The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests 06.11.1962 Y: 51, N: 10, A: 40, 
NV: 9, TVM: 110 
A/RES/1764(XVII) Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation 
20.11.1962 Y: 86, N: 0, A: 11, 
NV: 13, TVM: 110 
A/RES/1769(XVII) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 29.11.1962 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1770(XVII) Third International Conference on the Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy 29.11.1962 Y: 85, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 
25, TVM: 110 
A/RES/1801(XVII) Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention 
on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons 
14.12.1962 Y: 33, N: 0, A: 25, 
NV: 52, TVM: 110 
A/RES/1886(XVIII) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 18.10.1963 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1896(XVIII) Effects of atomic radiation 11.11.1963 adopted without vote 
A/RES/1909(XVIII) Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention 
on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons 
27.11.1963 Y: 64, N: 18, A: 25, 
NV: 4, TVM: 111 
A/RES/1910(XVIII) Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 27.11.1963 Y: 104, N: 1, A: 3, 
NV: 3, TVM: 111 
A/RES/2026(XX) Reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency 18.11.1965 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2028(XX) Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 19.11.1965 Y: 93, N: 0, A: 5, NV: 
19, TVM: 117 
A/RES/2032(XX) Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 03.12.1965 Y: 92, N: 1, A: 14, 
NV: 10, TVM: 117 
A/RES/2056(XX) Third international Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 16.12.1965 Y: 79, N: 0, A: 0, NV: 
38, TVM: 117 
A/RES/2078(XX) Effects of atomic radiation 18.12.1965 adopted without vote 
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A/RES/2098(XX) General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, tech-
nical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized 
agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Na-
tions system 
20.12.1965 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2149(XXI) Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement 
on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
04.11.1966 Y: 110, N: 1, A: 1, 
NV: 9, TVM: 121 
A/RES/2153(XXI)[B] Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 17.11.1966 Y: 48, N: 1, A: 59, 
NV: 14, TVM: 122 
A/RES/2153(XXI)[A] Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 17.11.1966 Y: 97, N: 2, A: 3, NV: 
19, TVM: 121 
A/RES/2156(XXI) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 22.11.1966 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2164(XXI) Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention 
on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons 
05.12.1966 Y: 80, N: 0, A: 23, 
NV: 18, TVM: 121 
A/RES/2163(XXI) Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 05.12.1966 Y: 100, N: 1, A: 2, 
NV: 18, TVM: 121 
A/RES/2188(XXI) General review of the programmes and activities in the economic, social, tech-
nical co-operation and related fields of the United Nations, the specialized 
agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Chil-
dren’s Fund and all other institutions and agencies related to the United Na-
tions system 
13.12.1966 Y: 98, N: 1, A: 6, NV: 
17, TVM: 122 
A/RES/2213(XXI) Effects of atomic radiation 17.12.1966 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2258(XXII) Effects of atomic radiation 25.10.1967 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2284(XXII) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 05.12.1967 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2286(XXII) Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 05.12.1967 Y: 82, N: 0, A: 28, 
NV: 12, TVM: 122 
A/RES/2289(XXII) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons 08.12.1967 Y: 77, N: 0, A: 29, 
NV: 16, TVM: 122 
A/RES/2309(XXII) Question of holding a 4th international conference on the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy 
13.12.1967 Y: 86, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 
32, TVM: 122 
A/RES/2346(XXII)[B] Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 19.12.1967 Y: 110, N: 0, A: 8, 
NV: 5, TVM: 123 
A/RES/2346(XXII)[A] Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 19.12.1967 Y: 112, N: 1, A: 4, 
NV: 6, TVM: 123 
A/RES/2343(XXII) Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 19.12.1967 Y: 103, N: 1, A: 7, 
NV: 12, TVM: 123 
A/RES/2373(XXII) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 12.06.1968 Y: 95, N: 4, A: 21, 
NV: 4, TVM: 124 
A/RES/2382(XXIII) Effects of atomic radiation 01.11.1968 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2406(XXIII) Fourth international Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 16.12.1968 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2456(XXIII)[C] Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 20.12.1968 Y: 75, N: 9, A: 30, 
NV: 12, TVM: 126 
A/RES/2456(XXIII)[B] Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 20.12.1968 Y: 98, N: 0, A: 16, 
NV: 12, TVM: 126 
A/RES/2456(XXIII)[D] Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 20.12.1968 Y: 108, N: 0, A: 7, 
NV: 11, TVM: 126 
A/RES/2456(XXIII)[A] Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 20.12.1968 Y: 103, N: 7, A: 5, 
NV: 11, TVM: 126 
A/RES/2457(XXIII) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 20.12.1968 Y: 93, N: 0, A: 4, NV: 
29, TVM: 126 
A/RES/2455(XXIII) Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 20.12.1968 Y: 109, N: 0, A: 5, 
NV: 12, TVM: 126 
A/RES/2496(XXIV) Effects of atomic radiation 28.10.1969 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2536(XXIV) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 11.12.1969 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2575(XXIV) Fourth international Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 15.12.1969 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2605(XXIV)[B] Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 16.12.1969 Y: 80, N: 1, A: 37, 
NV: 8, TVM: 126 
A/RES/2605(XXIV)[A] Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 16.12.1969 Y: 110, N: 0, A: 10, 
NV: 6, TVM: 126 
A/RES/2604(XXIV)[B] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 16.12.1969 Y: 114, N: 1, A: 4, 
NV: 7, TVM: 126 
A/RES/2604(XXIV)[A] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 16.12.1969 Y: 99, N: 7, A: 13, 
NV: 7, TVM: 126 
A/RES/2623(XXV) Effects of atomic radiation 13.10.1970 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2651(XXV) Fourth international Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 30.11.1970 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2655(XXV) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 04.12.1970 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2665(XXV) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful pur-
poses under appropriate international control 
07.12.1970 Y: 109, N: 0, A: 5, 
NV: 13, TVM: 127 
A/RES/2664(XXV) Implementation of the results of the Conference on Non-Nuclear-weapon 
states 
07.12.1970 Y: 106, N: 0, A: 9, 
NV: 12, TVM: 127 
A/RES/2666(XXV) Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2456 B (XXIII) 
concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the 
07.12.1970 Y: 104, N: 0, A: 12, 
NV: 11, TVM: 127 
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Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco)  
A/RES/2660(XXV) Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the 
Subsoil Thereof 
07.12.1970 Y: 104, N: 2, A: 2, 
NV: 19, TVM: 127 
A/RES/2663(XXV)[B] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 07.12.1970 Y: 112, N: 0, A: 1, 
NV: 14, TVM: 127 
A/RES/2663(XXV)[A] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 07.12.1970 Y: 102, N: 0, A: 13, 
NV: 12, TVM: 127 
A/RES/2763(XXVI) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 08.11.1971 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2773(XXVI) Effects of atomic radiation 29.11.1971 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2829(XXVI) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful pur-
poses under appropriate international control 
16.12.1971 Y: 103, N: 0, A: 9, 
NV: 20, TVM: 132 
A/RES/2830(XXVI) Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) 
concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco) 
16.12.1971 Y: 101, N: 0, A: 12, 
NV: 19, TVM: 132 
A/RES/2828(XXVI)[B] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 16.12.1971 Y: 71, N: 2, A: 38, 
NV: 21, TVM: 132 
A/RES/2828(XXVI)[C] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 16.12.1971 Y: 91, N: 2, A: 21, 
NV: 18, TVM: 132 
A/RES/2828(XXVI)[A] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 16.12.1971 Y: 74, N: 2, A: 36, 
NV: 20, TVM: 132 
A/RES/2905(XXVII) Effects of atomic radiation 17.10.1972 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2907(XXVII) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 31.10.1972 adopted without vote 
A/RES/2935(XXVII) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2830 (XXVI) concerning the 
signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Pro-
hibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
29.11.1972 Y: 101, N: 0, A: 17, 
NV: 14, TVM: 132 
A/RES/2931(XXVII) Implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon 
States 
29.11.1972 Y: 100, N: 0, A: 10, 
NV: 22, TVM: 132 
A/RES/2936(XXVII) Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the 
use of nuclear weapons 
29.11.1972 Y: 73, N: 4, A: 46, 
NV: 9, TVM: 132 
A/RES/2934(XXVII)[A] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 29.11.1972 Y: 105, N: 4, A: 9, 
NV: 14, TVM: 132 
A/RES/2934(XXVII)[C] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 29.11.1972 Y: 80, N: 4, A: 29, 
NV: 19, TVM: 132 
A/RES/2934(XXVII)[B] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 29.11.1972 Y: 89, N: 4, A: 23, 
NV: 16, TVM: 132 
A/RES/3056(XXVIII) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 29.10.1973 adopted without vote 
A/RES/3063(XXVIII) Effects of atomic radiation 09.11.1973 Y: 86, N: 0, A: 13, 
NV: 36, TVM: 135 
A/RES/3079(XXVIII) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning 
the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
06.12.1973 Y: 116, N: 0, A: 12, 
NV: 7, TVM: 135 
A/RES/3078(XXVIII)[A] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 06.12.1973 Y: 89, N: 5, A: 33, 
NV: 8, TVM: 135 
A/RES/3078(XXVIII)[B] Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests 06.12.1973 Y: 65, N: 7, A: 57, 
NV: 6, TVM: 135 
A/RES/3154(XXVIII)[B] Effects of atomic radiation 14.12.1973 Y: 117, N: 0, A: 5, 
NV: 13, TVM: 135 
A/RES/3154(XXVIII)[A] Effects of atomic radiation 14.12.1973 Y: 86, N: 0, A: 28, 
NV: 21, TVM: 135 
A/RES/3154(XXVIII)[C] Effects of atomic radiation 14.12.1973 Y: 91, N: 0, A: 33, 
NV: 11, TVM: 135 
A/RES/3213(XXIX) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 05.11.1974 Y: 66, N: 0, A: 9, NV: 
63, TVM: 138 
A/RES/3226(XXIX) Effects of atomic radiation 12.11.1974 adopted without vote 
A/RES/3265(XXIX)[A] Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia 09.12.1974 Y: 104, N: 1, A: 27, 
NV: 6, TVM: 138 
A/RES/3265(XXIX)[B] Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia 09.12.1974 Y: 96, N: 2, A: 36, 
NV: 4, TVM: 138 
A/RES/3263(XXIX) Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 09.12.1974 Y: 128, N: 0, A: 2, 
NV: 8, TVM: 138 
A/RES/3262(XXIX) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the 
signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohi-
bition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)  
09.12.1974 Y: 115, N: 0, A: 17, 
NV: 6, TVM: 138 
A/RES/3258(XXIX) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning 
the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
09.12.1974 Y: 114, N: 0, A: 15, 
NV: 9, TVM: 138 
A/RES/3257(XXIX) Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion 
of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban 
09.12.1974 Y: 95, N: 3, A: 33, 
NV: 7, TVM: 138 
A/RES/3386(XXX) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 12.11.1975 adopted without vote 
A/RES/3410(XXX) Effects of atomic radiation 28.11.1975 adopted without vote 
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A/RES/3472(XXX)[B] Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its 
aspects 
11.12.1975 Y: 82, N: 10, A: 36, 
NV: 16, TVM: 144 
A/RES/3472(XXX)[A] Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its 
aspects 
11.12.1975 Y: 126, N: 0, A: 2, 
NV: 16, TVM: 144 
A/RES/3478(XXX) Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear 
weapon tests 
11.12.1975 Y: 94, N: 2, A: 34, 
NV: 14, TVM: 144 
A/RES/3476(XXX)[A] Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia 11.12.1975 adopted without vote 
A/RES/3476(XXX)[B] Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia 11.12.1975 adopted without vote 
A/RES/3474(XXX) Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 11.12.1975 Y: 125, N: 0, A: 2, 
NV: 17, TVM: 144 
A/RES/3477(XXX) Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific 11.12.1975 Y: 110, N: 0, A: 20, 
NV: 14, TVM: 144 
A/RES/3467(XXX) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3258 (XXIX) concerning the 
signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Pro-
hibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
11.12.1975 Y: 115, N: 0, A: 12, 
NV: 17, TVM: 144 
A/RES/3473(XXX) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3262 (XXIX) concerning the 
signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohi-
bition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
11.12.1975 Y: 113, N: 0, A: 16, 
NV: 15, TVM: 144 
A/RES/3466(XXX) Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion 
of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban 
11.12.1975 Y: 106, N: 2, A: 24, 
NV: 12, TVM: 144 
A/RES/31/10 Effects of atomic radiation 08.11.1976 adopted without vote 
A/RES/31/11 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 10.11.1976 adopted without vote 
A/RES/31/70 Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its 
aspects 
10.12.1976 Y: 132, N: 0, A: 0, 
NV: 14, TVM: 146 
A/RES/31/71 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 10.12.1976 Y: 130, N: 0, A: 1, 
NV: 15, TVM: 146 
A/RES/31/73 Establishment of and nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 10.12.1976 Y: 91, N: 2, A: 43, 
NV: 10, TVM: 146 
A/RES/31/67 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3467 (XXX) concerning the 
signature and ratification of additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohi-
bition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
10.12.1976 Y: 119, N: 0, A: 14, 
NV: 13, TVM: 146 
A/RES/31/75 Implementation of the conclusions of the 1st Review Conference of the Par-
ties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
10.12.1976 Y: 115, N: 2, A: 19, 
NV: 10, TVM: 146 
A/RES/31/66 Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion 
of and treaty designed to achieve and comprehensive test ban 
10.12.1976 Y: 105, N: 2, A: 27, 
NV: 12, TVM: 146 
A/RES/31/89 Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-
weapon tests 
14.12.1976 Y: 95, N: 2, A: 36, 
NV: 13, TVM: 146 
A/RES/32/6 Effects of atomic radiation 31.10.1977 adopted without vote 
A/RES/32/50 Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development 08.12.1977 adopted without vote 
A/RES/32/49 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 08.12.1977 adopted without vote 
A/RES/32/83 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 12.12.1977 Y: 105, N: 0, A: 28, 
NV: 16, TVM: 149 
A/RES/32/82 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 12.12.1977 Y: 131, N: 0, A: 1, 
NV: 17, TVM: 149 
A/RES/32/79 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 31/67 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
12.12.1977 Y: 118, N: 0, A: 13, 
NV: 18, TVM: 149 
A/RES/32/76 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3473 (XXX) concerning the 
signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohi-
bition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
12.12.1977 113 Y: 0, N: 14, A: 
22, NV: 149, TVM: 
A/RES/32/78 Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion 
of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban; conclusion of a 
treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests 
12.12.1977 Y: 126, N: 2, A: 1, 
NV: 20, TVM: 149 
A/RES/32/105[F] Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa 14.12.1977 Y: 113, N: 7, A: 17, 
NV: 12, TVM: 149 
A/RES/32/155 Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Detente 19.12.1977 adopted without vote 
A/RES/33/4 Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development 02.11.1978 adopted without vote 
A/RES/33/3 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 02.11.1978 adopted without vote 
A/RES/33/5 Effects of atomic radiation 03.11.1978 adopted without vote 
A/RES/33/72[B] Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees 
of the security of non-nuclear states 
14.12.1978 Y: 124, N: 0, A: 14, 
NV: 12, TVM: 150 
A/RES/33/72[A] Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees 
of the security of non-nuclear states 
14.12.1978 Y: 137, N: 2, A: 4, 
NV: 7, TVM: 150 
A/RES/33/65 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 14.12.1978 Y: 97, N: 2, A: 37, 
NV: 14, TVM: 150 
A/RES/33/64 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 14.12.1978 Y: 138, N: 0, A: 1, 
NV: 11, TVM: 150 
A/RES/33/58 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/76 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
14.12.1978 adopted without vote 
A/RES/33/61 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/79 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
14.12.1978 adopted without vote 
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A/RES/33/57 Implementation of the conclusions of the 1st Review Conference of the Par-
ties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Establish-
ment of a preparatory committee for the 2nd Conference 
14.12.1978 Y: 122, N: 1, A: 16, 
NV: 11, TVM: 150 
A/RES/33/71[A] Military and nuclear collaboration with Israel 14.12.1978 Y: 72, N: 30, A: 37, 
NV: 11, TVM: 150 
A/RES/33/71[B] Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 14.12.1978 Y: 103, N: 18, A: 18, 
NV: 11, TVM: 150 
A/RES/33/71[C] Urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons 14.12.1978 Y: 130, N: 2, A: 8, 
NV: 10, TVM: 150 
A/RES/33/91[F] Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of such States where 
there are no such weapons at present 
16.12.1978 Y: 105, N: 18, A: 12, 
NV: 15, TVM: 150 
A/RES/33/91[D] Study on nuclear weapons 16.12.1978 Y: 117, N: 0, A: 21, 
NV: 12, TVM: 150 
A/RES/33/183[G] Nuclear collaboration with South Africa 24.01.1979 Y: 96, N: 5, A: 23, 
NV: 27, TVM: 151 
A/RES/34/11 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 02.11.1979 adopted without vote 
A/RES/34/12 Effects of atomic radiation 09.11.1979 adopted without vote 
A/RES/34/63 Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development 29.11.1979 adopted without vote 
A/RES/34/84 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees 
of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States 
11.12.1979 Y: 114, N: 1, A: 25, 
NV: 12, TVM: 152 
A/RES/34/85 Conclusion of an international convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon 
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
11.12.1979 Y: 120, N: 0, A: 22, 
NV: 10, TVM: 152 
A/RES/34/77 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 11.12.1979 Y: 136, N: 0, A: 1, 
NV: 15, TVM: 152 
A/RES/34/78 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in South Asia 11.12.1979 Y: 96, N: 2, A: 40, 
NV: 14, TVM: 152 
A/RES/34/71 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/58 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
11.12.1979 adopted without vote 
A/RES/34/74 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/61 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)  
11.12.1979 adopted without vote 
A/RES/34/89 Israeli nuclear armament 11.12.1979 Y: 97, N: 10, A: 38, 
NV: 7, TVM: 152 
A/RES/34/87C Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are 
no such weapons at present 
11.12.1979 Y: 99, N: 18, A: 19, 
NV: 16, TVM: 152 
A/RES/34/83G Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 11.12.1979 Y: 112, N: 16, A: 14, 
NV: 10, TVM: 152 
A/RES/34/76B Nuclear capability of South Africa 11.12.1979 adopted without vote 
A/RES/34/83J Nuclear weapons in all aspects 11.12.1979 Y: 120, N: 2, A: 19, 
NV: 11, TVM: 152 
A/RES/34/86 Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons 
11.12.1979 Y: 110, N: 1, A: 29, 
NV: 12, TVM: 152 
A/RES/34/93E Nuclear collaboration with South Africa 12.12.1979 Y: 119, N: 4, A: 18, 
NV: 11, TVM: 152 
A/RES/35/12 Effects of atomic radiation 03.11.1980 adopted without vote 
A/RES/35/17 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 06.11.1980 adopted without vote 
A/RES/35/112 Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development 05.12.1980 adopted without vote 
A/RES/35/145A Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 12.12.1980 Y: 111, N: 2, A: 31, 
NV: 10, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/154 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security 
of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weap-
ons 
12.12.1980 Y: 110, N: 2, A: 31, 
NV: 11, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/155 Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon 
states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
12.12.1980 Y: 121, N: 0, A: 24, 
NV: 9, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/148 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 12.12.1980 Y: 96, N: 3, A: 44, 
NV: 11, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/147 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 12.12.1980 adopted without vote 
A/RES/35/143 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 34/71 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlateloco) 
12.12.1980 Y: 138, N: 0, A: 5, 
NV: 11, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/157 Israeli nuclear armament 12.12.1980 Y: 99 , N: 6, A: 38 , 
NV: 11, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/156C Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are 
no such weapons at present 
12.12.1980 Y: 95, N: 18, A: 27, 
NV: 14, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/152D Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 12.12.1980 Y: 112, N: 19, A: 14, 
NV: 9, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/146A Nuclear capability of South Africa 12.12.1980 Y: 132, N: 0, A: 13, 
NV: 9, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/152C Nuclear weapons in all aspects 12.12.1980 Y: 124, N: 4, A: 17, 
NV: 9, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/152B Nuclear weapons in all aspects 12.12.1980 Y: 118, N: 18, A: 7, 
NV: 11, TVM: 154 
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A/RES/35/145B Prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time  12.12.1980 Y: 129, N: 0, A: 16, 
NV: 9, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/156F Study on nuclear weapons 12.12.1980 Y: 126, N: 0, A: 19, 
NV: 9, TVM: 154 
A/RES/35/206B Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa 16.12.1980 Y: 127, N: 4, A: 13, 
NV: 10, TVM: 154 
A/RES/36/14 Effects of atomic radiation 28.10.1981 adopted without vote 
A/RES/36/25 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 11.11.1981 Y: 128, N: 1 , A: 4 , 
NV: 23 , TVM: 156 
A/RES/36/27 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave 
consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and interna-
tional peace and security 
13.11.1981 Y: 109, N: 2, A: 34, 
NV: 12 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/84 Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 09.12.1981 Y: 118 , N: 2 , A: 23 , 
NV: 14 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/94 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security 
of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weap-
ons 
09.12.1981 Y: 115, N: 17, A: 12, 
NV: 13, TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/95 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
09.12.1981 Y: 145 , N: 0 , A: 2 , 
NV: 9 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/100 Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe 09.12.1981 Y: 82, N: 19, A: 41, 
NV: 15, TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/88 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 09.12.1981 Y: 93 , N: 3 , A: 44 , 
NV: 17 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/87A Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 09.12.1981 adopted without vote 
A/RES/36/87B Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 09.12.1981 Y: 107 , N: 2 , A: 31 , 
NV: 17 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/83 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/143 concerning the sig-
nature and ratificationof Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)  
09.12.1981 Y: 138, N: 0, A: 5, 
NV: 14, TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/98 Israeli nuclear armament 09.12.1981 Y: 101, N: 2, A: 39, 
NV: 15, TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/97E Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are 
no such weapons at present 
09.12.1981 Y: 84, N: 18, A: 42, 
NV: 13, TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/92I Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 09.12.1981 Y: 121, N: 19, A: 6, 
NV: 11, TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/86A Nuclear capability of South Africa 09.12.1981 Y: 129 , N: 4 , A: 10 , 
NV: 14 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/92E Nuclear weapons in all their aspects 09.12.1981 Y: 118, N: 18, A: 5, 
NV: 16, TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/81B Prevention of nuclear war 09.12.1981 adopted without vote 
A/RES/36/92K Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon 09.12.1981 Y: 68 , N: 14 , A: 57 , 
NV: 18 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/78 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation 
in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
09.12.1981 adopted without vote 
A/RES/36/92J World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent 
nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament 
09.12.1981 Y: 78, N: 3, A: 56, 
NV: 20, TVM: 157 
A/RES/36/172E Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa 17.12.1981 Y: 119, N: 19 , A: 4, 
NV: 15, TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/18 Armed Israeli agression against Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave con-
sequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and interna-
tional peace and security 
16.11.1982 Y: 119 , N: 2 , A: 13 , 
NV: 23, TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/19 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 19.11.1982 Y: 105 , N: 2 , A: 25 , 
NV: 25 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/78A Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations 09.12.1982 Y: 114 , N: 1 , A: 32 , 
NV: 10 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/72 Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 09.12.1982 Y: 124 , N: 2 , A: 19 , 
NV: 12 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/80 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security 
of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weap-
ons 
09.12.1982 Y: 108 , N: 17 , A: 19 
, NV: 13 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/81 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
09.12.1982 Y: 144 , N: 0 , A: 3 , 
NV: 10 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/76 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 09.12.1982 Y: 99 , N: 2 , A: 45 , 
NV: 11 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/75 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 09.12.1982 adopted without vote 
A/RES/37/85 Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests 09.12.1982 Y: 115 , N: 5 , A: 25 , 
NV: 12 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/71 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/83 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
09.12.1982 Y: 136 , N: 0 , A: 7 , 
NV: 14, TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/82 Israeli nuclear armament 09.12.1982 Y: 106 , N: 2 , A: 34 , 
NV: 15 , TVM: 157 
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A/RES/37/69D Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa 09.12.1982 Y: 120, N: 8, A: 16 , 
NV: 13, TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/78J Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 09.12.1982 Y: 112 , N: 19, A: 15 
, NV: 11 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/74B Nuclear capability of South Africa 09.12.1982 Y: 132 , N: 4 , A: 11 , 
NV: 10 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/78C Nuclear weapons in all aspects 09.12.1982 Y: 118 , N: 19 , A: 9 , 
NV: 11 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/78I Prevention of nuclear war 09.12.1982 Y: 130 , N: 0 , A: 17 , 
NV: 10 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/78E Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon 09.12.1982 Y: 81 , N: 14 , A: 52 , 
NV: 10 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/73 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty 09.12.1982 Y: 111 , N: 1 , A: 35 , 
NV: 10 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/87 Effects of atomic radiation 10.12.1982 adopted without vote 
A/RES/37/100C Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons 13.12.1982 Y: 117 , N: 17 , A: 8 , 
NV: 15 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/100A Freeze in nuclear weapons 13.12.1982 Y: 122 , N: 16 , A: 6 , 
NV: 13 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/99A Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are 
no such weapons at present 
13.12.1982 Y: 70, N: 18, A: 51, 
NV: 18 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/100B Nuclear arms freeze 13.12.1982 Y: 119 , N: 17 , A: 5 , 
NV: 16 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/99F Review of and supplement to the Comprehensive study of the question of nu-
clear-weapon-free zones in all aspects 
13.12.1982 Y: 141 , N: 1 , A: 2 , 
NV: 13 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/37/99H Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of 
the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Desctruc-
tion on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof 
13.12.1982 adopted without vote 
A/RES/37/167 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation 
in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
17.12.1982 Y: 111 , N: 26 , A: 7 , 
NV: 13 , TVM: 157 
A/RES/38/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 04.11.1983 adopted without vote 
A/RES/38/9 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave 
consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and interna-
tional peace and security 
10.11.1983 Y: 123, N: 2, A: 12, 
NV: 21, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/39G Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa 05.12.1983 Y: 122, N: 9, A: 17, 
NV: 10, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/60 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation 
in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
14.12.1983 adopted without vote 
A/RES/38/62 Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 15.12.1983 Y: 119, N: 2, A: 26, 
NV: 11, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/67 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security 
of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weap-
ons 
15.12.1983 Y: 108, N: 17, A: 18, 
NV: 15, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/68 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
15.12.1983 Y: 141, N: 0, A: 6, 
NV: 11, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/75 Condemnation of nuclear war 15.12.1983 Y: 95, N: 19, A: 30, 
NV: 14, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/73G Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 15.12.1983 Y: 126, N: 17, A: 6, 
NV: 9, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/78 Effects of atomic radiation 15.12.1983 adopted without vote 
A/RES/38/65 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 15.12.1983 Y: 94, N: 3, A: 46, 
NV: 15, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/64 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 15.12.1983 adopted without vote 
A/RES/38/73B Freeze on nuclear weapons 15.12.1983 Y: 124, N: 15, A: 7, 
NV: 12, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/72 Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests 15.12.1983 Y: 118, N: 4, A: 24, 
NV: 12, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/61 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 37/71 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
15.12.1983 Y: 135, N: 0, A: 9, 
NV: 14, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/74 Implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the 
Parties of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and estab-
lishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of 
the Parties to the Treaty 
15.12.1983 Y: 134, N: 0, A: 7, 
NV: 17, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/69 Israeli nuclear armament 15.12.1983 Y: 99, N: 2, A: 39, 
NV: 18, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/73E Nuclear-arms freeze 15.12.1983 Y: 124, N: 13, A: 8, 
NV: 13, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/76 Nuclear-weapon freeze 15.12.1983 Y: 108, N: 18, A: 20, 
NV: 12, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/63 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty 15.12.1983 Y: 117, N: 0, A: 29, 
NV: 12, TVM: 158 
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A/RES/38/183P Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 20.12.1983 Y: 99, N: 18, A: 24, 
NV: 17, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/183N Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 20.12.1983 Y: 122, N: 1, A: 25, 
NV: 10, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/183A Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 20.12.1983 Y: 88, N: 31, A: 24, 
NV: 15, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/181A Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 20.12.1983 Y: 142, N: 0, A: 6, 
NV: 10, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/183B Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 20.12.1983 Y: 110, N: 19, A: 15, 
NV: 14, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/181B Nuclear capability of South Africa 20.12.1983 Y: 133, N: 4, A: 11, 
NV: 10, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/183D Nuclear weapons in all aspects 20.12.1983 Y: 108, N: 19, A: 16, 
NV: 15, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/183G Prevention of nuclear war 20.12.1983 Y: 128, N: 0, A: 20, 
NV: 10, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/183C Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon 20.12.1983 Y: 74, N: 12, A: 57, 
NV: 15, TVM: 158 
A/RES/38/188I Review of and supplement to the Comprehensive study on the question of 
nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects 
20.12.1983 Y: 146, N: 0, A: 3, 
NV: 9, TVM: 158 
A/RES/39/12 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 13.11.1984 adopted without vote 
A/RES/39/14 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave 
consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and interna-
tional peace and security 
16.11.1984 Y: 106, N: 2, A: 33, 
NV: 18, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/52 Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 12.12.1984 Y: 122, N: 3, A: 23, 
NV: 11, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/57 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security 
of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weap-
ons 
12.12.1984 Y: 104, N: 19, A: 20, 
NV: 16, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/58 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
12.12.1984 Y: 146, N: 0, A: 4, 
NV: 9, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/63H Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 12.12.1984 Y: 128, N: 17, A: 5, 
NV: 9, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/55 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 12.12.1984 Y: 100, N: 3, A: 42, 
NV: 14, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/54 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 12.12.1984 adopted without vote 
A/RES/39/63G Freeze on nuclear weapons 12.12.1984 Y: 127, N: 11, A: 11, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/51 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/61 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
12.12.1984 Y: 139, N: 0, A: 8, 
NV: 12, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/60 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 38/72 on the immediate ces-
sation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests  
12.12.1984 Y: 123, N: 2, A: 24, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/61B Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa : nuclear 
capability of South Africa 
12.12.1984 Y: 137, N: 4, A: 11, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/63C Nuclear-arms freeze 12.12.1984 Y: 129, N: 12, A: 8, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/53 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty 12.12.1984 Y: 124, N: 0, A: 24, 
NV: 11, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/74 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation 
in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
13.12.1984 adopted without vote 
A/RES/39/94 Effects of atomic radiation 14.12.1984 adopted without vote 
A/RES/39/148[G] Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 17.12.1984 Y: 100, N: 12, A: 26, 
NV: 21, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/148[B] Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 17.12.1984 Y: 98, N: 16, A: 24, 
NV: 21, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/148[K] Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament 17.12.1984 Y: 124, N: 13, A: 9, 
NV: 13, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/148[F] Climatic effects of nuclear war : nuclear winter 17.12.1984 Y: 130, N: 0, A: 11, 
NV: 18, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/147 Israeli nuclear armament 17.12.1984 Y: 94, N: 2, A: 44, 
NV: 19, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/148[D] Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 17.12.1984 Y: 101, N: 19, A: 17, 
NV: 22, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/148[C] Nuclear weapons in all aspects 17.12.1984 Y: 102, N: 19, A: 13, 
NV: 25, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/151[D] Nuclear-weapon freeze 17.12.1984 Y: 104, N: 18, A: 18, 
NV: 19, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/148[P] Prevention of nuclear war 17.12.1984 Y: 128, N: 6, A: 12, 
NV: 13, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/148[E] Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon 17.12.1984 Y: 71, N: 11, A: 53, 
NV: 24, TVM: 159 
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A/RES/39/151[B] Study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects 17.12.1984 Y: 143, N: 0, A: 2, 
NV: 14, TVM: 159 
A/RES/39/148[A] Unilateral nuclear disarmament measures 17.12.1984 Y: 126, N: 1, A: 13, 
NV: 19, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/6 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave 
consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and interna-
tional peace and security 
01.11.1985 Y: 88, N: 13, A: 39, 
NV: 19, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 08.11.1985 adopted without vote 
A/RES/40/18 Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 18.11.1985 Y: 76, N: 0, A: 12, 
NV: 71, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/80A Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 12.12.1985 Y: 124, N: 3, A: 21, 
NV: 11, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/80B Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons 12.12.1985 Y: 121, N: 3, A: 24, 
NV: 11, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/85 Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security 
of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weap-
ons 
12.12.1985 Y: 101, N: 19, A: 25, 
NV: 14, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/86 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
12.12.1985 Y: 142, N: 0, A: 6, 
NV: 11, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/83 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 12.12.1985 Y: 104, N: 3, A: 41, 
NV: 11, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/82 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 12.12.1985 adopted without vote 
A/RES/40/94M General and complete disarmament : 3rd Review Conference of the Parties to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
12.12.1985 Y: 138, N: 0, A: 11, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/94H General and complete disarmament : nuclear-weapon freeze 12.12.1985 Y: 120, N: 17, A: 10, 
NV: 12, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/94B General and complete disarmament : study of the question of nuclear-weapon-
free zones in all its aspects 
12.12.1985 adopted without vote 
A/RES/40/88 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 36/60 on the immediate ces-
sation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests 
12.12.1985 Y: 120, N: 3, A: 29, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/79 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 39/51 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)  
12.12.1985 Y: 139, N: 0, A: 7, 
NV: 13, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/89B Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa : nuclear 
capability of South Africa 
12.12.1985 Y: 135, N: 4, A: 14, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/93 Israeli nuclear armament 12.12.1985 Y: 101, N: 2, A: 47, 
NV: 9, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/95 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation 
in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
12.12.1985 adopted without vote 
A/RES/40/81 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty 12.12.1985 Y: 116, N: 4, A: 29, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/152B Bilateral nuclear-arms and space-arms negotiations 16.12.1985 Y: 107, N: 0, A: 40, 
NV: 12, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/152P Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament 16.12.1985 Y: 131, N: 16, A: 6, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/152G Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter 16.12.1985 Y: 141, N: 1, A: 10, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/151F Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 16.12.1985 Y: 126, N: 17, A: 6, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/160 Effects of atomic radiation 16.12.1985 adopted without vote 
A/RES/40/151E Freeze on nuclear weapons 16.12.1985 Y: 126, N: 12, A: 10, 
NV: 11, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/152A Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 16.12.1985 Y: 123, N: 19, A: 7, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/152C Nuclear weapons in all aspects 16.12.1985 Y: 117, N: 19, A: 11, 
NV: 12, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/151C Nuclear-arms freeze 16.12.1985 Y: 131, N: 10, A: 8, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/152Q Prevention of nuclear war 16.12.1985 Y: 136, N: 3, A: 14, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/40/152H Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon 16.12.1985 Y: 70, N: 11, A: 65, 
NV: 13, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/12 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave 
consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and interna-
tional peace and security 
29.10.1986 Y: 86, N: 5, A: 55, 
NV: 13, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/36 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 11.11.1986 adopted without vote 
A/RES/41/46A Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 03.12.1986 Y: 135, N: 3, A: 14, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/46B Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 03.12.1986 Y: 127, N: 3, A: 21, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
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A/RES/41/51 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the 
security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nu-
clear weapons 
03.12.1986 Y: 106, N: 18, A: 25, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/52 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
03.12.1986 Y: 149, N: 0, A: 4, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/62A Effects of atomic radiation 03.12.1986 adopted without vote 
A/RES/41/62B Effects of atomic radiation 03.12.1986 adopted without vote 
A/RES/41/49 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 03.12.1986 Y: 107, N: 3, A: 41, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/48 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 03.12.1986 adopted without vote 
A/RES/41/59N General and complete disarmament : notification of nuclear tests 03.12.1986 Y: 130, N: 1, A: 22, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/59F General and complete disarmament : nuclear disarmament 03.12.1986 adopted without vote 
A/RES/41/45 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/79 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
03.12.1986 Y: 145, N: 0, A: 7, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/54 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/88 on the immediate ces-
sation and prohibiton of nuclear-weapon tests 
03.12.1986 Y: 123, N: 3, A: 26, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/55A Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 03.12.1986 Y: 150, N: 0, A: 5, 
NV: 4, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/55B IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE DENUCLEARI-
ZATION OF AFRICA : NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
03.12.1986 Y: 139, N: 4, A: 13, 
NV: 3, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/60F Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special 
Session of the General Assembly : Convention on the Prohibition of the Use 
of Nuclear Weapons 
03.12.1986 Y: 132, N: 17, A: 4, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/60E Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special 
Session of the General Assembly : freeze on nuclear weapons 
03.12.1986 Y: 136, N: 12, A: 5, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/60I Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special 
Session of the General Assembly : implementation of General Assembly res-
olution 40/151C on a nuclear arms freeze 
03.12.1986 Y: 139, N: 12, A: 4, 
NV: 4, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/47 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty 03.12.1986 Y: 137, N: 1, A: 15, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/86A Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 04.12.1986 Y: 88, N: 0, A: 56, 
NV: 15, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/86N Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 04.12.1986 Y: 140, N: 0, A: 13, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/86F Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament 04.12.1986 Y: 130, N: 15, A: 5, 
NV: 9, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/86H Climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter 04.12.1986 Y: 140, N: 1, A: 10, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/93 Israeli nuclear armament 04.12.1986 Y: 95, N: 2, A: 56, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/86B Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 04.12.1986 Y: 118, N: 17, A: 10, 
NV: 14, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/86G Prevention of nuclear war 04.12.1986 Y: 134, N: 3, A: 14, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
A/RES/41/212A UN Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peace-
ful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
11.12.1986 adopted without vote 
A/RES/41/212B UN Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peace-
ful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
11.12.1986 Y: 119, N: 0, A: 28, 
NV: 12, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/6 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 20.10.1987 adopted without vote 
A/RES/42/24 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation 
in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
27.11.1987 adopted without vote 
A/RES/42/26A Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 30.11.1987 Y: 137, N: 3, A: 14, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/26B Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 30.11.1987 Y: 128, N: 3, A: 22, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/31 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the 
security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nu-
clear weapons 
30.11.1987 Y: 112, N: 18, A: 20, 
NV: 9, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/32 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
30.11.1987 Y: 151, N: 0, A: 3, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/29 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 30.11.1987 Y: 114, N: 3, A: 36, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/28 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 30.11.1987 adopted without vote 
A/RES/42/38A General and completed disarmament : bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 30.11.1987 Y: 115, N: 0, A: 39, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/38D General and completed disarmament : bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 30.11.1987 Y: 143, N: 0, A: 13, 
NV: 3, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/38C General and completed disarmament : notification of nuclear tests 30.11.1987 Y: 147, N: 1, A: 8, 
NV: 3, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/38H General and completed disarmament : nuclear disarmament 30.11.1987 adopted without vote 
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A/RES/42/25 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
30.11.1987 Y: 147, N: 0, A: 7, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/34B Implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa 30.11.1987 Y: 140, N: 4, A: 13, 
NV: 2, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/34A Implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa 30.11.1987 Y: 151, N: 0, A: 4, 
NV: 4, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/44 Israeli nuclear armament 30.11.1987 Y: 97, N: 2, A: 52, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/39C Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special 
Session of the General Assembly : Convention on the Prohibition of the Use 
of Nuclear Weapons 
30.11.1987 Y: 135, N: 17, A: 4, 
NV: 3, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/39B Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special 
Session of the General Assembly : freeze on nuclear weapons 
30.11.1987 Y: 139, N: 12, A: 4, 
NV: 4, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/39H Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special 
Session of the General Assembly : implementation of General Assembly res-
olution 41/60I on a nuclear-arms freeze 
30.11.1987 Y: 140, N: 13, A: 2, 
NV: 4, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/42C Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted 
by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : cessation of the nuclear-
arms race and nuclear disarmament 
30.11.1987 Y: 137, N: 13, A: 7, 
NV: 2, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/42A Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted 
by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : non-use of nuclear weap-
ons and prevention of nuclear war 
30.11.1987 Y: 125, N: 17, A: 12, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/42D Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted 
by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : prevention of nuclear 
war 
30.11.1987 Y: 140, N: 3, A: 14, 
NV: 2, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/27 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty 30.11.1987 Y: 143, N: 2, A: 8, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/42/67 Effects of atomic radiation 02.12.1987 adopted without vote 
A/RES/43/6 Observer status for the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the General Assembly 
27.10.1988 adopted without vote 
A/RES/43/16 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 28.10.1988 adopted without vote 
A/RES/43/55 Effects of atomic radiation 06.12.1988 adopted without vote 
A/RES/43/63A Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 07.12.1988 Y: 136, N: 4, A: 13, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/63B Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 07.12.1988 Y: 127, N: 3, A: 21, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/68 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the 
security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nu-
clear weapons 
07.12.1988 Y: 117, N: 17, A: 16, 
NV: 9, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/69 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
07.12.1988 Y: 152, N: 0, A: 3, 
NV: 4, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/66 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 07.12.1988 Y: 116, N: 3, A: 34, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/65 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 07.12.1988 adopted without vote 
A/RES/43/75A General and complete disarmament : bilateral nuclear-arms negotiation 07.12.1988 Y: 141, N: 0, A: 12, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/75O General and complete disarmament : bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 07.12.1988 Y: 103, N: 0, A: 46, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/75N General and complete disarmament : comprehensive UN study on nuclear 
weapons 
07.12.1988 Y: 141, N: 1, A: 9, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/75E General and complete disarmament : nuclear disarmament 07.12.1988 adopted without vote 
A/RES/43/75M General and complete disarmament : Review Conference of the Parties to the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the 
Subsoil Thereof 
07.12.1988 adopted without vote 
A/RES/43/62 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
07.12.1988 Y: 149, N: 0, A: 5, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/82 Implementation of the conclusions of the 3rd Review Conference of the Par-
ties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establish-
ment of a Preparatory Committee for the 4th Review Conference 
07.12.1988 Y: 137, N: 0, A: 11, 
NV: 11, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/71A Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 07.12.1988 Y: 151, N: 0, A: 4, 
NV: 4, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/71B Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa : nuclear 
capability of South Africa 
07.12.1988 Y: 138, N: 4, A: 12, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/80 Israeli nuclear armament 07.12.1988 Y: 99, N: 2, A: 51, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/76E Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special 
Session of the General Assembly : Convention on the Prohibition of the Use 
of Nuclear Weapons 
07.12.1988 Y: 133, N: 17, A: 4, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/76B Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special 
Session of the General Assembly : nuclear arms freeze 
07.12.1988 Y: 135, N: 12, A: 3, 
NV: 9, TVM: 159 
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A/RES/43/78E Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted 
by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : cessation of the nuclear-
arms race and nuclear disarmament 
07.12.1988 Y: 135, N: 13, A: 5, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/78D Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted 
by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : climatic effects of nu-
clear war, including nuclear winter : report of the Secretary-General 
07.12.1988 Y: 145, N: 0, A: 9, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/78B Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted 
by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : non-use of nuclear weap-
ons and rpevention of nuclear war 
07.12.1988 Y: 127, N: 17, A: 6, 
NV: 9, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/78F Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted 
by the General Assembly at its 10th special session : prevention of nuclear 
war 
07.12.1988 Y: 136, N: 3, A: 14, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/43/64 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty 07.12.1988 Y: 146, N: 2, A: 6, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/13 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 25.10.1989 adopted without vote 
A/RES/44/45 Effects of atomic radiation 08.12.1989 adopted without vote 
A/RES/44/106 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and under Water 
15.12.1989 Y: 127, N: 2, A: 22, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/116B Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 15.12.1989 Y: 91, N: 0, A: 61, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/116K Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 15.12.1989 Y: 134, N: 0, A: 18, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/105 Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 15.12.1989 Y: 136, N: 3, A: 13, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/119E Cessation of nuclear-arms race and prevention of nuclear war 15.12.1989 Y: 138, N: 11, A: 6, 
NV: 4, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/110 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the 
security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nu-
clear weapons 
15.12.1989 Y: 131, N: 0, A: 21, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/111 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
15.12.1989 Y: 151, N: 0, A: 3, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/117C Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 15.12.1989 Y: 134, N: 17, A: 4, 
NV: 4, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/109 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 15.12.1989 Y: 116, N: 3, A: 32, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/108 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 15.12.1989 adopted without vote 
A/RES/44/104 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 43/62 concerning the signa-
ture and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
15.12.1989 Y: 147, N: 0, A: 3, 
NV: 9, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/113A Implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa 15.12.1989 Y: 147, N: 0, A: 4, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/121 Israeli nuclear armament 15.12.1989 Y: 104, N: 2, A: 43, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/119B Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 15.12.1989 Y: 129, N: 17, A: 7, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/113B Nuclear capability of South Africa 15.12.1989 Y: 137, N: 4, A: 10, 
NV: 8, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/116D Nuclear disarmament 15.12.1989 adopted without vote 
A/RES/44/117D Nuclear-arms freeze 15.12.1989 Y: 136, N: 13, A: 5, 
NV: 5, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/116O Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Emplace-
ment of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the 
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof 
15.12.1989 adopted without vote 
A/RES/44/119F South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty 15.12.1989 Y: 151, N: 0, A: 4, 
NV: 4, TVM: 159 
A/RES/44/107 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty 15.12.1989 Y: 145, N: 2, A: 6, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/7 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 23.10.1990 adopted without vote 
A/RES/45/50 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and under Water 
04.12.1990 Y: 116, N: 2, A: 28, 
NV: 13, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/58B Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 04.12.1990 Y: 131, N: 0, A: 22, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/58H Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 04.12.1990 Y: 99, N: 0, A: 50, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/49 Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions 04.12.1990 Y: 127, N: 3, A: 17, 
NV: 12, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/62C Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention 
of nuclear war 
04.12.1990 Y: 132, N: 12, A: 9, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/58E Comprehensive UN study on nuclear weapons 04.12.1990 adopted without vote 
A/RES/45/54 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
04.12.1990 Y: 145, N: 0, A: 3, 
NV: 11, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/53 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 04.12.1990 Y: 114, N: 3, A: 28, 
NV: 14, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/52 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 04.12.1990 adopted without vote 
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A/RES/45/56A IMPLEMENTATION OF DECLARATION ON DENUCLEARIZATION 
OF AFRICA 
04.12.1990 Y: 145, N: 0, A: 4, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/48 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 44/104 concerning the sig-
nature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibi-
tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco) 
04.12.1990 Y: 141, N: 0, A: 3, 
NV: 15, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/63 Israeli nuclear armament 04.12.1990 Y: 98, N: 2, A: 50, 
NV: 9, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/56B NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 04.12.1990 Y: 118, N: 4, A: 27, 
NV: 10, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/58D Nuclear disarmament 04.12.1990 adopted without vote 
A/RES/45/59D Nuclear-arms freeze 04.12.1990 Y: 126, N: 14, A: 12, 
NV: 7, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/58J Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities 04.12.1990 Y: 141, N: 1, A: 11, 
NV: 6, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/51 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty 04.12.1990 Y: 140, N: 2, A: 6, 
NV: 11, TVM: 159 
A/RES/45/71 Effects of atomic radiation 11.12.1990 adopted without vote 
A/RES/46/16 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 13.11.1991 Y: 141, N: 0, A: 9, 
NV: 16, TVM: 166 
A/RES/46/28 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and under Water 
06.12.1991 Y: 110, N: 2, A: 35, 
NV: 19, TVM: 166 
A/RES/46/36J Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations 06.12.1991 Y: 130, N: 0, A: 26, 
NV: 10, TVM: 166 
A/RES/46/29 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 06.12.1991 Y: 147, N: 2, A: 4, 
NV: 13, TVM: 166 
A/RES/46/32 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
06.12.1991 Y: 152, N: 0, A: 2, 
NV: 12, TVM: 166 
A/RES/46/31 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 06.12.1991 Y: 121, N: 3, A: 26, 
NV: 16, TVM: 166 
A/RES/46/30 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 06.12.1991 adopted without vote 
A/RES/46/34A Implementation of the Denuclearization of Africa : nuclear capacity of South 
Africa 
06.12.1991 Y: 108, N: 1, A: 47, 
NV: 10, TVM: 166 
A/RES/46/39 Israeli nuclear armament 06.12.1991 Y: 76, N: 3, A: 75, 
NV: 12, TVM: 166 
A/RES/46/37D Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special 
Session of the General Assembly : Convention on Prohibition of Use of Nu-
clear Weapons 
06.12.1991 Y: 122, N: 16, A: 22, 
NV: 6, TVM: 166 
A/RES/46/37C Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the 12th Special 
Session of the General Assembly : nuclear-arms freeze 
06.12.1991 Y: 119, N: 18, A: 23, 
NV: 6, TVM: 166 
A/RES/46/44 Effects of atomic radiation 09.12.1991 adopted without vote 
A/RES/46/34B Implementation of the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa 09.12.1991 adopted without vote 
A/RES/47/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 22.10.1992 Y: 146, N: 0, A: 5, 
NV: 28, TVM: 179 
A/RES/47/46 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and under Water 
09.12.1992 Y: 118, N: 2, A: 41, 
NV: 18, TVM: 179 
A/RES/47/52K Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament 09.12.1992 adopted without vote 
A/RES/47/47 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 09.12.1992 Y: 159, N: 1, A: 4, 
NV: 15, TVM: 179 
A/RES/47/50 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
09.12.1992 Y: 162, N: 0, A: 2, 
NV: 15, TVM: 179 
A/RES/47/61 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
09.12.1992 adopted without vote 
A/RES/47/53C Convention on Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 09.12.1992 Y: 126, N: 21, A: 21, 
NV: 11, TVM: 179 
A/RES/47/49 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 09.12.1992 Y: 144, N: 3, A: 13, 
NV: 19, TVM: 179 
A/RES/47/48 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 09.12.1992 adopted without vote 
A/RES/47/52A General and complete disarmament : Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons : 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee 
09.12.1992 Y: 168, N: 0, A: 0, 
NV: 11, TVM: 179 
A/RES/47/55 Israeli nuclear armament 09.12.1992 Y: 64, N: 3, A: 90, 
NV: 22, TVM: 179 
A/RES/47/53E Nuclear-arms freeze 09.12.1992 Y: 121, N: 19, A: 27, 
NV: 12, TVM: 179 
A/RES/47/54A Report of the Disarmament Commission 09.12.1992 adopted without vote 
A/RES/47/66 Effects of atomic radiation 14.12.1992 adopted without vote 
A/RES/47/76 Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 15.12.1992 adopted without vote 
A/RES/48/14 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 01.11.1993 Y: 140, N: 1, A: 9, 
NV: 34, TVM: 184 
A/RES/48/38 Effects of atomic radiation 10.12.1993 adopted without vote 
A/RES/48/69 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and under Water 
16.12.1993 Y: 118, N: 3, A: 45, 
NV: 18, TVM: 184 
A/RES/48/75B Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament 16.12.1993 adopted without vote 
A/RES/48/70 Comprehensive test-ban treaty 16.12.1993 adopted without vote 
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A/RES/48/73 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
16.12.1993 Y: 166, N: 0, A: 4, 
NV: 14, TVM: 184 
A/RES/48/85 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
16.12.1993 adopted without vote 
A/RES/48/76B Convention on Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 16.12.1993 Y: 120, N: 23, A: 24, 
NV: 17, TVM: 184 
A/RES/48/86 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa 16.12.1993 adopted without vote 
A/RES/48/72 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 16.12.1993 Y: 153, N: 3, A: 12, 
NV: 16, TVM: 184 
A/RES/48/71 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 16.12.1993 adopted without vote 
A/RES/48/78 Israeli nuclear armament 16.12.1993 Y: 53, N: 45, A: 65, 
NV: 21, TVM: 184 
A/RES/48/75L Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices 
16.12.1993 adopted without vote 
A/RES/49/32 Effects of atomic radiation 09.12.1994 adopted without vote 
A/RES/49/75F 1995 Review and Extension Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
15.12.1994 Y: 103, N: 40, A: 25, 
NV: 17, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/69 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and under Water 
15.12.1994 Y: 116, N: 4, A: 49, 
NV: 16, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/75P Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament 15.12.1994 Y: 171, N: 0, A: 1, 
NV: 13, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/70 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 15.12.1994 adopted without vote 
A/RES/49/73 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
15.12.1994 Y: 168, N: 0, A: 3, 
NV: 14, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/83 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
15.12.1994 adopted without vote 
A/RES/49/76E Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons 15.12.1994 Y: 115, N: 24, A: 31, 
NV: 15, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/72 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 15.12.1994 Y: 156, N: 3, A: 10, 
NV: 16, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/71 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 15.12.1994 adopted without vote 
A/RES/49/75L General and complete disarmament : bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and 
nuclear disarmament 
15.12.1994 adopted without vote 
A/RES/49/75H Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weap-
ons 
15.12.1994 Y: 163, N: 0, A: 8, 
NV: 14, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/65 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 15.12.1994 Y: 161, N: 1, A: 6, 
NV: 17, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/75K Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
on the legalilty of the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
15.12.1994 Y: 78, N: 43, A: 38, 
NV: 26, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/75E Step-by-step reduction of nuclear threat 15.12.1994 Y: 111, N: 24, A: 33, 
NV: 17, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/78 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 15.12.1994 Y: 60, N: 4, A: 100, 
NV: 21, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/84 The South Atlantic region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone 15.12.1994 Y: 161, N: 3, A: 3, 
NV: 18, TVM: 185 
A/RES/49/138 Establishment of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone 19.12.1994 adopted without vote 
A/RES/50/9 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 01.11.1995 Y: 144, N: 1, A: 8, 
NV: 32, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/26 Effects of atomic radiation 06.12.1995 adopted without vote 
A/RES/50/70Q 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
12.12.1995 Y: 161, N: 0, A: 2, 
NV: 22, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/64 Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapen Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and under Water 
12.12.1995 Y: 110, N: 4, A: 45, 
NV: 26, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/70I Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament 12.12.1995 Y: 150, N: 0, A: 14, 
NV: 21, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/70N Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament 12.12.1995 Y: 105, N: 37, A: 20, 
NV: 23, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/65 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 12.12.1995 adopted without vote 
A/RES/50/68 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
12.12.1995 Y: 122, N: 0, A: 44, 
NV: 19, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/77 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
12.12.1995 adopted without vote 
A/RES/50/70R Contribution to nuclear disarmament 12.12.1995 adopted without vote 
A/RES/50/71E Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 12.12.1995 Y: 108, N: 27, A: 28, 
NV: 22, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/67 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 12.12.1995 Y: 154, N: 3, A: 10, 
NV: 18, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/66 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 12.12.1995 adopted without vote 
A/RES/50/78 Final text of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba 
Treaty) 
12.12.1995 adopted without vote 
A/RES/50/70P Nuclear disarmament 12.12.1995 Y: 106, N: 39, A: 17, 
NV: 23, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/70C Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weap-
ons 
12.12.1995 Y: 154, N: 0, A: 10, 
NV: 21, TVM: 185 
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A/RES/50/70A Nuclear testing 12.12.1995 Y: 86, N: 18, A: 44, 
NV: 37, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/73 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 12.12.1995 Y: 56, N: 2, A: 100, 
NV: 27, TVM: 185 
A/RES/50/245 Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty 10.09.1996 Y: 158, N: 3, A: 5, 
NV: 19, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/10 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 29.10.1996 Y: 141, N: 2, A: 8, 
NV: 34, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/45M Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons 
10.12.1996 Y: 115, N: 22, A: 32, 
NV: 16, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/53 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) 10.12.1996 adopted without vote 
A/RES/51/45R Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament 10.12.1996 Y: 160, N: 0, A: 11, 
NV: 14, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/45I Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament 10.12.1996 Y: 107, N: 37, A: 24, 
NV: 17, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/43 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
10.12.1996 Y: 125, N: 0, A: 45, 
NV: 15, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/52 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapon in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
10.12.1996 adopted without vote 
A/RES/51/46D Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 10.12.1996 Y: 114, N: 31, A: 27, 
NV: 13, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/42 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 10.12.1996 Y: 156, N: 3, A: 8, 
NV: 18, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/41 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 10.12.1996 adopted without vote 
A/RES/51/45O Nuclear disarmament 10.12.1996 Y: 110, N: 39, A: 20, 
NV: 16, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/45G Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weap-
ons 
10.12.1996 Y: 159, N: 0, A: 11, 
NV: 15, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/45B The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 10.12.1996 Y: 129, N: 3, A: 38, 
NV: 15, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/48 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 10.12.1996 Y: 129, N: 3, A: 32, 
NV: 21, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/45A Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons : 2000 Review Confer-
ence of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
and its Preparatory Committee 
10.12.1996 Y: 167, N: 0, A: 2, 
NV: 16, TVM: 185 
A/RES/51/121 Effects of atomic radiation 13.12.1996 adopted without vote 
A/RES/52/11 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 12.11.1997 Y: 151, N: 1, A: 5, 
NV: 28, TVM: 185 
A/RES/52/38O Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
09.12.1997 Y: 116, N: 26, A: 24, 
NV: 19, TVM: 185 
A/RES/52/46 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 09.12.1997 adopted without vote 
A/RES/52/38M Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament 09.12.1997 Y: 161, N: 0, A: 8, 
NV: 16, TVM: 185 
A/RES/52/36 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
09.12.1997 Y: 116, N: 0, A: 51, 
NV: 18, TVM: 185 
A/RES/52/45 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
09.12.1997 adopted without vote 
A/RES/52/39C Convention on theh Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 09.12.1997 Y: 109, N: 30, A: 27, 
NV: 19, TVM: 185 
A/RES/52/38S Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia 09.12.1997 adopted without vote 
A/RES/52/35 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia 09.12.1997 Y: 153, N: 3, A: 8, 
NV: 21, TVM: 185 
A/RES/52/34 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 09.12.1997 adopted without vote 
A/RES/52/38L Nuclear disarmament 09.12.1997 Y: 109, N: 39, A: 18, 
NV: 19, TVM: 185 
A/RES/52/38K Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weap-
ons 
09.12.1997 Y: 156, N: 0, A: 10, 
NV: 19, TVM: 185 
A/RES/52/38N The nuclear-weapon-free southern hemishpere and adjacent areas 09.12.1997 Y: 131, N: 3, A: 34, 
NV: 17, TVM: 185 
A/RES/52/41 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 09.12.1997 Y: 147, N: 2, A: 14, 
NV: 22, TVM: 185 
A/RES/52/55 Effects of atomic radiation 10.12.1997 adopted without vote 
A/RES/53/21 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 02.11.1998 Y: 113, N: 1, A: 8, 
NV: 63, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/44 Effects of atomic radiation 03.12.1998 adopted without vote 
A/RES/53/77Z Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament 04.12.1998 Y: 166, N: 0, A: 8, 
NV: 11, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/75 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
04.12.1998 Y: 117, N: 0, A: 52, 
NV: 16, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/83 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
04.12.1998 adopted without vote 
A/RES/53/78[D] Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 04.12.1998 Y: 111, N: 39, A: 22, 
NV: 13, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/77A Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia  04.12.1998 adopted without vote 
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A/RES/53/74 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 04.12.1998 adopted without vote 
A/RES/53/77W Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
04.12.1998 Y: 123, N: 25, A: 25, 
NV: 12, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/77D Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status 04.12.1998 adopted without vote 
A/RES/53/77X Nuclear disarmament 04.12.1998 Y: 110, N: 41, A: 18, 
NV: 16, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/77U Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weap-
ons 
04.12.1998 Y: 160, N: 0, A: 11, 
NV: 14, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/77G Nuclear testing 04.12.1998 Y: 118, N: 9, A: 33, 
NV: 25, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/77Q Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 04.12.1998 Y: 154, N: 3, A: 10, 
NV: 18, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/77F Reducing nuclear danger 04.12.1998 Y: 108, N: 45, A: 17, 
NV: 15, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/77I The Conference on Disarmament decision to establish, under item 1 of its 
agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarma-
ment", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the 
Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-dis-
criminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty 
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices 
04.12.1998 adopted without vote 
A/RES/53/80 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 04.12.1998 Y: 158, N: 2, A: 11, 
NV: 14, TVM: 185 
A/RES/53/77Y Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : the need for a new agenda 04.12.1998 Y: 114, N: 18, A: 38, 
NV: 15, TVM: 185 
A/RES/54/26 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 15.11.1999 Y: 122, N: 1, A: 6, 
NV: 59, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/48 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) 01.12.1999 adopted without vote 
A/RES/54/63 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 01.12.1999 Y: 158, N: 0, A: 6, 
NV: 24, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/52 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
01.12.1999 Y: 111, N: 0, A: 53, 
NV: 24, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/60 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlateloco) 
01.12.1999 adopted without vote 
A/RES/54/55D Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 01.12.1999 Y: 104, N: 42, A: 17, 
NV: 25, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/51 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 01.12.1999 adopted without vote 
A/RES/54/54Q Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
01.12.1999 Y: 114, N: 28, A: 22, 
NV: 24, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/54P Nuclear disarmament 01.12.1999 Y: 104, N: 41, A: 17, 
NV: 26, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/54D Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weap-
ons 
01.12.1999 Y: 153, N: 0, A: 12, 
NV: 23, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/54L Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 01.12.1999 Y: 157, N: 3, A: 4, 
NV: 24, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/54K Reducing nuclear danger 01.12.1999 Y: 104, N: 43, A: 14, 
NV: 27, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/57 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 01.12.1999 Y: 149, N: 3, A: 9, 
NV: 27, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/54G Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : the need for a new agenda 01.12.1999 Y: 111, N: 13, A: 39, 
NV: 25, TVM: 188 
A/RES/54/65 Cooperation between the UN and the Preparatory Commission for the Com-
prehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
06.12.1999 adopted without vote 
A/RES/54/66 Effects of atomic radiation 06.12.1999 adopted without vote 
A/RES/54/280 Agreement concerning the relationship between the UN and the Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
15.06.2000 adopted without vote 
A/RES/55/33[D] 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons 
20.11.2000 Y: 163, N: 1, A: 3, 
NV: 22, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/33[R] A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 20.11.2000 Y: 155, N: 1, A: 12, 
NV: 21, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/41 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 20.11.2000 Y: 161, N: 0, A: 6, 
NV: 22, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/31 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapon 
20.11.2000 Y: 111, N: 0, A: 54, 
NV: 24, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/39 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
20.11.2000 adopted without vote 
A/RES/55/34[G] Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 20.11.2000 Y: 109, N: 43, A: 16, 
NV: 21, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/34[H] Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 20.11.2000 adopted without vote 
A/RES/55/33[W] Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia  20.11.2000 adopted without vote 
A/RES/55/30 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 20.11.2000 adopted without vote 
A/RES/55/33[X] Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
20.11.2000 Y: 119, N: 28, A: 22, 
NV: 20, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/33[S] Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status 20.11.2000 adopted without vote 
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A/RES/55/33[T] Nuclear disarmament 20.11.2000 Y: 109, N: 39, A: 20, 
NV: 21, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/33[I] Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 20.11.2000 Y: 159, N: 4, A: 5, 
NV: 21, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/33[N] Reducing nuclear danger 20.11.2000 Y: 110, N: 45, A: 14, 
NV: 20, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/33[Y] The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to 
establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms 
race and nuclear disarmament" , an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis 
of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained 
therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively 
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weap-
ons or other nuclear explosive devices  
20.11.2000 adopted without vote 
A/RES/55/36 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 20.11.2000 Y: 157, N: 3, A: 8, 
NV: 21, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/33[C] Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : the need for a new agenda 20.11.2000 Y: 154, N: 3, A: 8, 
NV: 24, TVM: 189 
A/RES/55/121 Effects of atomic radiation 08.12.2000 adopted without vote 
A/RES/55/244 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 16.03.2001 adopted without vote 
A/RES/56/24[O] 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee 
29.11.2001 Y: 156, N: 1, A: 3, 
NV: 29, TVM: 189 
A/RES/56/24[N] A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 29.11.2001 Y: 139, N: 3, A: 19, 
NV: 28, TVM: 189 
A/RES/56/17 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) 29.11.2001 adopted without vote 
A/RES/56/22 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
29.11.2001 Y: 105, N: 0, A: 54, 
NV: 30, TVM: 189 
A/RES/56/30 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
29.11.2001 adopted without vote 
A/RES/56/25B Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 29.11.2001 Y: 104, N: 46, A: 11, 
NV: 28, TVM: 189 
A/RES/56/21 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 29.11.2001 adopted without vote 
A/RES/56/24[S] Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
29.11.2001 Y: 111, N: 29, A: 21, 
NV: 28, TVM: 189 
A/RES/56/24[R] Nuclear disarmament 29.11.2001 Y: 103, N: 41, A: 17, 
NV: 28, TVM: 189 
A/RES/56/24[G] Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 29.11.2001 Y: 148, N: 4, A: 4, 
NV: 33, TVM: 189 
A/RES/56/24[C] Reducing nuclear danger 29.11.2001 Y: 98, N: 45, A: 14, 
NV: 32, TVM: 189 
A/RES/56/24[J] The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to 
establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms 
race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis 
of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained 
therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively 
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weap-
ons or other nuclear explosive devices 
29.11.2001 adopted without vote 
A/RES/56/27 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 29.11.2001 Y: 153, N: 3, A: 6, 
NV: 27, TVM: 189 
A/RES/56/49 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
07.12.2001 Y: 134, N: 1, A: 2, 
NV: 52, TVM: 189 
A/RES/56/50 Effects of atomic radiation 10.12.2001 adopted without vote 
A/RES/56/94 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 14.12.2001 Y: 150, N: 1, A: 2, 
NV: 36, TVM: 189 
A/RES/57/9 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 11.11.2002 Y: 138, N: 1, A: 2, 
NV: 50, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/49 Cooperation between the UN and the Preparatory Commission for the Com-
prehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization  
21.11.2002 Y: 128, N: 1, A: 3, 
NV: 59, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/78 A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 22.11.2002 Y: 156, N: 2, A: 13, 
NV: 20, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/68 Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework 22.11.2002 adopted without vote 
A/RES/57/100 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 22.11.2002 Y: 164, N: 1, A: 5, 
NV: 21, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/56 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
22.11.2002 Y: 106, N: 0, A: 55, 
NV: 30, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/94 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 22.11.2002 Y: 110, N: 45, A: 12, 
NV: 24, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/69 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia  22.11.2002 adopted without vote 
A/RES/57/55 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 22.11.2002 adopted without vote 
A/RES/57/85 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
"Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons " 
22.11.2002 Y: 117, N: 30, A: 24, 
NV: 20, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/67 Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status 22.11.2002 adopted without vote 
A/RES/57/79 Nuclear disarmament 22.11.2002 Y: 107, N: 41, A: 21, 
NV: 22, TVM: 191 
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A/RES/57/73 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 22.11.2002 Y: 160, N: 3, A: 5, 
NV: 23, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/84 Reducing nuclear danger 22.11.2002 Y: 107, N: 46, A: 17, 
NV: 21, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/58 Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons 22.11.2002 Y: 120, N: 3, A: 42, 
NV: 26, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/80 The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to 
establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms 
race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis 
of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate therein, 
a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifia-
ble treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devises 
22.11.2002 adopted without vote 
A/RES/57/97 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 22.11.2002 Y: 158, N: 3, A: 8, 
NV: 22, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/59 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : the need for a new agenda 22.11.2002 Y: 125, N: 6, A: 36, 
NV: 24, TVM: 191 
A/RES/57/115 Effects of atomic radiation 11.12.2002 adopted without vote 
A/RES/58/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 05.11.2003 Y: 129, N: 1, A: 0, 
NV: 61, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/59 A path to total elimination of nuclear weapons 08.12.2003 Y: 164, N: 2, A: 14, 
NV: 11, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/30 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) 08.12.2003 adopted without vote 
A/RES/58/71 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 08.12.2003 Y: 173, N: 1, A: 4, 
NV: 13, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/35 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
08.12.2003 Y: 119, N: 0, A: 58, 
NV: 14, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/31 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
08.12.2003 adopted without vote 
A/RES/58/64 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 08.12.2003 Y: 118, N: 46, A: 13, 
NV: 14, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/34 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 08.12.2003 adopted without vote 
A/RES/58/46 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
08.12.2003 Y: 124, N: 29, A: 22, 
NV: 16, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/56 Nuclear disarmament 08.12.2003 Y: 112, N: 45, A: 20, 
NV: 14, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/49 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 08.12.2003 Y: 168, N: 3, A: 8, 
NV: 12, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/47 Reducing nuclear danger 08.12.2003 Y: 114, N: 47, A: 17, 
NV: 13, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/50 Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons 08.12.2003 Y: 128, N: 4, A: 43, 
NV: 16, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/57 The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to 
establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms 
race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis 
of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained 
therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively 
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weap-
ons or other nuclear explosive devices 
08.12.2003 adopted without vote 
A/RES/58/68 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 08.12.2003 Y: 162, N: 4, A: 10, 
NV: 15, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/51 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : a new agenda 08.12.2003 Y: 133, N: 6, A: 38, 
NV: 14, TVM: 191 
A/RES/58/88 Effects of atomic radiation 09.12.2003 adopted without vote 
A/RES/59/6 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
22.10.2004 Y: 104, N: 1, A: 0, 
NV: 86, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/18 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 01.11.2004 Y: 123, N: 1, A: 0, 
NV: 67, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/76 A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons 03.12.2004 Y: 165, N: 3, A: 16, 
NV: 7, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/75 Accelerating implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments 03.12.2004 Y: 151, N: 6, A: 24, 
NV: 10, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/94 Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework 03.12.2004 adopted without vote 
A/RES/59/109 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 03.12.2004 Y: 177, N: 2, A: 4, 
NV: 8, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/64 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
03.12.2004 Y: 118, N: 0, A: 63, 
NV: 10, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/102 Convention on the Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons 03.12.2004 Y: 125, N: 48, A: 12, 
NV: 6, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/63 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 03.12.2004 adopted without vote 
A/RES/59/83 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
03.12.2004 Y: 132, N: 29, A: 24, 
NV: 6, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/73 Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status 03.12.2004 adopted without vote 
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A/RES/59/77 Nuclear disarmament 03.12.2004 Y: 117, N: 43, A: 21, 
NV: 10, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/85 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 03.12.2004 Y: 171, N: 4, A: 8, 
NV: 8, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/79 Reducing nuclear danger 03.12.2004 Y: 116, N: 46, A: 18, 
NV: 11, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/106 Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 03.12.2004 Y: 170, N: 5, A: 9, 
NV: 7, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/81 The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to 
establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms 
race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis 
of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained 
therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively 
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weap-
ons or other nuclear explosive devices 
03.12.2004 Y: 179, N: 2, A: 2, 
NV: 8, TVM: 191 
A/RES/59/114 Effects of atomic radiation 10.12.2004 adopted without vote 
A/RES/59/290 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 13.04.2005 adopted without vote 
A/RES/60/6 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 31.10.2005 Y: 137, N: 1, A: 0, 
NV: 53, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/49 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 08.12.2005 adopted without vote 
A/RES/60/95 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 08.12.2005 Y: 172, N: 1, A: 4, 
NV: 14, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/53 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
08.12.2005 Y: 120, N: 0, A: 59, 
NV: 12, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/50 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
08.12.2005 adopted without vote 
A/RES/60/88 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 08.12.2005 Y: 111, N: 49, A: 13, 
NV: 18, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/98 Effects of atomic radiation 08.12.2005 adopted without vote 
A/RES/60/52 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 08.12.2005 adopted without vote 
A/RES/60/72 Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 
Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons 
08.12.2005 Y: 87, N: 56, A: 26, 
NV: 22, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/76 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
08.12.2005 Y: 126, N: 29, A: 24, 
NV: 12, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/70 Nuclear disarmament 08.12.2005 Y: 113, N: 45, A: 20, 
NV: 13, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/58 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas : accelerating 
the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments 
08.12.2005 Y: 167, N: 3, A: 8, 
NV: 13, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/79 Reducing nuclear danger 08.12.2005 Y: 115, N: 49, A: 15, 
NV: 12, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/65 Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 08.12.2005 Y: 168, N: 2, A: 7, 
NV: 14, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/92 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 08.12.2005 Y: 164, N: 5, A: 5, 
NV: 17, TVM: 191 
A/RES/60/56 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments 
08.12.2005 Y: 153, N: 5, A: 20, 
NV: 13, TVM: 191 
A/RES/61/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 30.10.2006 Y: 114, N: 1, A: 1, 
NV: 76, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/47 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
04.12.2006 Y: 133, N: 1, A: 0, 
NV: 58, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/70 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee 
06.12.2006 Y: 175, N: 0, A: 3, 
NV: 14, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/104 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 06.12.2006 Y: 172, N: 2, A: 4, 
NV: 14, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/57 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
06.12.2006 Y: 119, N: 1, A: 59, 
NV: 13, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/97 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 06.12.2006 Y: 119, N: 52, A: 10, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/88 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia  06.12.2006 Y: 141, N: 3, A: 37, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/56 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 06.12.2006 adopted without vote 
A/RES/61/83 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
06.12.2006 Y: 125, N: 27, A: 29, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/87 Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status 06.12.2006 adopted without vote 
A/RES/61/78 Nuclear disarmament 06.12.2006 Y: 115, N: 48, A: 18, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/69 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 06.12.2006 Y: 167, N: 3, A: 9, 
NV: 13, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/85 Reducing nuclear danger 06.12.2006 Y: 118, N: 52, A: 13, 
NV: 9, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/74 Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 06.12.2006 Y: 167, N: 4, A: 7, 
NV: 14, TVM: 192 
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A/RES/61/103 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 06.12.2006 Y: 166, N: 5, A: 6, 
NV: 15, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/65 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments 
06.12.2006 Y: 157, N: 7, A: 13, 
NV: 15, TVM: 192 
A/RES/61/109 Effects of atomic radiation 14.12.2006 adopted without vote 
A/RES/62/2 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 29.10.2007 adopted without vote 
A/RES/62/15 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 05.12.2007 adopted without vote 
A/RES/62/59 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 05.12.2007 Y: 176, N: 1, A: 4, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/19 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
05.12.2007 Y: 121, N: 1, A: 56, 
NV: 14, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/16 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
05.12.2007 adopted without vote 
A/RES/62/51 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 05.12.2007 Y: 120, N: 52, A: 10, 
NV: 10, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/36 Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems 05.12.2007 Y: 139, N: 3, A: 36, 
NV: 14, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/18 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 05.12.2007 adopted without vote 
A/RES/62/24 Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 
Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons 
05.12.2007 Y: 109, N: 55, A: 15, 
NV: 13, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/39 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
05.12.2007 Y: 127, N: 27, A: 27, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/42 Nuclear disarmament 05.12.2007 Y: 117, N: 47, A: 17, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/35 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 05.12.2007 Y: 169, N: 3, A: 8, 
NV: 12, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/46 Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources 05.12.2007 adopted without vote 
A/RES/62/32 Reducing nuclear danger 05.12.2007 Y: 117, N: 52, A: 12, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/37 Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 05.12.2007 Y: 170, N: 3, A: 9, 
NV: 10, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/56 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 05.12.2007 Y: 170, N: 5, A: 7, 
NV: 10, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/25 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments 
05.12.2007 Y: 156, N: 5, A: 14, 
NV: 17, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/31 Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) 05.12.2007 Y: 174, N: 1, A: 5, 
NV: 12, TVM: 192 
A/RES/62/100 Effects of atomic radiation 17.12.2007 adopted without vote 
A/RES/63/6 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 27.10.2008 adopted without vote 
A/RES/63/13 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
03.11.2008 Y: 64, N: 1, A: 0, NV: 
127, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/87 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 02.12.2008 Y: 175, N: 1, A: 3, 
NV: 13, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/39 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
02.12.2008 Y: 122, N: 1, A: 58, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/75 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 02.12.2008 Y: 121, N: 50, A: 10, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/41 Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems 02.12.2008 Y: 141, N: 3, A: 34, 
NV: 14, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/63 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia  02.12.2008 Y: 141, N: 3, A: 36, 
NV: 12, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/38 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 02.12.2008 adopted without vote 
A/RES/63/49 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
02.12.2008 Y: 127, N: 30, A: 23, 
NV: 12, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/56 Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status 02.12.2008 adopted without vote 
A/RES/63/46 Nuclear disarmament 02.12.2008 Y: 117, N: 45, A: 19, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/65 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 02.12.2008 Y: 171, N: 3, A: 7, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/47 Reducing nuclear danger 02.12.2008 Y: 118, N: 50, A: 14, 
NV: 10, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/73 Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 02.12.2008 Y: 173, N: 4, A: 6, 
NV: 9, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/84 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 02.12.2008 Y: 169, N: 5, A: 6, 
NV: 12, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/58 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments 
02.12.2008 Y: 166, N: 5, A: 7, 
NV: 14, TVM: 192 
A/RES/63/89 Effects of atomic radiation 05.12.2008 adopted without vote 
A/RES/64/8 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 02.11.2009 adopted without vote 
A/RES/64/24 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 02.12.2009 adopted without vote 
A/RES/64/69 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 02.12.2009 Y: 175, N: 1, A: 3, 
NV: 13, TVM: 192 
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A/RES/64/27 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
02.12.2009 Y: 118, N: 0, A: 58, 
NV: 16, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/59 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 02.12.2009 Y: 116, N: 50, A: 12, 
NV: 14, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/26 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 02.12.2009 adopted without vote 
A/RES/64/31 Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 
Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons 
02.12.2009 Y: 109, N: 56, A: 10, 
NV: 17, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/55 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
02.12.2009 Y: 124, N: 31, A: 21, 
NV: 16, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/35 International Day Against Nuclear Tests 02.12.2009 adopted without vote 
A/RES/64/53 Nuclear disarmament 02.12.2009 Y: 111, N: 45, A: 19, 
NV: 17, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/44 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 02.12.2009 Y: 170, N: 3, A: 6, 
NV: 13, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/37 Reducing nuclear danger 02.12.2009 Y: 115, N: 50, A: 14, 
NV: 13, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/47 Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 02.12.2009 Y: 171, N: 2, A: 8, 
NV: 11, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/52 Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia 
02.12.2009 Y: 166, N: 3, A: 6, 
NV: 17, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/66 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 02.12.2009 Y: 167, N: 6, A: 6, 
NV: 13, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/57 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments 
02.12.2009 Y: 169, N: 5, A: 5, 
NV: 13, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/29 Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices 
02.12.2009 adopted without vote 
A/RES/64/39 Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) 02.12.2009 Y: 174, N: 0, A: 6, 
NV: 12, TVM: 192 
A/RES/64/85 Effects of atomic radiation 10.12.2009 adopted without vote 
A/RES/65/9 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 08.11.2010 adopted without vote 
A/RES/65/39 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 08.12.2010 adopted without vote 
A/RES/65/61 Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for stra-
tegic relations 
08.12.2010 adopted without vote 
A/RES/65/91 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 08.12.2010 Y: 179, N: 1, A: 3, 
NV: 9, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/43 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
08.12.2010 Y: 119, N: 0, A: 58, 
NV: 15, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/40 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
08.12.2010 adopted without vote 
A/RES/65/80 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 08.12.2010 Y: 124, N: 49, A: 11, 
NV: 8, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/71 Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems 08.12.2010 Y: 157, N: 3, A: 22, 
NV: 10, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/42 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 08.12.2010 adopted without vote 
A/RES/65/76 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
08.12.2010 Y: 133, N: 28, A: 23, 
NV: 8, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/70 Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status 08.12.2010 adopted without vote 
A/RES/65/56 Nuclear disarmament 08.12.2010 Y: 120, N: 45, A: 18, 
NV: 9, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/58 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 08.12.2010 Y: 174, N: 3, A: 6, 
NV: 9, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/60 Reducing nuclear danger 08.12.2010 Y: 121, N: 49, A: 14, 
NV: 8, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/88 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 08.12.2010 Y: 172, N: 6, A: 8, 
NV: 6, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/59 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments 
08.12.2010 Y: 173, N: 5, A: 5, 
NV: 9, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/65 Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices 
08.12.2010 Y: 179, N: 1, A: 2, 
NV: 10, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/49 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia 08.12.2010 Y: 144, N: 3, A: 36, 
NV: 9, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/72 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 08.12.2010 Y: 173, N: 1, A: 11, 
NV: 7, TVM: 192 
A/RES/65/96 Effects of atomic radiation 10.12.2010 adopted without vote 
A/RES/65/127 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
13.12.2010 adopted without vote 
A/RES/66/7 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 02.11.2011 adopted without vote 
A/RES/66/33 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committee 
02.12.2011 Y: 175, N: 0, A: 3, 
NV: 15, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/23 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 02.12.2011 adopted without vote 
A/RES/66/64 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 02.12.2011 Y: 175, N: 1, A: 3, 
NV: 14, TVM: 193 
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A/RES/66/26 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
02.12.2011 Y: 120, N: 0, A: 57, 
NV: 16, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/57 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 02.12.2011 Y: 117, N: 48, A: 12, 
NV: 16, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/25 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 02.12.2011 adopted without vote 
A/RES/66/28 Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 
2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons 
02.12.2011 Y: 118, N: 52, A: 6, 
NV: 17, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/46 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
02.12.2011 Y: 130, N: 26, A: 23, 
NV: 14, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/51 Nuclear disarmament 02.12.2011 Y: 117, N: 45, A: 18, 
NV: 13, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/48 Reducing nuclear danger 02.12.2011 Y: 117, N: 49, A: 13, 
NV: 14, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/61 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 02.12.2011 Y: 167, N: 6, A: 5, 
NV: 15, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/40 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments 
02.12.2011 Y: 169, N: 6, A: 6, 
NV: 13, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/44 Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices 
02.12.2011 Y: 158, N: 2, A: 21, 
NV: 12, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/43 Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) 02.12.2011 adopted without vote 
A/RES/66/45 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 02.12.2011 Y: 169, N: 1, A: 11, 
NV: 12, TVM: 193 
A/RES/66/70 Effects of atomic radiation 09.12.2011 adopted without vote 
A/RES/67/3 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 05.11.2012 adopted without vote 
A/RES/67/9 Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
19.11.2012 adopted without vote 
A/RES/67/26 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 03.12.2012 adopted without vote 
A/RES/67/76 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 03.12.2012 Y: 184, N: 1, A: 3, 
NV: 5, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/29 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
03.12.2012 Y: 126, N: 0, A: 57, 
NV: 10, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/64 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 03.12.2012 Y: 129, N: 49, A: 10, 
NV: 5, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/46 Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems 03.12.2012 Y: 164, N: 4, A: 19, 
NV: 6, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/28 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 03.12.2012 adopted without vote 
A/RES/67/33 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
03.12.2012 Y: 135, N: 22, A: 26, 
NV: 10, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/39 High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament 03.12.2012 Y: 179, N: 0, A: 4, 
NV: 10, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/52 Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status 03.12.2012 adopted without vote 
A/RES/67/60 Nuclear disarmament 03.12.2012 Y: 124, N: 44, A: 18, 
NV: 7, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/55 Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 03.12.2012 Y: 179, N: 4, A: 4, 
NV: 6, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/45 Reducing nuclear danger 03.12.2012 Y: 123, N: 48, A: 15, 
NV: 7, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/56 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations 03.12.2012 Y: 147, N: 4, A: 31, 
NV: 11, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/73 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 03.12.2012 Y: 174, N: 6, A: 6, 
NV: 7, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/34 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments 
03.12.2012 Y: 175, N: 6, A: 5, 
NV: 7, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/53 Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or 
Other Nuclear Explosive Devices 
03.12.2012 Y: 166, N: 1, A: 21, 
NV: 5, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/31 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia 03.12.2012 Y: 146, N: 2, A: 35, 
NV: 10, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/59 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 03.12.2012 Y: 174, N: 1, A: 13, 
NV: 5, TVM: 193 
A/RES/67/112 Effects of atomic radiation 18.12.2012 adopted without vote 
A/RES/68/10 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 06.11.2013 adopted without vote 
A/RES/68/25 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 05.12.2013 adopted without vote 
A/RES/68/68 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 05.12.2013 Y: 181, N: 1, A: 3, 
NV: 8, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/28 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
05.12.2013 Y: 127, N: 0, A: 57, 
NV: 9, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/26 Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 
05.12.2013 adopted without vote 
A/RES/68/58 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 05.12.2013 Y: 126, N: 49, A: 9, 
NV: 9, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/27 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 05.12.2013 adopted without vote 
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A/RES/68/35 Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 
2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons 
05.12.2013 Y: 120, N: 53, A: 9, 
NV: 11, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/32 Follow-up to the 2013 High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nu-
clear Disarmament 
05.12.2013 Y: 137, N: 28, A: 20, 
NV: 8, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/42 Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons  
05.12.2013 Y: 133, N: 24, A: 25, 
NV: 11, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/47 Nuclear disarmament 05.12.2013 Y: 122, N: 44, A: 17, 
NV: 10, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/40 Reducing nuclear danger 05.12.2013 Y: 125, N: 50, A: 10, 
NV: 8, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/46 Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations 05.12.2013 Y: 158, N: 4, A: 20, 
NV: 11, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/65 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East 05.12.2013 Y: 169, N: 5, A: 6, 
NV: 13, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/39 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : accelerating the implementation of 
nuclear disarmament commitments 
05.12.2013 Y: 171, N: 7, A: 5, 
NV: 10, TVM: 193 
A/RES/68/49 Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) 05.12.2013 adopted without vote 
A/RES/68/51 United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 05.12.2013 Y: 169, N: 1, A: 14, 
NV: 9, TVM: 193 
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Table 2: SC Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (1945-2013) 
Symbol Title Date Voting Summary345 
S/RES/20(1947) Security Council resolution 20 (1947) [on international control of atomic en-
ergy] 
10.03.1947 Y: 011, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000 , TVM: 011 
S/RES/52(1948) Security Council resolution 52 (1948) [on international control of atomic en-
ergy] 
22.06.1948 Y: 009, N: , A: 002, NV: 
000, TVM: 011 
S/RES/74(1949) Security Council resolution 74 (1949) [on transmission of resolutions on 
atomic energy to the General Assembly] 
16.09.1949 Y: 009, N: 000, A: 002, 
NV: 000, TVM: 011 
S/RES/255(1968) Security Council resolution 255 (1968) [on measures to safeguard non-nu-
clear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons] 
19.06.1968 Y: 010, N: 000, A: 005, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/487(1981) Security Council resolution 487 (1981) [on the Israeli military attack on Iraqi 
nuclear facilities] 
19.06.1981 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000 , 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/707(1991) Security Council resolution 707 (1991) [on Iraqi violation of Security Council 
resolution 687 (1991) with regard to inspection of its biological, chemical and 
nuclear weapons capabilities] 
15.08.1991 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/825(1993) Security Council resolution 825 (1993) [on the decision of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Prolifer-
ation of Nuclear Weapons] 
11.05.1993 Y: 013, N: 000, A: 002, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/984(1995) Security Council resolution 984 (1995) [on security assurances against the use 
of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] 
11.04.1995 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1172(1998) Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) [on nuclear tests conducted by India 
on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998] 
06.06.1998 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1540(2004) Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) [on non-proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons] 
28.04.2004 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1673(2006) Security Council resolution 1673 (2006) [on extension of the mandate of the 
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)] 
27.04.2006 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1695(2006) Security Council resolution 1695 (2006) [on the launching of ballistic missiles 
by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)]  
15.07.2006 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1696(2006) Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) [on suspention by Iran of all enrich-
ment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development]  
31.07.2006 Y: 014, N: 001, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1718(2006) Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) [on imposition of restrictive measures 
on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)] 
14.10.2006 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1737(2006) Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) [on measures against the Islamic Re-
public of Iran in connection with its enrichment-related and reprocessing ac-
tivities, including research and development] 
23.12.2006 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1747(2007) Security Council resolution 1747 (2007) [on further measures against Iran in 
connection with its development of sensitive technologies in support of its nu-
clear and missile programmes] 
24.03.2007 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1762(2007) Security Council resolution 1762 (2007) [on termination of the mandates of 
UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and 
the IAEA’s Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO)] 
29.06.2007 Y: 014, N: 000, A: 001, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1803(2008) Security Council resolution 1803 (2008) [on further measures against Iran in 
connection with its development of sensitive technologies in support of its nu-
clear and missile programmes] 
03.03.2008 Y: 014, N: 000, A: 001, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1810(2008) Security Council resolution 1810 (2008) [on non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and on extension of the mandate of the Security Council 
Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) concerning Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons] 
25.04.2008 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1835(2008) Security Council resolution 1835 (2008) [on Iran’s obligations to comply with 
Security Council’s resolutions and meeting the requirements of the IAEA 
Board of Governors] 
27.09.2008 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1874(2009) Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) [on measures against the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea in connection with its nuclear weapon tests] 
12.06.2009 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1887(2009) Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) [on nuclear non-proliferation and nu-
clear disarmament] 
24.09.2009 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1928(2010) Security Council resolution 1928 (2010) [on extension of the mandate of the 
Panel of Experts on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] 
07.06.2010 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1929(2010) Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) [on measures against the Islamic Re-
public of Iran in connection with its enrichment-related and reprocessing ac-
tivities, including research and development] 
09.06.2010 Y: 012, N: 002, A: 001, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1957(2010) Security Council resolution 1957 (2010) [on termination of the weapons of 
mass destruction, missile, and civil nuclear-related measures imposed by res-
olutions 678 (1991) and 707 (1991)] 
15.12.2010 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1977(2011) Security Council resolution 1977 (2011) [on non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and on extension of the mandate of the Security Council 
Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) concerning Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons until 25 Apr. 
2021] 
20.04.2011 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
                                                     
345 Y=Yes; N=No; A= Abstentions; NV=Non-Voting; Total Voting Membership. 
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S/RES/1984(2011) Security Council resolution 1984 (2011) [on extension of the mandate of the 
Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2009) concerning 
the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 June 2012] 
09.06.2011 Y: 014, N: 000, A: 001, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/1985(2011) Security Council resolution 1985 (2011) [on renewal of the mandate of the UN 
Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 
(2009) concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea until 12 June 
2012] 
10.06.2011 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/2049(2012) Security Council resolution 2049 (2012) [on extension of the mandate of the 
Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010) concerning 
the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 July 2013] 
07.06.2012 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/2050(2012) Security Council resolution 2050 (2012) [on extension of the mandate of the 
Panel of Experts as specified in resolution 1874 (2009) concerning the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea until 12 July 2013] 
12.06.2012 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/2055(2012) Security Council resolution 2055 (2012) [on increase of the size of the Group 
of Experts of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Reso-
lution 1540 (2004) concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and 
Biological Weapons] 
29.06.2012 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/2087(2013) Security Council resolution 2087 (2013) [on condemning the missile launch 
of 12 Dec. 2012 by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] 
22.01.2013 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/2094(2013) Security Council resolution 2094 (2013) [on strengthening sanctions against 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and condemning the missile 
launch of 12 Feb. 2013] 
07.03.2013 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/2105(2013) Security Council resolution 2105 (2013) [on extension of the mandate of the 
Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010) concerning 
the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 July 2014] 
05.06.2013 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/2141(2014) Security Council resolution 2141 (2014) [on extension of the mandate of the 
Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 
(2009) concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea until 5 Apr. 
2015] 
05.03.2014 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
NV: 000, TVM: 015 
S/RES/2159(2014) Security Council resolution 2159 (2014) [on extension of the mandate of the 
Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010) concerning 
the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 July 2015] 
09.06.2014 Y: 015, N: 000, A: 000, 
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Figure 2: Nuclear Fission and Nuclear Fusion 
 
Left: Uranium-235 combines with a neutron to form an unstable intermediate, which 
quickly splits into the radioactive isotopes barium-144 and krypton-89 plus three 
neutrons in the process of nuclear fission. Right: Deuterium and tritium combine by 
nuclear fusion to form helium plus a neutron. In both processes, high amounts of 




Figure 3: World’s Nuclear Warhead Stockpile (1945-2010) 
 
Source: Thomas Rheuters, available at: <http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/in-
dex.php/worlds-nuclear-warhead-stockpile-graphic-day>. 
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Figure 4: Worldwide Nuclear Testing: Atmospheric and Underground 
(1945-2013) 
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Figure 5: GA Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
per year (1945-2013) 
 
Source: own research and diagram. 
 
Figure 6: SC Resolutions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
per year (1945-2013) 
 
Source: own research and diagram. 
